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THE  ESSENTIALS  OF 
AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 


WORKS  OF 
ANDRE   CHERADAME 


THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 
THE  PANGERMAN  PLOT  UNMASKED 
THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 


L'EUROPE    ET   LA   QUESTION    D'AUTRICHE   AU 
SEUIL  DU  XXE  SIECLE  [1901) 

(Czech  and  Russian  translations) 

L'ALLEMAGNE,   LA   FRANCE   ET   LA   QUESTION 
D'AUTRICHE  [1902] 

(An  abridgment  of  the  preceding) 

LA  MACEDOINE,  LE  CHEMIN  DE  FER  DE  BAG- 
DAD [1903] 

LA    COLONISATION    ET    LES    COLONIES    ALLE- 
MANDES  [1905I 

LE  MONDE  ET  LA  GUERRE  RUSSO-JAPONAISE 
[1906] 

LA  CRISE  FRANCAISE  [1912] 

DOUZE  ANS  DE  PROPAGANDE  EN  FAVEUR  DES 
PEUPLES  BALKANIQUES  [1913] 

LA    PAIX    QUE    VOUDRAIT   L'ALLEMAGNE,    1915 

(1915I 

(Pamphlet) 

LE   PLAN    PANGERMANISTE   DEMASQUE    [1916] 
(English,  Portuguese,  Spanish,  Italian,  Russian, 
and  Japanese  translations) 

PAN-GERMANY,  THE  DISEASE  AND  THE  CURE, 
AND    A    PLAN    FOR    THE    ALLIES    [1918] 

LES  BENEFICES  DE   GUERRE  DE  L'ALLEMAGNE 
ET   LA   FORMULE  BOCHE  "  NI    ANNEXIONS, 
NI  INDEMNITES"  |i9l8) 
(Pamphlet) 


THE  ESSENTIALS  OF 
AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 


BY 

ANDRE  CHERADAME 

AUTHOU   OF   "the   PANGEBMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED* 


WITH   MAPS 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 

1918 


COPTRIGHT,  1918,  BY 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 


Published  December,  191S 


PI 


■^ 


^ 


PREFACE 

A  considerable  number  of  the  Allies  believe 
that  the  conclusion  of  the  armistice  with  Ger- 
many on  November  10th,  1918,  signified  that 
all  was  over,  that  we  were  assured  of  abso- 
lute victory,  and  that  the  general  demobiliza- 
tion could  be  immediately  begun. 

As  this  is  an  erronous  belief,  it  constitutes 
a  source  of  immense  danger. 

The  object  of  this  book  is  to  show  this 
danger  in  the  strongest  light,  and  to  convince 
public  opinion  that  it  is  urgently  necessary  to 
guard  against  it  without  delay.  I  shall  show 
that  our  victory  may  be  very  seriously  com- 
promised during  the  armistice  preceding 
peace. 

Many  of  my  readers  may  possibly  be  sur- 
prised by  this  statement,  especially  those 
who  as  yet  know  nothing  of  me;  and  for  this 
reason  I  must  first  explain  why  I  am  partic- 
ularly entitled  to  be  heard  by  the  general 
public  at  this  crucial  moment  of  the  world's 
history. 

During   a   period    of    twenty   years   before 


vi  PREFACE 

1914,  I  devoted  all  my  time  and  all  my  means 
to  the  defense  of  peace.  In  order  to  avoid 
entirely  the  horrors  of  this  war,  I  had  care- 
fully studied  the  conditions  which  would  cause 
it  with  the  view  of  showing  how  it  could  best 
be  prevented. 

Events  have  shown  that  the  measures  I  ad- 
vanced in  my  books,  published  from  1901  to 
1914,  to  prevent  the  German  aggression,  were 
right.  If,  therefore,  these  measures  had  been 
followed,  this  horrible  war  would  never  have 
taken  place,  and  millions  of  men  would  still 
be  living.  These  things  justify  me  in  thinking 
that  I  can  give  some  information  that  will 
be  especially  useful  to  prevent  a  recurrence  of 
the  war. 

There  are  other  reasons  why  confidence 
may  be  accorded  me: 

The  two  maps  given  on  pages  viii  and  ix 
demonstrate  that  already  in  1901  I  had  clearly 
explained  in  what  the  Pangerman  plan  con- 
sisted, exactly  as  it  was  realized  sixteen  years 
later,  in  1917. 

In  191  ^2,  I  declared  that  the  European  war 
would  begin  by  an  attack  on  Serbia  (see  La 
Defense  Nationale,  November  30th,  1912),  that 
the  ricrnian  offensive  against  France  which 
would   follow    would    be    "terrific    in   its    na- 


PREFACE  vii 

ture,"  and    "pushed  to  the  verge  of  frenzy" 
(see  La  Crise  frangaisc,  page  507). 

As  the  result  of  four  months'  investigation 
in  the  Balkans  at  the  beginning  of  1914,  I 
published  in  the  Paris  Correspondant  (June, 
1914)  indications  which  showed  that  the  gov- 
ernment of  Vienna  "was  about  to  set  off  an 
explosion  which  should  destroy  the  state  of 
things  beginning  to  take  shape  in  the  Bal- 
kans." In  August,  1914,  I  pointed  out  that 
Bulgaria  would  declare  war  against  the  Allies 
as  soon  as  they  met  with  a  military  defeat, 
which  came  to  pass  after  the  affair  in  the 
Dardanelles. 

In  my  book,  The  Pangerman  Plot  Unmasked, 
published  at  the  beginning  of  1916  (see  page 
73),  I  denounced  in  advance  the  series  of  Ger- 
man pacifist  manoeuvres,  including  the  one 
now  in  progress — the  armistice  trick,  based 
on  the  evacuation  of  Belgium  and  France, 
to  be  followed  by  a  negotiated  peace  which 
finally,  in  spite  of  first  appearances,  would 
result  in  a  German  victory. 

This  peril  still  exists  in  a  much  greater  de- 
gree than  is  believed,  but  we  can  completely 
avert  it  if  the  Allies  take  advantage  of  the 
tremendous  effect  produced  by  the  defeat  of 
Bulgaria    and    the    revolt    of    the    oppressed 


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PREFACE 


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PREFACE 


IX 


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X  PREFACE 

peoples  in  Austria-Hungary,  who  have  opened 
to  the  Alhes  a  free,  triumphal  road  from  Bel- 
grade or  Fiume  to  northern  Bohemia;  that 
is,  to  a  point  only  250  kilometres  south  of 
Berlin.  These  events,  which  in  the  single 
month  of  October,  1918,  completely  trans- 
formed the  general  situation  of  the  Alhes, 
grew  out  of  the  application  of  a  political 
strategy  on  the  principles  and  methods  of 
which  I  have  not  ceased  to  point  out  from 
the  beginning  of  the  war.  See  V Illustration, 
January  2d,  1915;  "How  to  Destroy  Panger- 
many,"  Atlantic  Monthly,  December,  1917; 
Pangermany,  the  Disease  and  Cure,  and  a  Plan 
for  the  Allies.  On  page  211  of  this  book,  pub- 
hshed  by  the  Atlantic  Monthly  early  in  1918, 
will  be  found  a  formula  summarizing  the  con- 
ditions of  victory,  which,  as  events  have  since 
shown,  were  amply  carried  out  by  the  Allies 
in  September-October,  1918. 

On  page  212  of  the  same  book,  I  said  once 
more:  "In  reality  it  is  enough  that  the  Austro- 
German  communications  should  be  seriously 
disturbed  for  the  situation  to  become,  with 
extraordinary  swiftness,  very  difficult  both 
morally  and  materially  for  the  armies  con- 
centrated on  the  western  front  by  the  Ger- 
man Stall." 


PREFACE  xi 

I  said  at  the  end  of  this  book:  "If  we  en- 
courage the  Slavs,  we  shall  inevitably  bring 
about  an  internal  explosion  in  Pangermany, 
and  before  the  close  of  1918  complete  victory 
will  be  ours." 

A  long  series  of  events  sustain  my  predic- 
tions. Not  that  I  am  at  all  a  prophet;  I  am 
only  what  may  be  called  a  good  mechanic- 
engineer  who  has  studied  the  very  complicated 
European  machine  long  and  deeply,  and,  as  is 
only  natural  under  such  circumstances,  I  can 
see  much  farther  into  the  future  than  those 
who  have  not  undergone  the  same  special 
training. 

The  service  which  I  may  now  be  able  to 
render  lies  in  pointing  out  to  the  general  public 
the  great  dangers  of  the  period  of  armistice, 
and  the  way  to  avert  them. 


We  must  first  understand  that  the  armistice 
signed  by  Germany  is  not  identical  with  an 
unconditional  surrender.  This  agreement  gives 
strong  guarantees  to  the  Allies,  no  doubt,  but 
none  the  less  it  limits  their  action,  as  they 
are  not  allowed  to  occupy  the  whole  territory 
of  Germany.  The  German  army  is  not  de- 
mobilized, it  is  simply  to  withdraw  beyond  a 


xii  PREFACE 

definite  zone,  and  a  portion  of  its  material 
is  still  in  its  possession. 

The  armistice  is  therefore  an  agreement 
which  assumes,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  Ger- 
mans will  keep  their  word,  and,  on  the  other, 
that  the  Allies  wull  know  how  to  draw  the 
most  advantages  from  the  securities  which 
have  been  given  them. 

The  application  of  the  principle  of  repara- 
tion for  damage  caused  is  in  particular  re- 
markably elastic.  It  may  be  applied  in  a  way 
so  inadequate  that — as  I  shall  show  later  on — 
the  final  result  would  be  that  France  would 
in  reality  completely  lose  the  war — a  result 
which  would  have  as  its  consequence  the  de- 
feat of  all  the  Allies. 

The  armistice  is,  then,  a  convention,  that  is, 
a  paper,  worth  just  as  much  as  its  applica- 
tion; and  while  the  armistice  is  in  force  the 
Germans  and  those  who  take  their  part  in 
the  different  Allied  countries  will  surely  at- 
tempt— 

1st.  To  increase  the  enormous  lessening  of 
morale  which  the  conclusion  of  the  armistice 
has  brought  about  among  the  Allied  troops 
by  making  tliem  think  that  there  can  be  imme- 
diate demobilization. 

2d.  To  modify  the  conditions  of  the  armi- 
stice or  to  secure  their  incomplete  execution. 


PREFACE  xiii 

3d.  To  stir  up  rivalries  which  may  naturally 
exist  between  the  greater  Allies  and  between 
the  peoples  to  be  set  free  by  the  Entente  in 
central  and  eastern  Europe,  but  which  have 
hitherto  been  held  in  check  by  the  restraints 
of  the  war. 

4th.  By  means  of  this  situation  to  reach 
a  negotiated  peace. 

5th.  To  obtain  much  more  favorable  con- 
ditions of  peace,  on  the  plea  that  the  Ger- 
mans are  now  republicans. 

When  one  is  familiar  with  the  persistency 
and  power  of  German  propaganda  it  is  clear 
that  if  these  modes  of  action  are  systematically 
applied  for  several  months,  at  the  peace  the 
Allied  victory  will  be  shorn  of  much  of  its 
greatness. 

I  state  below  certain  things  which  have 
taken  place  or  became  known  in  the  space 
of  only  seventy-two  hours  before  or  after  the 
signature  of  the  armistice  by  Germany, 
November  10th,  1918. 

The  Evening  Post  of  November  11th  an- 
nounces that  the  delegates  from  the  Central 
Powers  will  have  preparatory  conferences  with 
the  envoys  of  the  Allies.  A  negotiated  peace 
in  conformity  with  Boche  ideas  is,  then,  in 
preparation,  which  is  contrary  to  the  wish 
of    the    immense    majority    of    the    American 


xiv  PREFACE 

public,  which  has  clearly  pronounced  in  favor 
of  a  dictated  peace. 

In  New  York,  on  the  10th  of  November, 
4,000  sociahsts  held  a  meeting  at  the  Star 
Casino  to  protest  against  the  occupation  of 
German  fortresses  by  the  Allies  {New  York 
Tribune,  November  11th,  1918). 

Even  before  the  armistice  had  been  signed, 
on  November  8th,  Lord  Robert  Cecil,  British 
Under-Secretary  of  State,  said:  "A  genuine 
democratic  German  government  assuredly 
would  be  accorded  better  peace  terms." 

On  November  11th,  Doctor  Solf,  German 
Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  begs  President 
Wilson  to  persuade  the  Allies  to  "mitigate 
the  fearful  conditions  of  the  armistice." 

However  this  may  be,  if  these  facts  and 
this  information  can  be  known  in  three  days, 
what  will  be  the  effect  of  events  of  the  same 
sort  which  cannot  fail  to  increase  from  now 
to  the  conclusion  of  peace  .'^  It  is  certain  that 
these  results  would  have  the  effect  of  making 
the  victory  of  the  Allies  "evaporate"  to  a  con- 
siderable extent. 

This  will  be  better  understood  if  we  analyze 
the  constituents  of  victory,  understanding 
clearly  what  "virtual"  victory  means,  and 
what  are  the  conditions  to  transform  it  into 
"real"  victory. 


PREFACE  XV 

The  reason  which  decided  Germany  to  sign 
the  armistice  Hes  in  the  fact  that  the  Alhes, 
having  "virtuall}""  mastered  the  right  to 
pass  through  Austria-Hungary,  could  attack 
Germany  on  the  south.  Under  these  condi- 
tions, being  no  longer  able  to  prevent  a  mili- 
tary defeat  on  her  own  soil,  Germany  had 
no  interest  in  the  continuance  of  the  struggle. 
It  is  therefore  a  "virtual"  threat  of  the  Allies 
that  has  brought  about  for  them  a  victory 
which,  before  the  realization  of  the  armistice 
and  of  the  conditions  of  peace,  is  also  in  a 
virtual  state. 

The  greater  number  of  the  Allies  believe 
that  the  armistice  signed  by  Germany,  being 
a  written  acknowledgment  of  defeat  accepted 
in  her  name,  constitutes  victory  for  the  Allies; 
but  this  is  not  true.  The  armistice  in  itself 
is  only  one  of  the  probabilities  of  victory, 
since  it  is  worth  no  more  than  the  application 
which  is  made  of  its  terms  and  the  force  which 
the  Allies  can  derive  from  this  application 
in  imposing  conditions  of  peace  which  assure 
them  a  truly  lasting  and  curative  victory. 
It  is  of  cardinal  importance  to  remember  that 
after  four  years  of  an  extremely  complex 
struggle,  which  has  overturned  Europe  in  a 
manner  unprecedented  in  historj',  real  victory 
ivill  not  result  from  the  signature  of  a  document. 


xvi  PREFACE 

or  even  from  the  recovery  of  territory  once  lost, 
like  Alsace-Lorraine  for  France,  but  from  a  differ- 
ence in  the  whole  situation  of  the  victor  by  com- 
parison with  that  of  the  vanquished. 

Two  contestants  enter  a  contest,  each  with 
100;  when  accounts  are  settled  one  is  found 
to  have  60,  the  other  80;  the  latter  is  clearly 
the  winner.  But  what  may  possibly  give  rise 
to  serious  and  even  fatal  mistakes  is  the  fact 
that  the  difference  in  the  final  state  of  the 
two  antagonists  in  this  war,  resulting  from 
the  sum  of  various  factors  and  from  accounts 
long  and  very  difficult  to  draw  up,  will  show 
themselves  only  when  months  or  even  years 
have  elapsed  after  the  conclusion  of  peace. 

This  is  the  reason  why  it  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  insure  ourselves  against  any  risk  of 
error,  by  means  of  the  most  extreme  caution 
in  strictly  applying  the  conditions  of  the  armi- 
stice, and  in  definitely  imposing  conditions 
of  peace  which  have  been  studied  out  with 
the  greatest  technical  care. 


As  an  illustration,  let  us  take  the  example 
of  France  to  show  the  imperative  nature  of 
these  necessities.  The  permanent  character 
of   the   victory   of   France   is   unquestionably 


PREFACE  xvii 

the  very  condition  of  the  real  and  definitive 
victory  of  the  AUies.  It  is  certain,  for  instance, 
that  if,  twenty  years  after  the  conclusion  of 
peace,  France  should  succumb  as  a  result  of 
the  remote  consequences  of  the  war,  Germany 
would  rule  Europe.  It  would  thus  be  shown 
that  the  Allies  would  have  been  completely 
deceived  in  declaring,  as  many  of  them  are 
doing  at  this  moment,  that  they  were  certain 
of  having  brought  off  a  final  victory. 

France,  being  the  pivot  of  the  coalition  which 
has  just  imposed  conditions  for  an  armistice 
on  Germany,  is  consequently  victorious;  but 
for  the  present  only  in  the  virtual  and  con- 
ditional sense,  even  after  the  occupation  of 
Alsace-Lorraine.  Undoubtedly,  it  is  in  many 
respects  a  great  advantage  for  France  to  re- 
gain her  lost  provinces.  But,  in  the  first  place, 
France  is  only  doing  this  after  she  has  been 
deprived  of  them  for  forty-seven  years,  and, 
secondly,  the  advantage  resulting  from  this 
restoration  will  only  be  a  real  one  for  France 
if  the  'peace  conditions  are  such  that  she  can 
keep  Alsace-Lorraine  permanently. 

On  the  signature  of  the  armistice  securing 
to  France  the  occupation  of  the  lost  provinces 
France  has  not  the  certainty  of  being  able 
to   keep   them   permanently,   because   of   the 


xviii  PREFACE 

conditions  brought  about  by  the  war,  first, 
in  their  population,  and,  secondly,  in  their 
finances,  conditions  which  at  the  moment  of  the 
signature  of  the  armistice,  in  spite  of  appear- 
ances, put  France  in  a  clearly  unfavorable 
situation  with  respect  to  Germany. 

Everything  is  a  question  of  comparison. 
The  Americans  are  100  millions,  and  their 
war  losses  (about  55,000  dead  and  180,000 
wounded)  are  very  rightly  felt  by  them. 
But  the  harm  done  by  the  war  to  the  French 
people  assumes  proportions  infinitely  more  con- 
siderable. 

It  is  a  tremendous  fact  which  should  be  kept 
in  mind  by  all  those  who  wish  to  guarantee  the 
immediate  future  of  Europe  and  of  peace  that 
France  has  lost  more  men  than  Germany,  not 
only  in  proportion  to  the  population  of  the 
two  countries  but  actually  in  absolute  figures. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Germany  with  its  68,- 
000,000  inhabitants  in  1914  has  had  1,580,000 
killed,  while  France  with  its  scarcely  40,000,000 
inhabitants  has  a  total  of  dead  which  has  not 
been  officially  published  at  the  moment  of  this 
writing  but  which  those  who  are  semi-officially 
informed  know  to  be  greater  than  the  figures 
of  German  deaths  just  given. 

Besides,   not    to    speak   of   the   numberless 


PREFACE  xix 

wounded  who  may  recover  sooner  or  later, 
France  has  about  one  miUion  cripples  and  in- 
valids, and  one  million  and  a  half  coming  out 
of  the  war  with  serious  and  permanent  forms 
of  illness;  say,  4  millions  of  the  physically  and 
morally  best  men  of  France  destroyed  or  re- 
duced to  the  most  serious  incapacity.  (If,  in 
proportion  to  its  population,  the  United  States 
had  had  losses  on  the  same  scale  as  those  of 
France,  these  losses  would  be  about  10  millions 
of  Americans). 

This  is  not  all.  At  least  2  millions  of  French 
civilians  have  endured  the  Boche  yoke  for 
the  space  of  four  years,  and  the  health  of  great 
numbers  among  them  has  been  broken  down 
by  what  they  have  undergone.  Thousands 
of  women  and  girls  have  been  forced  to  bear 
the  worst  ineffaceable  stain. 

The  evil  effects  of  the  war  on  the  popula- 
tion of  France  will  be  still  more  aggravated 
by  the  fact  that  the  French  birth-rate  is  a 
third  less  than  that  of  Germany.  It  is,  there- 
fore, certain  that  Germany  will  repair  her 
losses  in  men  much  more  quickly  than  France. 

This  situation  of  the  French  population  is  so 
serious  that  it  will  make  real  and  definitive  vic- 
tory for  France  impossible,  unless  the  conditions 
of  peace  imposed  by  the  Allies  shall  bring  about 


XX  PREFACE 

in  Europe  such  a  condition  that  Germany  shall 
not  be  able  to  profit  by  her  superiority  in  num- 
bers by  renewing  her  attacks  on  France. 

Let  us  now  take  up  the  economic  inferiority 
in  which  France  finds  herself  with  respect  to 
Germany  at  the  moment  of  the  signature  of 
the  armistice. 

War  expenses  have  been  very  much  heavier 
for  France  than  for  Germany.  A  French  shell 
made  with  English  coal  and  American  steel 
is,  of  course,  very  much  dearer  than  a  German 
shell  made  with  metal  stolen  from  Briey  and 
coal  seized  from  the  Belgians;  and  this  is  true 
not  only  of  nearly  all  materials  of  war  but 
also  food,  when  we  compare  the  expenses  of 
the  two  countries  during  the  war. 

The  richest  provinces  of  France  have  been 
devastated;  they  cannot  be  restored  under 
a  very  long  time,  even  if  Germany  pays  the 
expenses.  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  is  in- 
tact, therefore  in  an  infinitely  more  advan- 
tageous position  to  resume  her  activities  after 
the  peace. 

Any  reparation  for  direct  damage  done  which 
Germany  makes  to  France,  can  only  at  the 
best  put  tilings  back  as  they  were  before 
the  war.  But  it  must  be  distinctly  under- 
stood  that  this  reparation  for  direct  damage 


PREFACE  xxi 

leaves  still  existing  the  indirect  damage  which 
has  been  inflicted  upon  the  whole  of  France 
by  the  war — indirect  damage  which  is  almost 
never  spoken  of,  and  which  in  the  material 
field  is  infinitely  greater  than  the  direct  damage 
done  to  the  invaded  French  departments.  This 
indirect  material  damage  consists  in  the  costs 
of  the  war  to  France — so  great  that  only  to 
pay  the  interest  on  the  loans  made  and  the 
pensions  to  the  widows,  orphans,  and  wounded, 
the  taxes  paid  by  the  French,  which  were  1  bil- 
lion of  dollars  before  the  war,  will  be  increased 
in  a  nearly  permanent  form  to  almost  3  billions 
of  dollars.  Thus,  in  spite  of  the  optimistic  as- 
sertions which  I  sometimes  hear,  I  claim  that 
in  a  country  of  which  the  population  has  been 
so  thoroughly  decimated  as  that  of  France, 
it  would  be  practically  impossible  to  make 
the  people  pay  each  year  for  a  length  of  time 
three  times  as  much  in  taxes  as  before  the  war. 
The  word  "reparation"  only  having  been 
generally  understood  hitherto  as  applying  to 
direct  damages,  we  have  as  a  result  that,  owing 
to  the  fact  of  the  indirect  material  damages 
which  the  war  has  caused  France,  she  finds 
herself  at  the  time  of  signing  the  armistice 
under  a  financial  burden  considerably  heavier 
than  that  of  Germany. 


xxii  PREFACE 

These  things  lead  us  to  the  inevitable  con- 
clusion that  when  the  armistice  was  signed 
the  losses  of  all  kinds  produced  by  the  war 
were  considerably  greater  for  France,  and  it 
is  therefore  perfectly  fair  to  say  that  the  con- 
clusion of  the  armistice  only  assures  a  virtual 
victory  to  France.  In  fact,  if  the  conditions 
of  peace  to  be  imposed  on  Germany  do  not 
radically  abolish  in  some  way  the  difference 
in  mutual  situation  between  France  and  Ger- 
many when  the  armistice  was  concluded,  as 
far  as  actual  losses  of  men  and  money  are  con- 
cerned, the  superiority  in  the  mutual  position 
which  will  finally  decide  the  real  victory  of 
France  over  Germany  cannot  be  realized. 
In  this  case,  in  a  very  few  years  after  the  con- 
clusion of  peace,  France,  to  the  surprise  of 
all  the  world,  would  appear  in  a  condition  of 
real  and  irremediable  defeat,  after  having 
been  in  a  condition  of  virtual  victory  at  the 
moment  of  the  signature  of  the  armistice. 
It  is,  therefore,  plain  that  this  signature  and 
even  the  occupation  of  Alsace-Lorraine  are 
by  no  means  sufficient  to  secure  the  real  and 
definitive  victory  to  France.  This  can  only  be 
settled  long  after  the  conclusion  of  peace, 
provided  first  that  the  terms  of  the  armistice 
arc  thoroughly  applied,  and  afterward  that 
the  conditions  of  peace,  carefully  considered 


PREFACE  xxiii 

in  the  interest  of  Europe  and  the  whole  world, 
assure  to  France  material  reparation  exten- 
sive enough  to  compensate  for  the  immense 
disadvantage  from  the  point  of  view  of  in- 
debtedness and  the  state  of  population,  as 
explained  above,  at  which  she  stands  with 
regard  to  Germany  at  the  present  time. 


The  whole  German  pacifist  manoeuvre  since 
the  conclusion  of  the  armistice  has  precisely 
in  view  the  prevention  of  France  and  her  Allies 
from  accomplishing  those  results  which  are 
the  conditions  of  real  victory.  This  Boche 
manoeuvre  in  its  essence  consists  in  this:  To 
profit  by  the  words  "republic"  and  "socialism," 
so  that  the  Boche  Social  Democrats,  who  are 
nearly  all  tainted  with  the  Pan-Germanist  spirit 
and  have  vigorously  supported  the  Kaiser  for 
four  years,  may  bring  about  by  their  connec- 
tion with  the  pacifist  Socialists  of  the  Allied 
countries,  who  know  nothing  of  Germany  and 
easily  allow  themselves  to  be  taken  in  by 
phrases,  that  peace  shall  be  negotiated  with 
the  greatest  possible  speed  and  concluded  with 
the  approval  of  the  "Internationale."  The 
success  of  this  manoeuvre  will  secure  for  Ger- 
many the  following  results: 

1st.  Peace  will  be  concluded  very  quickly 


xxiv  PREFACE 

before  an  exliaustive  study  by  the  Allies  of 
the  vast  and  difficult  problems  which  the  war 
has  presented. 

2d.  The  responsibihty  for  the  war  being 
concentrated  on  Kaiserism,  the  German  people 
for  the  sake  of  repubhcan  fraternity  will  only 
be  forced  to  repair  a  small  part  of  the  damage 
they  have  caused. 

These  two  results  will  of  themselves  be  suf- 
ficient to  save  Germany  from  defeat  to-day, 
and  to  assure  her  of  victory  to-morrow,  for 
they  will  leave  the  following  consequences 
when  but  a  few  years  have  passed: 

The  peace  being  merely  a  patched-up  one, 
the  anti-Pan-Germanist  Slavic  states,  Bohemia, 
Jugo-Slavia,  Roumania  and  Poland,  will  not 
be  securely  organized.  The  Germans  will  keep 
on  with  their  intrigues  among  them  all  the 
more  easily  because  they  will  have  remained 
practically  the  masters  of  Russia,  deprived  of 
its  middle  class  destroyed  by  the  Bolshevists. 

France  having  to  support  the  burden  of 
the  enormous  excess  of  its  war  expenses  in 
comparison  with  Germany  would  succumb 
financially.  The  French  birth-rate,  lower  than 
that  of  Germany,  and  the  French  losses  in  men, 
greater  than  those  of  Germany,  would  each 
year  after  the  war  increase  the  relative  weak- 


PREFACE  XXV 

ness  of  France.  Thus  a  state  of  things  would 
be  brought  about  which  would  enable  the 
German  people  to  accomplish  that  of  which 
Maximilian  Harden  warned  us  nearly  three 
years  ago  when  he  said: 

"If  it  is  felt  in  France  that  peace  can  be 
possible  only  through  the  restoration  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  and  if  we  are  forced  to  sign  such  a 
peace,  the  70  millions  of  Germans  will  soon 
destroy  it."  (See  the  Temps,  February  9th, 
1916). 

On  the  day  when  this  attack  is  brought  about 
by  the  conditions  just  explained,  France — which 
has  saved  the  world  by  giving  England  time 
to  arm  herself  and  the  United  States  time  to 
become  convinced  of  the  Pan-Germanist  peril 
— will  go  down  irretrievably  in  the  midst  of 
her  glory. 

This  is  the  result  that  the  Germans  are  seek- 
ing, and  that  the  Allies  of  France,  morally 
and  materially  united,  ought  to  prevent  at 
any  price.  What  I  have  said  shows  that  we 
are  of  present  really  in  this  curious  position: 
we  may  have  to-day  the  appearance  of  victory 
and  to-morrow  the  reality  of  defeat.  To  avoid 
the  danger,  however,  it  is  enough  to  see  the 
Boche  manoeuvre  clearly  and  not  allow  our- 
selves to  be  misled  by  ideologists. 


xxvi  PREFACE 

It  would  be  a  terrible  mistake  to  believe 
that  a  German  republic  will  abandon  all  war- 
like ideas  and  wishes  for  revenge.  Very  prob- 
ably a  German  republic  would  be  extremely 
military,  particularly  if  the  Allies  were  so 
foolish  as  not  to  deprive  the  Germans  of  the 
means  to  rebuild  their  forces;  and  in  any  case 
no  precaution  can  be  too  great  to  avoid  a  repeti- 
tion of  the  war.  I  have  explained  in  detail 
in  this  book  (see  page  70  and  following)  that 
one  of  the  surest  ways  to  prevent  another 
war  for  the  possession  of  Alsace-Lorraine  would 
be  to  create  in  central  Europe  a  barrier  of 
free  states,  strongly  anti-German,  and  as  this 
would  restrain  Germany  from  fresh  outbreaks 
in  any  direction,  it  should  be  brought  about 
in  the  interest  of  the  entire  world. 


The  essential  object  of  the  peace  conference 
is  to  assure  the  reparation  by  the  German 
people  of  the  damages  they  have  caused  and 
to  reconstruct  Europe,  but  this  reconstruction, 
to  be  durable,  must  be  well  done.  In  order 
that  the  new  European  machine  which  is  to 
be  built  up  from  the  parts  of  Pangermany 
should  work  smoothly  under  normal  con- 
ditions, it  should  be  very  thoroughly  put  in 


PREFACE  xxvii 

order  by  skilled  mechanics,  which  is  as  much 
as  to  say  that  the  rehabilitation  of  Europe 
demands  the  right  solution  of  very  numerous 
and  difficult  problems  which  require  precise 
information  on  ethnography,  national  psy- 
chology, and  practical  political  economy.  Such 
information  was  certainly  not  possessed  by 
many  leaders  in  the  Entente  when  the  armi- 
stice was  signed.    The  proof  is  this: 

It  was  only  at  the  end  of  the  fourth  year 
of  the  war  that  the  Entente  understood  the 
importance  to  the  world  of  the  Czecho-Slovak 
people,  which  for  twenty-five  years  at  least 
the  Germans  had  considered  as  one  of  the 
greatest  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  Pangerman 
plan.  It  is  only  at  the  end  of  1918  that 
Czecho-Slovaks  were  recognized  by  the  Allies 
as  an  independent  people. 

When  the  armistice  was  concluded  the 
Roumanians  and  the  Jugo-Slavs  had  not  yet 
been  recognized  by  the  Entente  with  any- 
thing like  the  same  formality  as  in  the  case 
of  the  Czecho-Slovaks,  though  the  creation 
of  Greater  Roumania  and  of  a  strong  Jugo- 
slav state  is  just  as  necessary  to  the  founda- 
tion of  peace  as  the  independence  of  Bohemia. 
I  will  not  speak  of  a  crowd  of  other  questions 
raised  by  the  war,  particularly  those  relating 


xxviii  PREFACE 

to  finance,  which  are  of  immense  importance, 
and  have  only  been  touched  by  the  AUies  in 
the  most  superficial  way.  Thus,  the  vital 
fact  that  the  indirect  damages  made  by  Ger- 
man aggression  in  France  are  far  larger  than 
the  direct  damages^  and  like  them  call  for 
reparation,  has  not  yet  been  clearly  brought 
out. 

It  is  under  such  circumstances  that  as  I 
write  these  lines  there  is  talk  of  an  extremely 
early  meeting  of  the  peace  conference,  with 
the  aim  of  deciding  all  these  questions  on  which 
for  many  years  the  fate  of  nations  will  de- 
pend. 

I  hold  it  as  my  solemn  duty,  in  no  way  to 
be  set  aside,  to  declare  openly  that  if  the  peace 
congress  meets  without  taking  the  time  needed 
to  obtain  in  Central  Europe  informations  which 
are  now  still  lacking,  fatal  mistakes  will  inevi- 
tably result,  and  causes  sure  to  provoke  future 
conflicts  will  remain,  which  will  soon  bring  forth 
their  evil  fruit. 

One  cannot  all  at  once  "patch  up"  a  peace 
and  reconstitute  Europe  on  a  firm  basis;  the 
thing  cannot  be  done. 

If  the  Germans  are  making  the  greatest 
effort  to  bring  the  peace  conference  together 
at  the  earliest  possible  moment  it  is  because 


PREFACE  xxix 

they  are  well  aware  that  the  Allies  lack  in- 
formation, and  hope  to  gain  great  advantage 
thereby. 

Public  opinion  would  do  well  to  protest  at 
once  against  the  hasty  conclusion  of  the  peace 
conference.  The  Allied  people  have  spent  their 
blood  and  their  gold  like  water,  and  it  is  their 
right  and  their  duty  to  insist  that  the  fruit 
of  so  many  sacrifices  shall  not  be  spoiled  by 
unnecessary  haste. 


In  order  to  show  the  absolute  need  of  avoid- 
ing a  precipitate  decision,  I  have  in  this  book 
taken  examples  drawn  from  the  war,  chosen 
in  such  a  way  as  also  to  enlighten  my  readers 
on  the  great  events  which  have  just  passed 
with  such  extraordinary  rapidity  that  their 
vast  import  is  not  easy  to  grasp. 

Chapter  I  reminds  us  how  the  Germans 
must  have  constantly  deceived  us,  from  the 
beginning  of  the  war;  for  instance,  by  making 
us  think  that  they  were  starving  long  before 
this  famine  had  become  a  reality,  which  hap- 
pened in  September-October,  1918,  when  re- 
volts in  Austria-Hungary  and  the  Allied  occu- 
pation of  the  Danube  cut  communications 
between  Germany  and  the  East. 


XXX  PREFACE 

This  general  survey  of  German  methods  of 
deceit  shows  us  with  what  distrust  we  ought 
to  receive  their  promises  and  transformations 
during  the  armistice.  Aheady,  it  is  easy  to 
detect  that  these  transformations  are  to  a  great 
extent  camouflage. 

In  Chapter  II,  I  show  under  what  terribly 
dangerous  conditions  the  Germans  made  ready 
for  the  armistice  trick,  which  would  have  per- 
haps succeeded  if  the  great  success  of  the  Allies 
in  the  Balkans,  and  the  insurrection  of  op- 
pressed peoples  in  Austria-Hungary,  had  not — 
in  October,  1918 — abruptly  changed  the  gen- 
eral situation  in  favor  of  the  Allies. 

Chapter  III  makes  clear  that  it  was  not 
owing  to  diplomatic  discussions  but  to  mili- 
tary actions  and  Slavic  insurrections  in  Sep- 
tember-October, 1918  (the  downfall  of  Bul- 
garia and  of  Austria-Hungary),  which  drove 
Germany  to  conclude  an  armistice  on  terms 
dictated  by  the  Allies. 

Chapter  III  also  shows  that  on  the  solution 
in  favor  of  the  Allies  of  the  effectives  problem 
depended  the  events  of  October,  1918,  in  central 
Europe,  for  up  to  that  time  the  superiority 
in  man-power  was  on  the  side  of  Pangermany. 
The    same    chapter    contains    an    exhaustive 


PREFACE  xxxi 

description  of  the  errors,  which  in  my  opinion 
are  made  by  the  Alhes,  even  at  the  present 
moment,  as  to  German  man-power.  The 
deduction  is  that  if  the  AUies  can  really  be 
wrong  on  a  subject  vitally  important,  it  is 
certain  that  they  lack  indispensable  informa- 
tion as  to  numbers  of  other  questions,  on  the 
proper  answers  to  which  depends  a  firm  and 
enduring  peace. 

In  the  same  chapter,  I  have  studied  the 
sources  of  military  effectives  which  could  pos- 
sibly be  utilized  in  Russia  by  the  German 
Republicans  ( ! )  coquetting  with  the  Russian 
Bolshevists.  This  shows  that  the  Allies  should 
cut  Germany  entirely  off  from  Russia  by  a 
series  of  states  organized  as  strongly  as  pos- 
sible: Poland,  Bohemia,  a  democratic  Magyar 
state.  Greater  Roumania,  and  Jugo-Slavia. 

Chapter  IV  describes  the  centres  of  imperial- 
ism which  led  to  the  formation  and  establish- 
ment of  Pangermany,  and  shows  with  what 
care  and  in  what  manner  the  Allies  should 
destroy  these  hotbeds  to  avert  any  renewal 
of  the  war. 

Finally,  the  Conclusions  present  conditions 
on  the  observance  of  which  public  opinion 
should   insist   in   order   to   guard   against   the 


xxxii  PREFACE 

dangers  of  the  armistice  period,  and  thus  ar- 
rive at  a  well-founded  peace,  at  an  enduring 
and  complete  victory. 

New  Yobk,  November  25,  1918. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PBBTACa  


CHAPTER  L 
How  ntx  Gebmaks  Dkceivx  Alued  Pubuc  Orac- 

lOM 

I.  The  danger  of  a  complacent  optimism,  and  of  the 
poisoning  of  Allied  public  opinion  through 
biassed  news  coming  from  neutral  nations,  but 
of  Boche  origin. 

n.  The  results  of  a  systematic  poisoning  of  Allied 
opinion  by  the  Germans,  and  the  consequent 
danger. 

ni.    The  German  high  command  directs  pacifist  of- 
fensives started  from  Berlin. 


CHAPTER  n. 
How  THK  Germans,  if  Thet  Secure  as  Aruibtick, 

COUVT  UPON  CaRRTING  OFF  THE  ViCTORT  AS  A  CON- 
SEQUENCE OF  THE  Economic  Condition  Created  in 
Europe  bt  Four  Years  of  War  -        -        -        -         51 

I.    Germany's  war  profits  form  the  chief  basis  of  the 
pacifist  manoeuvres. 


xxxiv  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

n.  The  fact  that  the  circulation  of  paper  currency 
in  Germany  is  largely  measured  by  the  produce 
of  her  gigantic  thefts,  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  of  the  Allies  depends  on  their  complete  vic- 
tory, constitutes  the  second  base  of  German 
schemes. 

in.  Hi  circumstances  make  it  feasible,  the  Alsace-Lor- 
raine trick  will  be  tried  in  order  to  enter"  on  the 
practical  realization  of  German  plans  by  divid- 
ing the  Allies,  and  leading  France  to  "peace 
talk"  before  a  complete  victory. 

rV.  Why  the  Germans  believe  that,  if  the  Allies  are  led 
into  "peace  talk"  before  achieving  a  full  grasp 
of  the  European  situation  which  assures  their 
victory,  their  financial  ruin  will  ensue.  This 
without  more  great  battles  would  be  enough  to 
bring  about  the  final  success  of  Germany. 


CHAPTER  m. 


PAoa 


Pangermant's  Probable  Miutary  Strength,  and 
Its  Weakness  at  the  Outset  of  the  Fifth  Year 
OF  War     -        -        - -      88 

I.    The  annual  military  contingent  of  Germany. 

n.     Approximate  strength  of  German  mobilized  forces 
in  August,  1918. 

in.     Critical  discussion  of  the  figures  .found  to  represent 
the  man-pKJwer  of  Germany. 

rV.    The  probable  total  forces  of  Pangermany  in  Au- 
gust, 1918. 

V.     How  new  sources  of  effectives  could  have  been 
used  to  offset  the  American  numbers,  if  the  Al- ' 
lies  had  not  acted  in  the  Balkans  and  time  had 
been  left  to  the  Germans. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xxxv 

VI.  How  it  is  the  successes  of  the  Allies  in  the  Balkans 
that  secure  the  superiority  in  man-power  to  the 
Entente. 

VII.  The  teachings  of  the  recent  past  and  of  the 
present  prove  the  immense  power  of  political 
strategy,  and  that  for  the  Allies  the  Danube- 
Central  Europe  front  exerts  a  decisive  influence 
on  the  issue  of  the  war. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

PAOB 

Why   the  Allies   of   Germany   Have   Thought   It 
Was  to  Their  Interest  to  Act  With  Her  -        -    181 

I.    Why  Turkey  went  with  Germany. 

n.    The  advantages  which  the  Bulgarians  thought  to 
gain  by  siding  with  Berlin. 

in.  Reasons  for  which  Austria-Hungary  is  unavoid- 
ably an  indispensable  base  for  Pangerman  im- 
perialism. 

IV.  The  five  centres  of  imperialism  must  be  de- 
stroyed. 


Conclusions 217 


MAPS  AND  FACSIMILES 


WAam 


Ce  que  serait  rAllemagne  agrandie  de  I'Autriche  (fac- 
simile of  a  map  published  in  1901)          .        .        -  viii 

Pan-Germany  at  the  end  of  1917-        -         -        -         -  ix 

Map  of  the  war  or  Pan-Germania,  August,  1918     -  14,  15 

German  offensive  and  counter  offensive  of  the  Allies, 

April.  1918,  to  August  6,  1918          ...        -  29 

Alsace-Lorraine  and  Central  Pan-Germany     -        -        -  75 

Facsimiles  of  pamphlet  published  in  1914        -        -     116,  117 

New  sources  of  possible  effectives  for  the  Germans  -        -  164 

The  great  nationalities  in  Turkey 189 

The  encroachments  of  the  planned  Bulgarian  hegemony 

upon  the  neighboring  states 194 

The  three  parts  of  Austria-Hungary        .        .        -        -  802 

The  nationalities  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina          .        -        -  204 

The  nationalities  in  Austria    ------  206 

The  nationalities  in  Hungary 207 

The  five  centres  of  Imperialism  in  Pan-Germany   -        -  216 

The  Europe  of  the  Peace 234 


CHAPTER  I. 

HOW   THE   GERMANS   DECEIVE    ALLIED    PUBLIC 
OPINION. 

I.     The   danger   of   a   complacent   optimism,   and   of   the 

poisoning   of   Allied   public   opinion   through   biassed 

news  coming   from  neutral    nations,    but  of   Boche 

origin. 

n.    The  results  of  a  systematic  poisoning  of  Allied  opinion 

by  the  Germans,  and  the  consequent  danger. 
in.    The  German  high  command  directs  pacifist  offensives 
started  from  Berlin. 

It  is  my  conviction  that  Allied  public 
opinion  is  constantly  manipulated  by  the 
Germans,  who  thus  shape  it  in  a  manner 
favorable  to  their  plans.  I  know  that  this 
statement  will  seem  surprising;  it  is  never- 
theless true,  as  I  hope  to  show. 

I. 

Few  are  aware  of  a  fact  of  tremendous  im- 
portance: from  the  outset  of  the  war,  the 
government  of  Berlin  has  exerted  a  constant 
pressure  on  the  Allies  in  Europe  through  a 
part  of  their  own  press.  The  fact  that  the 
war  was  a  surprise  to  the  Allies  proves  that 
they  had  previously  no  direct  and  trustworthy 


2  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

information  as  to  the  Central  Powers  and  the 
Balkans.  In  the  course  of  the  war,  the  same 
lack  of  information  has  been  amply  proved 
by  the  Entente's  mistakes  in  policy,  mistakes 
now  understood  and  bitterly  regretted.  On 
the  other  hand,  for  the  first  three  years  of  the 
struggle  many  in  France  and  England  allowed 
themselves  to  be  complacently  optimistic. 
Numbers  of  good  people,  seeing  the  huge  En- 
tente coalition,  felt  sure  of  a  speedy  triumph. 
Naturally  this  systematic  optimism  caused 
many  among  the  Alhes  to  accept  any  favor- 
able reports  as  true.  The  Germans  with  their 
usual  cleverness  have  employed  a  very  simple 
method  to  turn  these  circumstances  to  their 
own  advantage.  In  neutral  papers,  partic- 
ularly those  of  Switzerland  and  Holland,  they 
constantly  pubhshed  and  continue  to  publish 
short  extracts  from  German  newspapers,  or 
despatches,  ten  or  fifteen  hues  long,  as  to  the 
state  of  affairs  in  the  German  Empire,  and 
from  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  Entente 
newspapers  of  Europe  have  made  use  of  these 
extracts  and  statements  to  supply  the  lack 
of  exact  information  about  the  enemy.  The 
greater  part  of  the  news  from  Turkey,  Bul- 
garia, Austria-Hungary,  before  their  collapse, 
and  Germany  appearing  in  Allied  papers  has 


HOW  THE  GERMANS  DECEIVE  3 

been  dated  from  Zurich,  Berae,  or  Amster- 
dam. The  German  Government  has  kept  its 
own  press,  as  well  as  that  of  the  Allies,  under 
the  strictest  observation,  and  every  stranger 
passing  through  Pangerman  territory  has  been 
closely  watched;  how,  then,  was  it  possible 
that  information  from  such  sources  could  be 
true?  I  have  made  a  study  for  twenty-five 
years  of  the  states  which  have  made  up  Pan- 
germany,  and  being  thus  in  a  position  to  judge 
of  the  worth  of  these  reports,  I  can  state 
positively  that,  during  the  first  four  years  of 
the  war,  eight  out  of  ten  of  these  items  were 
false,  and  made  in  Berlin. 

This  biassed  information  has  been  arranged 
with  great  ingenuity;  it  has  taken  a  variety  of 
forms,  and  contained  just  enough  falsehood  to 
be  useful  to  the  Boche  cause.  Allied  news- 
papers and  correspondents  in  Switzerland  and 
Holland  were  frequently  taken  in,  and  reprinted 
this  so-called  information.  The  great  number 
of  these  reprints  caused  the  danger,  which  has 
been  most  serious,  for  since  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  Germany  has  succeeded  in  using  them  at 
any  given  moment  to  foster  the  state  of  mind 
among  the  Allies  necessary  to  the  success  of 
any  serious  military  operation.    For  example: 

No  one  now  doubts  that  the  junction  with 


4  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

Turkey  and  Bulgaria  was  of  vital  importance 
to  Germany.  Austria-Germany  must  have 
yielded  long  ago  without  the  help  of  the 
Bulgar-Turks  and  their  eastern  resources.  It 
was  therefore  necessary  to  crush  Serbia  at  any 
cost,  as  a  condition  of  this  eastern  alliance. 

From  the  early  part  of  1915,  the  psycholog- 
ical foundations  for  this  enterprise  were  laid 
by  means  of  the  German  papers,  all  docilely 
following  instructions  from  the  General  Staff 
in  Berlin,  and  dwelling  on  the  idea  that  "the 
decision  must  come  on  the  west  front,  which 
is  all-important,  and  where  alone  we  must 
look  for  it." 

Many  organs  of  the  western  Allies,  being 
converted  to  this  theory  of  the  principal  front, 
which,  in  fact,  allowed  Germany  to  take  pos- 
session of  three-fourths  of  Europe,  have  found 
in  these  Boche  statements  arguments  in  sup- 
port of  their  ideas,  and  have  reprinted  them 
with  a  readiness  which  must  have  been  de- 
lightful to  Berlin,  for  at  this  time  the  General 
Staff  dreaded  above  everything  to  see  the 
Anglo-French  send  even  150,000  men  to  the 
Danube.  These  with  the  350,000  Serbians 
and  700,000  Roumanians,  would  have  made 
up  a  force  of  1,200,000  men,  amply  sufficient 
to  have  kept  Austria-Germany   from   seizing 


HOW  THE  GERMANS  DECEIVE  5 

the  granary  of  the  east,  to  keep  open  through 
Roumania  communication  with  the  Russians, 
who  were  still  in  Austria,  in  eastern  Galicia, 
and  to  prevent  the  entrance  of  Bulgaria  and 
Turkey  into  the  war,  the  Balkan  campaigns 
having  stripped  them  of  munitions. 

In  addition  the  government  of  Constan- 
tinople as  soon  as  it  saw  itself  deprived  of  the 
possibility  of  German  help,  by  the  estabhsh- 
ment  of  a  firm  Allied  front  on  the  Danube, 
would  have  been  shortly  forced  to  reopen  the 
Turkish  straits. 

The  interest  of  the  Germans  in  the  destruc- 
tion of  Serbia  was  therefore  absolutely  vital. 
Their  propaganda  having  helped  to  prevent 
France  and  England  from  understanding  the 
extraordinary  importance  of  the  Danube  front 
at  the  beginning  of  1915,  in  October  of  that 
year,  they  began  the  invasion. 

At  that  time,  most  men  at  the  head  of  west- 
ern affairs  thought  the  east  could  have  no 
decisive  influence  on  the  fate  of  the  war. 
There  was,  nevertheless,  a  party  in  France 
which  wished  to  send  a  strong  expedition  from 
Salonika  to  the  help  of  Serbia,  with  the  ob- 
ject of  sharply  opposing  the  junction  of  Ger- 
many and  the  east.  At  the  end  of  1915,  it 
was,  therefore,  much  to  the  interest  of  Berlin 


6  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

to  persuade  the  Franco-English  that  there 
was  nothing  to  be  gained  by  reinforcing  Ser- 
bia. As  a  part  of  Allied  opinion  was  opposed 
to  the  Balkan  expedition,  this  was  pressed 
into  the  service  of  the  German  plans  by  means 
of  a  great  number  of  despatches  which  ap- 
peared in  the  Dutch  and  Swiss  papers,  copied 
in  a  simple-minded  way  by  the  French  and 
EngHsh  press.  These  despatches  stated  that 
railroad  communications  were  already  re- 
opened between  Hungary  and  Bulgaria,  via 
Serbia.  A  comparison  of  the  date  of  these 
first  despatches  as  they  appeared  in  the  En- 
tente press  with  the  truth  afterward  pubHshed, 
as  to  the  re-estabhshment  of  normal  communi- 
cation by  rail  between  the  Central  Empires 
and  Bulgaria  shows  a  diflference  of  about  six 
weeks.  Now  these  reports,  though  nominally 
from  neutral  sources,  came  really  from  Ger- 
many, and  as  they  anticipated  events  they 
resulted  in  encouraging  those  in  France  and 
England  who  opposed  the  Salonika  expedition. 
Their  argument  had  a  specious  appearance  of 
truthfulness.  They  said:  "Let  us  not  strip 
our  most  important  front,  for  it  is  too  late; 
we  have  lost  our  chance  in  the  Balkans;  rail- 
road communications  are  already  reopened 
between  Hungary  and  Bulgaria.**     This  was 


HOW  THE  GERMANS  DECEIVE  7 

enough  to  satisfy  Berlin,  and  this  one  false 
idea  disseminated  by  German  propaganda  had 
incalculable  consequences,  and  for  a  long  time 
sufficed  to  turn  the  current  of  the  war  into 
channels  desired  by  Germany. 

If  the  numerous  despatches  from  Boche 
sources  had  not  misled  Franco-English  opin- 
ion, and  if  Serbia  had  been  promptly  rein- 
forced at  the  end  of  1915  when  Roumania 
could  have  come  in  with  great  effect  while 
Russia  was  still  fighting  bravely,  and  the  Slavs 
and  Latins  of  Austria-Hungary  were  ready  for 
revolt,  the  known  facts  show  that  the  Anglo- 
French  could  have  saved  the  Balkan  situation 
to  a  great  extent,  and  could  have  prevented 
the  economic  and  mihtary  reorganization  of 
Turkey  and  Bulgaria  by  the  Germans.  With- 
out this  eastern  alliance,  Austria-Germany 
would  long  since  have  become  unable  to  hold 
out  against  the  coalition  as  is  proved  by  the 
terrible  blow  given  to  Austria-Germany  by  the 
Allied  victory  over  Bulgaria.  These  consid- 
erations bring  home  to  us  the  deep  injury  done 
to  the  Allied  cause  by  the  newspaper  propa- 
ganda  of  biassed  news. 

Many  similar  instances  could  be  cited;  in 
fact,  each  important  German  campaign  has 
been  aided  by  this  inspired  information  coming 


8  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

through  Holland  and  Switzerland,  which  is 
then  reprinted  by  a  part  of  the  AUied  Euro- 
pean papers  with  a  credulity  hard  to  under- 
stand. 

This  has  happened  so  often  that  I  believe 
there  is  a  department  in  the  General  Staff  at 
Berlin  which  might  be  called  "Bureau  for  the 
manufacture  of  blunders  to  be  made  by  the 
Allies."  In  this  bureau  are  elaborated  biassed 
news  despatches  which,  when  finished,  are 
sent  out  through  the  neutral  press. 

To  show  how  far  it  is  possible  to  go  in  this 
direction  with  the  Allied  newspapers  in  Eu- 
rope, this  Berlin  office  feels  its  way  by  pub- 
lishing news  as  absurd  as  it  is  false.  Thus, 
about  two  years  ago  almost  the  whole  Allied 
European  press  copied  a  neutral  despatch 
asserting  that  William  II  was  dying  of  cancer. 
Recently  many  of  our  papers  have  informed 
us  that  Hindenburg  had  died  of  an  apoplectic 
attack  brought  on  by  a  violent  quarrel  with 
the  Emperor;  this  also  purported  to  be  a  neu- 
tral rumor.  If  news  of  this  caliber  is  believed 
one  can  understand  how  ready  are  many  AlHed 
papers  to  reprint  less  sensational  reports,  but 
some  of  these  are  even  more  dangerous;  as 
witness  the  repeated  rumors  which  have  led 
the  Allies  to  believe  that  overtures  for  a  sepa- 


HOW  THE  GERMANS  DECEIVE  9 

rate  peace  had  come  from  Austria-Hungary, 
Bulgaria,  or  Turkey,  or  that  a  coolness  had 
arisen  between  these  countries  and  BerHn. 
The  facts  have  proved,  however,  that  only 
Bulgaria  has  tried  seriously  to  negotiate  sepa- 
rately, and  even  this  only  recently. 

In  fact,  the  Germans  hoodwinked  the  Allies 
just  as  at  a  Spanish  bull-fight  the  matador 
distracts  the  attention  of  the  bull  so  as  to  take 
him  at  a  disadvantage.  The  bull  is  ten  times 
as  strong  as  the  man,  and  can  soon  make  an 
end  of  him  by  a  direct  charge.  But,  as  we 
know,  red  is  particularly  obnoxious  to  the 
bull,  and  that  is  why  the  matador  flourishes 
a  short  red  cloak.  The  enraged  animal  can 
see  nothing  else,  and  as  he  makes  his  furious 
charge  his  enemy's  long  sword  is  plunged  into 
his  withers. 

The  Germans  play  this  identical  game  with 
the  Allies.  They  know  that  our  united 
strength  is  greater  than  theirs,  and  that  they 
would  be  quickly  beaten  if  we  hit  them  in 
the  right  place.  To  avoid  this  they  distract 
our  attention  from  the  weak  points  of  Pan- 
germany  by  misleading  despatches,  which  af- 
fect us  as  the  matador's  red  cloak  acts  on 
the  bull. 

Our    complacent    optimism    inclines    us    to 


10  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

believe  this  manufactured  German  news;  our 
minds  have  been  perverted  by  it,  so  that  we  see 
things  as  we  wish  and  not  as  they  are.  This 
explains  how,  only  a  few  weeks  after  the  war 
began,  the  Allied  pubhc  in  Europe  firmly  be- 
heved  that  the  shortage  of  foodstuffs  in  Ger- 
many would  soon  cause  her  to  yield,  that  sup- 
phes  for  her  munitions  were  lacking,  that  the 
Sociahsts  would  force  a  peace  on  the  Berlin 
government,  that  their  reserves  were  nearly 
exhausted,  that  each  German  offensive  was 
the  last,  the  sign  of  the  desperation  of  a  people 
longing  for  peace,  etc. 

Now,  after  four  years,  results  have  shown 
the  emptiness  of  these  conclusions,  but  as 
they  have  constantly  been  repeated  for  so 
long  a  time,  in  spite  of  themselves  the  Allies 
think  about  Germany  much  as  Berhn  would 
have  them,  and  this  on  many  important  points. 
This  state  of  mind  favors  the  unprecedented 
efforts  that  the  Germans  make  to  secure  an 
armistice  before  Germany  itself  should  be 
completely  invaded. 

Of  course,  it  is  pleasant  to  find  news  in  the 
paper  which  leads  one  to  think  that  the  war 
will  soon  be  over;  but  war  is  not  a  pleasant 
thing;  it  is  a  grim  necessity,  which  must  be 
ended  as  soon  as  possible  by  a  decisive  vie- 


HOW  THE  GERMANS  DECEIVE  11 

tory.  Pleasant  tidings  when  they  are  untrue 
greatly  prolong  the  war,  and  cause  the  death 
of  great  numbers  of  brave  men;  this  encour- 
aging information,  when  inexact,  may  have  the 
most  sinister  consequences. 

It  is  largely  because  much  of  our  Alhed 
press  has  imbibed  false  news,  that  the  Entente 
with  its  large  forces  and  resources  of  all  kinds 
has  not  brought  them  to  bear  where  they  would 
have  won  a  decision  in  the  quickest  and  easiest 
way.  For  this  reason,  we  are  confronted  with 
the  remarkable  fact  that  there  are  68  millions 
of  Germans,  50  millions  subjects  of  Austria- 
Hungary  (inadequately  prepared  from  the 
military  standpoint,  and  of  whom  28  millions 
at  least  are  thoroughly  anti-German),  5  mil- 
lions of  Bulgarians,  and  20  millions  of  Turks 
lacking  proper  armament  on  account  of  the 
Balkan  Wars,  and  of  whom  at  least  14  millions 
wished  to  keep  out  of  this  struggle — altogether 
a  total  of  143  million  inhabitants  of  the  Central 
Empires,  who  have  been  able  for  four  years  to 
conquer  or  withstand  370  millions  of  Allies 
(France  has  40  millions,  England  46  millions, 
Italy  36  millions,  Serbia  5,  Roumania  8,  Japan 
53,  and  Russia  182  millions).  (These  figures 
do  not  include  the  large  colonies,  which  have 
rendered  such  valuable  assistance  to  the  AlKes.) 


12  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

This  situation  has  made  indispensable  the  entry 
of  100  miUions  of  Americans  into  the  war. 


II. 

The  systematic  dissemination  of  biassed 
news  among  the  AUies  combines  with  the  in- 
fluence of  the  pacifists  and  Bolchevist  groups 
that  exist  in  all  the  Entente  countries  who 
play  the  German  game — unintentionally  per- 
haps, but  that  matters  little.  A  considerable 
part  of  Allied  public  opinion  is  so  poisoned  and 
distorted  by  this  double  influence  that  it  forms 
wrong  views  on  essential  points,  on  points 
where  a  right  understanding  is  vitally  neces- 
sary. For  example,  the  action  especially  of 
England  and  America  as  to  the  war  was  de- 
cided by  their  indignation  at  Germany's  viola- 
tion of  the  treaties  guaranteeing  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium,  and  of  international  laws  as  to 
marine  warfare.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that 
when  Germany  cynically  broke  her  word,  it 
so  shocked  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States 
that  they  were  convinced  of  the  necessity  of 
the  great  sacrifices  of  men  and  money  de- 
manded of  them. 

Since  these  great  countries  entered  the  war, 
Germany  has  broken  every  law,  human  and 


HOW  THE  GERMANS  DECEIVE  13 

divine,  in  a  way  never  before  known  in  history. 
She  tortures  prisoners,  kills  the  wounded,  and 
torpedoes  hospital-ships;  her  soldiers  resort 
to  the  most  treacherous  tricks;  the  German 
authorities  sent  to  Bucharest  tubes  filled  with 
bacilli  to  spread  infectious  diseases.  In  the 
countries  they  occupy,  they  have  killed  thou- 
sands of  civilians,  including  women  and  chil- 
dren. They  stirred  up  the  Turks  to  murder 
more  than  a  million  of  Armenians,  and  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  of  Greeks.  On  the  very 
morrow  of  its  signature,  the  government  of 
Berlin  had  violated  the  treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk, 
which  it  had  itself  dictated.  It  is  clear  now, 
therefore,  that  no  right-thinking  man  can  ever 
again  trust  in  the  German  word.  It  would 
indeed  be  insane  to  do  so.  In  spite  of  these 
self-evident  facts,  corroborated  by  common 
sense  and  the  war  map,  there  is  actually  a 
large  number  of  people  among  the  Allies  wil- 
ling to  accept  the  idea  of  a  negotiated  peace, 
which  would  put  an  end  to  hostilities  by  a 
treaty  in  which  Germany  would  pledge  her- 
self to  restitution  and  future  good  conduct. 
The  war  into  which  many  of  the  Allies  were 
led  by  their  horror  at  the  German  violation 
of  a  "scrap  of  paper"  would  thus,  in  spite  of 
their  unheard-of  sacrifices  in  men  and  money. 


14 


AN  ENDURING  ^^CTORY 


HOW  THE   GERMANS  DECEIVE 


15 


^^"n^;/:-/)  map  of  the  war 

"^grad  OR  PAN  G ER.M AN lA, AUGUST  1918 

Bank'  fronts 

VaMal  vtatM  of  Ccrmany  cmtcd  from  former  Ruulan  Hrrltory 


^  -  --=^    Allied  lefTllory  occupied  by  Cermaoy 
^™^^^^^-  ,  j-_---__—_ ^    Slavic.  Latin,  and  Semitic  people*  held  In  oppreielon  fa  the  lerrl- 

'9/ii^^^^  (f        tt'l  t  t  •    'I    tor;  of  the  Central  Powen 

JiC'>iy    .  .O  -  —  —  ■  Hamburg-Penian  CuU  Railway 

I         A 


(       EGYPT 


16  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

be  ended  for  these  same  Allies  by  another 
"scrap  of  paper"!  If  those  among  the  Allies 
who  admit  this  eventuality  showed  similar 
signs  of  mental  aberration  in  their  private  af- 
fairs, would  they  not  soon  be  put  in  a  lunatic 
asylum  ? 

But  there  are  other  reasons  which  show 
yet  more  strongly  how  little  the  real  bases  of 
victory  and  lasting  peace  are  understood  in 
Entente  countries,  even  among  the  most  en- 
lightened. A  great  proportion  of  the  Allies 
think  the  war  will  end  by  a  peace  conference 
around  the  green  table,  between  our  represen- 
tatives and  those  of  the  Central  Powers.  A 
glance  at  the  war  map  (see  Pangermany  in 
August,  1918,  page  14)  will  prove  that  this 
is  practically  impossible.  The  choice  is  clear. 
If  the  Allies  open  negotiations  with  Germany 
without  having  destroyed  competely  her  grip 
on  Central  Europe — the  key  of  the  world — 
which  implies  the  dismemberment  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  the  German  hegemony  will  con- 
tinue; their  position  will  be  so  weak  that  these 
negotiations  can  only  end,  as  did  the  pseudo- 
negotiations  at  Brcst-Litovsk,  in  complete  de- 
ception followed  by  the  most  irremediable  of 
catastrophes.  But  if  the  Allies,  after  having 
materially    destroyed    the    German    hold    on 


HOW  THE  GERMANS  DECEIVE  17 

Central  Europe — which  is  quite  possible  if, 
thanks  to  extended  air  transport,  they  supply 
the  necessary  means  of  action  to  the  oppressed 
peoples  of  that  region — Czecho-Slovaks,  Jugo- 
slavs, and  Roumanians  and  in  reinforcing  with 
them  the  Allied  army  of  the  Balkans — if  they 
are  willing  after  such  frightful  sacrifices  to 
discuss  peace  on  equal  terms  with  Germany  in 
a  conference,  instead  of  purely  and  simply 
dictating  their  just  conditions  as  victorious 
soldiers,  conscious  of  the  right,  it  will  then  be 
clear  that  the  Allies  are  completely  ignorant 
of  German  psychology,  and  a  peace  will  be 
made  which  will  allow  Prussian  militarism  to 
continue  to  exist,  and  later  to  begin  it  all  over 
again. 

Under  the  influence  of  constant  Boche- 
inspired  though  pretended-neutral  despatches, 
many  among  us  think  that  Germany  is  ruined 
by  the  war;  but  the  truth  is  that  she  is  run- 
ning over  with  wealth  of  every  kind  stolen 
from  three-fourths  of  Europe,  as  I  shall  show 
in  Chapter  II. 

This  German  news  has  also  convinced  large 
numbers  that  the  Teutons  can  be  starved  into 
submission,  but  such  is  not  the  fact. 

Everything  is  comparative  in  war.  From 
the  standpoint  of  food-supply,  we  need  only 


18  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

ask  if  conditions  in  the  Central  Empires  were 
better  or  worse  than  with  us.  Let  us  look 
into  the  situation  as  it  was  up  to  October, 
1918,  that  is  up  to  the  collapse  of  Bulgaria. 
The  German  people,  undoubtedly,  suffered  a 
serious  lack  in  foodstuffs,  but  much  of  this 
suffering  came  from  the  severe  but  far-sighted 
prudence  of  the  Prussian  administration,  which 
imposed  strict  regulations  in  order  to  hold  out 
longer  against  the  Allies.  The  German  dif- 
ficulties were  less  in  production  than  in  trans- 
portation, owing  to  the  lack  of  means  of 
communication  between  Germany  and  the 
East.  These  difficulties  of  transport,  how- 
ever, diminished  with  time  by  the  construc- 
tion of  new  lines  of  railroad,  which  were  being 
rapidly  built,  especially  since  Germany  con- 
trolled the  whole  course  of  the  Danube, 
which  running  from  southern  Germany  to  the 
Black  Sea,  north  of  the  Roumanian  Dobrudja, 
furnished  easy  transport  for  Serbia,  Bulgaria, 
Roumania,  and  the  vast  regions  belonging  to 
Turkey  and  Russia,  bordering  on  the  Black 
Sea.  For  these  reasons,  though  Germans  may 
have  suffered  sharply  from  insufficient  food, 
they  could  not  be  starved  out.  There  was 
no  famine  in  the  Central  Empires  except  in 
Slav  or  Latin  districts,  where  Teutonic  cruelty 


HOW  THE  GERIVIANS  DECEIVE  19 

used  this  hideous  method  to  slowly  destroy 
a  hated  people.  It  was  stated  that  Germany 
was  more  in  need  of  food  than  the  Allies,  but 
how  could  this  be?  When  you  study  the  war 
map  (page  14),  you  realize  that  England, 
France,  and  Italy  were  forced  to  supply  them- 
selves from  Australia  and  America  at  ruin- 
ously high  rates,  owing  to  the  increased  freight 
charges  due  to  submarine  warfare. 

On  the  other  hand,  Germany  had  easy  access 
to  all  the  granaries  of  Europe;  Hungary, 
Roumania,  the  Balkans,  Asia  Minor,  southern 
Russia  were  all  free  to  her,  and  she  could  plun- 
der them  as  she  pleased.  She  stole  everything 
she  needed,  over  immense  territories.  She  has 
50  millions  of  slaves.  Allied  subjects,  who  raise 
her  crops  without  wages,  and  Christian  pop- 
ulations in  Turkey  were  forced  to  intensive 
cultivation  for  her  in  Asia  Minor.  Even  be- 
hind the  German  lines  in  the  west  the  unlucky 
Belgians  and  French,  with  their  beasts  of  bur- 
den, work  for  the  Teutons.  They  even  had 
to  keep  a  strict  account  of  the  eggs,  most  of 
which  were  reserved  for  the  Germans.  All  over 
the  wide  Pangermanist  territory  production 
was  carefully  supervised.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, how  could  Germany  be  starved  into 
peace  before  France,  England,  or  Italy  .'^    But 


20  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

if  the  Allies  wish  it,  J  amine  can  become  a  reality 
in  Austria-Germany.  Now  that  the  Allies  are 
masters  of  the  Danube,  the  revictualling  of 
Austria-Germany  is  at  once  imperilled. 

The  aim  of  Berlin's  biassed  news  has  been  to 
conceal  the  great  extent  of  the  German  gains 
in  the  east,  and  to  concentrate  the  attention 
of  the  Allies  on  the  western  front,  so  that 
they  may  not  view  the  European  situation 
as  a  whole.  This  aim  has  been  easily  reached, 
especially  since  the  Allies  lost  their  hold  on 
the  east,  enabling  Germany  to  bring  all  her 
available  force  to  bear  on  the  western  front, 
where  by  force  of  circumstances  all  large  mili- 
tary operations  are  now  taking  place.  As  we 
now  no  longer  had  the  entire  European  war 
map  in  view  (page  14)  a  large  section  of  Allied 
pubHc  opinion  was  apt  to  give  undue  impor- 
tance to  actions  in  the  west,  though  these 
could  not  bring  about  a  final  decision  and  real 
and  complete  victory,  while  the  surrender  of 
Bulgaria  has  proved  by  its  consequences  the 
immense  importance  of  the  Balkan  effort. 

I  will  cite,  by  way  of  illustration,  the  effect 
on  the  Allied  public  of  the  loss  and  recapture 
of  a  part  of  the  salient  between  Rheims  and 
Soissons. 

On  the  27th  of  May,  1918,  as  a  result  of 


HOW  THE  GERMANS  DECEIVE  21 

the  surprise  at  the  Chemin-des-Dames,  the 
Teutons  succeeded  in  forming  a  good-sized 
sahent  between  these  points,  A  week  later, 
they  advanced  to  Chateau-Thierry;  less  than 
80  kilometres  from  Paris,  which  was  there- 
fore threatened  with  severe  bombardment  in 
case  of  further  advance.  However,  since  the 
15th  of  July,  General  Foch  has  so  ably  handled 
his  forces  that,  assisted  by  American  reinforce- 
ments, they  regained  up  to  the  30th  of  July  a 
part  of  the  salient,  showing  a  dash  and  courage 
beyond  all  praise.  Laying  aside  other  great 
Entente  successes  which  have  since  occurred, 
I  select  the  30th  of  July  for  my  illustration. 
The  Germans  were  then  forced  to  retire  from 
Chateau-Thierry  to  Fere-en-Tardenois,  a  dis- 
tance of  about  20  kilometres.  What  did  a 
part  of  the  Allied  press  at  once  say?  It  de- 
clared that  Germany  had  suffered  a  decisive 
defeat,  which  would  open  the  eyes  of  her 
people,  and  deal  a  terrible  blow  at  Prussian 
militarism,  etc.  Observe  that  this  sort  of  thing 
was  encouraged  even  on  the  30th  of  July  by 
the  Boches,  who  have  a  deep  interest  in  making 
the  Allies  count  on  victory  before  it  is  within 
their  grasp.  It  is  easy  to  see  why,  for  Germany 
wants  to  "discuss"  peace  terms  while  she 
holds  firmly  to  the  territory  she  has  occupied, 


22  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

and  means  to  keep.  She  has,  therefore,  the 
strongest  reasons  to  wish  to  persuade  the  Alhes 
that  their  successes  are  great  enough  to  justify 
peace  talk. 

The  London  Daily  Express,  followed  by  sev- 
eral other  Allied  papers,  published  a  despatch 
dated  Geneva,  July  30th,  1918: 

"La  Suisse  states  that  a  high  neutral  oflScial, 
who  has  just  arrived  at  Basle  from  Berlin, 
declares  that  in  spite  of  all  German  precau- 
tions to  hide  the  defeat  in  the  west,  the  truth 
has  penetrated  among  the  masses. 

"Such  great  moral  depression  has  not  been 
seen  before  during  the  war,  which  it  is  now 
considered  is  lost  whenever  Foch  chooses  his 
hour  to  strike.  .  .  . 

"The  German  losses  during  the  last  three 
months  reach  nearly  a  million.  The  losses  in 
the  last  two  offensives  amounted  to  350,000 
and  these  have  completely  disorganized  the 
plans  of  the  high  command." 

Let  us  consider  these  despatches  and  com- 
ments coming  from  this  mysterious  neutral, 
but  one  so  well  informed  that  on  the  30th  of 
July  he  knew  the  exact  amount  of  the  Ger- 
man losses  for  some  weeks  previously,  though 
the  Berlin  General  Staff  is  not  usually  very 
communicative  on  such  points. 


HOW  THE  GERMANS  DECEIVE  23 

Let  us  examine  what  had  taken  place  when 
this  despatch  was  dated,  without  considering 
the  great  retirements  of  the  Germans,  which 
have  taken  place  since,  yielding  to  military- 
pressure  and,  perhaps,  also  because  of  the 
political  strategy  spoken  of  in  Chapter  II. 
As  I  desire  especially  to  emphasize,  I  am 
simply  proposing  by  choosing  a  precise  and 
limited  example  to  show  the  necessity,  if  the 
Allies  would  arrive  at  a  true  victory,  of  under- 
standing the  importance  of  military  events  by 
distinguishing  carefully  between  their  local 
significance  and  the  influence  which  they  may 
have  upon  the  European  war-field  considered 
as  a  whole,  which  is  quite  a  different  thing. 

Can  it  be  denied  that  the  operations  en- 
gaged in  by  the  Allies  south  of  the  Soissons- 
Rheims  salient  after  July  15,  were  chiefly  in- 
tended to  cover  Paris,  and  prevent  a  bom- 
bardment? This  local  object  was  completely 
attained  on  the  30th.  The  operation  was  skil- 
fully conducted  by  General  Foch,  and  all  the 
Allies  did  wonders,  including  the  American 
"boys,"  who  proved  themselves  extraordinarily 
fine,  working  well  with  the  other  troops,  while 
their  spirit  and  freshness  were  of  incalculable 
service  in  putting  new  life  into  soldiers,  who 
had  stood  the  strain  of  four  years  of  terrible 


24  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

struggle.  The  success  of  the  operation  was 
due  mainly  to  these  American  reinforcements, 
and  it  is  the  plain  truth  to  say  that  America 
saved  Paris,  the  heart  of  France,  of  which 
the  Germans  thought  themselves  sure.  They 
also  believed  they  were  about  to  end  the  war 
by  a  brilliant  and  decisive  victory.  The  de- 
feat inflicted  by  the  Allies  has  crushed  this 
hope.  The  vast  majority  of  Germans  wished 
to  ruin  France  completely,  and  it  is  certain 
that  it  was  with  disappointed  rage  that  they 
accepted  their  defeat  and  deception,  and  found 
themselves  obliged  to  continue  the  war  with 
modified  plans. 

Our  successes  dating  from  July  30th  were  a 
great  encouragement,  and  we  were  fully  en- 
titled to  our  joy  in  them;  they  were  still  in- 
creasing and  showed  much  improvement  in  the 
conduct  of  the  war.  The  unity  of  command 
with  the  help  from  America  have  proved  their 
value  and  given  rise  to  the  highest  hopes  which 
have  since  been  entirely  justified.  Such  events 
naturally  make  us  optimistic,  and  optimism  is 
necessary  to  victory,  and  should  be  cultivated 
whenever  it  is  justified  by  facts  resting  upon 
a  solid  basis. 

This  appears  to  be  a  fair  estimate  of  our 
recapture  of  part  of  the  Soissons-Rheims  sa- 


HOW  THE  GERMANS  DECEIVE  25 

lient  on  July  30th,  viewed  from  the  local  stand- 
point. But  in  order  to  show  how  overcon- 
jBdence  can  imperil  the  real  victory  of  the 
Allies,  and  to  demonstrate  the  biassed  char- 
acter of  the  news  from  the  Swiss  source  quoted 
above,  let  us  see  how  the  situation  on  July 
30th,  1918,  eliminating,  I  repeat,  all  subse- 
quent events,  could  affect  the  evolution  of  the 
war,  considered  in  its  whole  European  aspect. 
The  whole  military  situation  on  the  30th 
of  July  is  seen  at  a  glance  on  the  map  (page 
14).  Germany  was  mistress  of  three-fourths 
of  Europe,  in  control  of  large  sections  of  Rus- 
sia and  Asia  Minor,  while  the  Allies,  pent  up 
in  the  west,  could  only  feed  themselves  through 
maritime  communications,  lengthy  and  dif- 
ficult in  the  extreme.  At  Chateau-Thierry, 
the  Germans  were  80  kilometres  from  Paris, 
and  when  they  fell  back  20  kilometres  on 
July  30th,  they  were  still  only  100  kilometres 
from  the  heart  of  France.  Our  mysterious 
neutral  assures  us  that  German  opinion  inter- 
preted this  retreat  as  implying  the  loss  of  the 
war  to  Germany.  I  am  convinced  that  such 
an  opinion,  voluntarily  accepted  at  this  date 
by  many  of  the  Allies,  would  be  highly  prej- 
udicial to  a  real  and  complete  victory  by  pro- 
ducing dangerous  delusions.     I  think  I  know 


26  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

the  Germans  and  the  methods  of  their  Gen- 
eral Staff  well  enough  to  be  sure  that  the 
opinion  attributed  to  the  German  people  at 
large,  on  the  30th  of  July,  cannot  be  the  true 
one.  No  doubt  it  enraged  them  to  be  balked 
when  Paris  and  the  end  seemed  near;  but  it 
is  a  far  cry  from  that  to  the  belief  that  a  re- 
tirement of  20  kilometres  at  that  date  meant 
the  loss  of  the  war. 

Besides,  we  may  be  sure  that  the  German 
people  knew  only  part  of  the  truth. 

Another  despatch  from  Zurich  in  the  New 
York  Evening  Worlds  August  12th,  says: 

**A  neutral  banker  just  returned  from  Ger- 
many was  interviewed  here  to-day.  *  Events 
on  the  French  front  depress  the  educated  Ger- 
mans, but  the  masses  are  ignorant  of  the  real 
situation,'  he  said." 

This  flatly  contradicts  the  former  despatch 
above,  and  may  be  regarded  as  true  because 
it  is  much  more  probable.  The  Berlin  General 
Staff,  by  means  of  absolute  authority,  exerted 
over  the  German  press,  could  easily  make  the 
people  believe  that  the  retirement  of  20  kilo- 
metres from  Chateau-Thierry  was  a  check, 
not  a  serious  defeat.  Even  at  that  time  public 
confidence  was  maintained  by  sight  of  the  war 
map,    showing    the    immense    territories    held 


HOW  THE   GERMANS  DECEIVE  27 

by  the  Germans,  and  their  enormous  gains  in 
consequence;  while  on  such  a  map  a  retire- 
ment of  20  kilometres  looks  insignificant.  It 
is  ridiculous,  therefore,  to  believe  that  the 
German  people  thought  the  war  to  be  lost 
on  the  30th  of  July. 

But  common  sense  shows  still  better  that 
it  could  not  have  been  so.  Let  us  suppose 
that  the  Allies  had  first  advanced  and  then 
retired  just  as  the  Germans  did,  and  imagine 
ourselves  liberators  of  the  people  enslaved 
by  Teutonic  ambition  with  three-fourths  of 
Europe  in  our  power,  Germany  surrounded 
geographically,  and  the  Allied  army  within 
80  kilometres  of  Berlin.  Suppose  then  the 
Germans  bringing  up  their  reserves  and  making 
a  great  effort,  admirably  carried  out.  They 
would  push  back  the  Allies  from  a  distance  of 
20  kilometres  to  one  of  a  hundred  from  Berlin. 
Would  the  Allies  after  such  a  blow  believe 
that  the  war  was  lost  ?  Certainly  not.  Then, 
knowing  the  tenacity  of  the  Germans,  why 
should  they  think  themselves  vanquished  be- 
cause they  were  forced  back  20  kilometres  on 
the  30th  of  July  ? 

Looking  at  the  argument  from  another 
angle,  the  annexed  map  shows  the  French 
military   front   before   the   great   German   of- 


28  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

fensive  which  began  seriously  in  April,  1918, 
the  extreme  limits  reached  by  this  offensive, 
and  the  ground  retaken  by  the  Allies  by  Au- 
gust 3d,  as  against  that  gained  by  the  Ger- 
mans. 

At  the  end  of  March,  before  the  offen- 
sive, we  did  not  consider  ourselves  victorious, 
though  it  was  then  the  general  opinion  that 
the  Germans  could  not  advance  much  on  the 
western  front.  They  did,  however,  gain  con- 
siderable ground  in  three  directions:  toward 
Armentieres,  toward  Amiens,  and  as  far  as 
Chateau-Thierry.  By  the  3d  of  July,  we  had 
retaken  nearly  a  fourth  of  the  ground  lost 
since  April,  as  may  be  seen  on  the  map.  Look- 
ing at  the  whole  European  theatre  of  war  under 
these  circumstances,  how  could  we  call  our- 
selves more  victorious  then  than  we  did  be- 
fore the  German  offensive,  when  they  had 
less  of  our  territory  than  on  August  3d.'^ 

It  may  be  said,  because  the  Germans  lost 
enormously  in  men  and  material  during  their 
retreat.  Let  us  look  into  this  question.  True, 
their  losses  were  so  great  as  first  to  bring  their 
offensive  to  a  stand  and  then  to  force  them 
to  fall  back.  But  can  we  seriously  beheve  that 
our  own  losses  from  April  to  the  end  of  July 
were  not  practically  equal  to  those  of  the  Ger- 


HOW  THE  GERMANS  DECEIVE 


29 


GERMAN  OFFENSIVE  AND  COUNTER  OFFENSIVE 

OF  THE  ALLIES,  APRIL  1918  TO  AUGUST  6.  1918. 


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30  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

mans?  While  their  rapid  advance  lasted  up 
until  the  end  of  July,  they  took  from  us  many 
guns,  prisoners,  and  ammunition.  In  our 
own  counter-offensive,  we  have  done  hkewise. 
In  order  to  compare  the  losses  on  both  sides 
fairly,  we  must  not  look  at  a  short  period,  but 
at  the  whole  operation.  We  shall  have  to  reck- 
on up  our  losses  from  April  to  July  15th,  and 
those  we  inflicted  on  the  Germans  when  we 
retook  the  ground  previously  given  up. 

Now,  by  the  3d  of  August,  we  have  taken 
back  a  fourth  of  the  ground  occupied  by  the 
Germans  since  April.  Have  we  caused  them 
greater  losses  than  we  ourselves  have  suffered  ? 
It  is  possible  of  course,  but  improbable,  and 
no  reports  published  seem  to  confirm  it.  In 
military  operations,  when  both  sides  are  act- 
ing under  nearly  the  same  conditions,  the 
losses  in  men  and  material  are  about  equal, 
unless  in  cases  where  one  army  is  completely 
demoralized,  while  the  other  remains  intact. 
If  the  Allies  exert  all  the  power  they  possess 
throughout  Europe,  this  demorahzation  will 
surely  come  for  the  German  army.  The  sur- 
render of  Bulgaria  hastens  considerably  the 
moment,  but  all  I  wish  to  prove  is  that  on 
August  3d,  we  had  no  good  reason  to  believe 
that  the  German  losses  had  been  much  greater 


HOW  THE   GERMANS  DECEIVE  31 

than  our  own,  reckoning  from  the  beginning 
of  their  offensive  in  April,  1918. 

On  the  matter  of  losses  and  also  on  other 
questions,  just  after  they  took  Chateau-Thierry 
on  the  4th  of  June,  the  Frankfort  Gazette,  pub- 
lished the  following  article,  which  suggests 
some  interesting  comments: 

''Whenever  our  armies  start  a  new  offensive, 
the  enemy  press  ascribes  some  distant  objec- 
tive to  our  high  command.  In  this  manner, 
when  our  front  becomes  stabilized  before  these 
supposed  aims  are  reached,  they  can  say  the 
operation  has  failed.  When  we  attack  in  Flan- 
ders, they  say  our  object  is  Calais.  Now  that 
we  are  marching  on  the  Marne,  they  accuse 
us  of  trying  for  Paris. 

"Neither  Hindenburg  nor  Ludendorff  wage 
a  geographical  war;  their  aim  is  always  to 
weaken  and  finally  to  destroy  the  enemy's 
army.  They  acted  on  this  principle  in  the 
east,  and  apply  it  now  on  the  western  front. 
They  choose  a  sector  and  make  a  surprise  at- 
tack, supported  by  superior  numbers,  and 
push  forward  until  the  enemy's  reserves  come 
up  and  restore  the  balance.  During  our  at- 
tack the  enemy  losses  are  the  greater,  but 
from  this  on  they  tend  to  be  equal.  It  is,  there- 
fore,  useless   to   pursue   the   action,    and   our 


32  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

positions  become  fixed,  while  we  take  measures 
to  deal  another  blow  where  our  complete  prep- 
arations or  superiority  in  numbers  promise 
a  fresh  victory  at  little  cost. 

"We  have  often  dealt  in  this  way  with  our 
enemies,  and  will  do  so  again.  The  great  battle 
lasted  seven  days,  and  during  that  time  the 
enemy  brought  his  reserves  from  the  Channel 
and  the  Vosges,  stripping  sectors  where  we 
shall  attack  the  next  time,  and  where  we  shall 
gain  another  success  like  that  just  ended." 

These  lines,  like  most  German  publications 
intended  to  impress  opinion  at  home,  con- 
tain some  truth  and  some  falsehood.  As  I 
have  frequently  explained,  large  operations  of 
the  German  General  Staff  are  planned  to  reach 
a  maximum  result,  if  luck  is  on  their  side,  and 
at  worst  a  minimum.  To  hide  their  disap- 
pointments the  Germans  lie  when  they  say 
they  were  not  trying  to  reach  Paris  or  the 
Channel.  When  they  attacked  in  Flanders 
and  toward  Amiens,  they  meant  if  they  had 
the  chance  to  push  through  to  the  sea,  their 
maximum  objective  in  this  case.  In  the  same 
way,  they  moved  on  Chateau-Thierry  with 
the  ultimate  hope  of  seizing  Paris.  They  could 
not  reach  these  farthest  points,  but  when  we 
look  at  the  map  (page  29),  must  we  not  admit 


HOW  THE  GERMANS  DECEIVE  33 

that  they  did  accomplish  an  important  part 
of  the  minimum  results  implied  in  the  article 
from  the  Frankfort  Gazette? 

The  German  offensive  from  April  to  August 
3d,  of  this  year  has  not  been  strong  enough 
to  keep  all  the  ground  gained;  but  up  to  that 
date  it  held  most  of  it.  Even  if  the  Germans 
were  forced  to  yield  all  the  territory  won  by 
them  since  April,  unless  they  meet  with  an 
absolutely  crushing  defeat,  their  offensive, 
looked  at  as  a  whole,  must  have  brought  them 
important  gains,  if  we  try  to  look  at  the  war 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  enemy,  as  we 
must  if  we  wish  to  draw  the  right  conclusions 
from  the  course  of  events. 

In  the  first  place,  the  Teuton  offensive  has 
forced  the  Allies  to  strike  back  at  fixed  points, 
instead  of  leaving  them  free  to  attack  when 
and  where  they  choose. 

Again,  in  his  advance  the  enemy  has  dev- 
astated large  districts,  at  the  cost  of  mil- 
hards  to  France,  driving  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands from  their  homes,  and  obliging  the 
French  Government  to  devise  complicated 
and  expensive  defenses  for  Paris,  and  to  pre- 
pare to  send  away  a  considerable  part  of  its 
population.  The  German  war  plan  includes 
this  economic  injury  to  its  adversary,  increased 


34  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

by  the  direction  given  to  each  blow;  but  up  to 
now,  this  highly  important  point  has  been  but 
little  understood  among  us. 

I  shall  be  told  in  answer  that  our  own  opera- 
tions from  April  to  August  have  caused  great 
loss  to  the  Germans  in  men  and  material.  This 
question  of  losses  needs  careful  consideration 
and  to  understand  it  better  we  should  keep 
in  mind  the  general  conditions  under  which 
the  war  proceeds  and  which  we  are  apt  to  for- 
get. 

Many  among  us  talk  of  the  enemy's  losses 
as  if  we  had  discovered  a  way  to  make  war 
without  hurting  ourselves,  but  unfortunately 
this  cannot  be.  It  is  hard  to  realize  that  in 
the  great  offensives  and  counter-offensives  at 
the  western  front  lasting  for  weeks,  even  if 
the  Germans  lose  500,000  men  and  we  only 
400,000,  a  difference  of  100,000  in  our  favor, 
the  former  would  still  be  the  gainers  owing 
to  the  capital  factor  in  the  situation  which 
we  leave  out  of  account.  Wc  think  of  the 
Allied  position  as  if  the  western  front  were 
a  wall  with  comparable  conditions  on  each 
side.  Many  of  us  believe  that  if  the  enemy 
extends  his  line  toward  the  west  ho  gains,  while 
if  we  push  it  eastward  in  the  same  proportion 
the  Allies  achieve  a  success  analogous  to  that 


HOW  THE  GERMANS  DECEIVE  35 

reached  by  the  Germans.  In  order  to  see  why 
this  impression  is  not  the  correct  one,  we  must 
grasp  the  great  difference  made  by  the  fact 
that  Germany  is  fighting  in  France  and  Bel- 
gium, while  w^e  make  war  on  our  own  soil. 
Every  kilometre  that  Germany  has  gained  on 
the  western  front  has  brought  her  closer  into 
our  vital  points,  the  Channel  coasts  and  Paris. 
Meanwhile  in  their  advance  her  armies  reduce 
their  war  expenses  by  living  on  the  country, 
robbing  us  and  enriching  themselves  at  the 
same  time.  On  the  contrary,  in  order  to  re- 
gain her  invaded  provinces,  France  spends 
milliards  in  projectiles,  and  with  her  own 
shells  tears  to  pieces  French  towns  and  vil- 
lages which  the  Germans  had  not  entirely  de- 
stroyed. 

Are  France  and  Germany,  then,  in  the  same 
situation?  The  Allies  look  too  much  at  the 
military  side  of  the  question,  without  con- 
sidering economic  factors  which,  nevertheless, 
are  closely  connected  with  the  conduct  of  the 
war  and  will  strongly  influence  the  conditions 
of  peace.  The  Allies  do  not  reahze  the  differ- 
ence made  by  the  fact  that  the  war  has  not 
touched  Germany  directly,  except  at  the  very 
first,  when  the  Russians  penetrated  a  small 
part  of  eastern  Prussia.     On  the  other  hand. 


36  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

the  richest  provinces  of  France  have  been  bled 
white,  and  the  economic  effect  of  this  alone 
would  decide  in  favor  of  Germany  if  the 
AlHed  victory  should  not  be  so  complete  as 
to  insure  compensation  to  France  for  her  im- 
mense losses.  The  situation,  therefore,  is 
not  all  the  same  for  both  sides  on  the  western 
front. 

There  are  other  reasons  yet  more  conclusive. 
In  the  course  of  an  offensive  followed  by  a 
reverse,  let  us  assume  that  the  Germans  lose 
more  men  by  a  fourth  than  the  Allies,  but 
even  this  sacrifice  may  have  its  military  com- 
pensations enabhng  the  enemy  to  keep  his 
general  position  nearly  the  same,  with  the 
difference  of  a  few  kilometres,  while  he  oc- 
cupies behind  his  western  front  a  great  extent 
of  country  over  which  he  can  still  fight  and 
fall  back  indefinitely,  thus  weakening  his  ad- 
versary before  his  own  soil  can  be  directly 
attacked.  An  objector  to  this  argument  may 
urge  that  "we  shall  exhaust  the  Germans  if 
we  continue  to  kill  100,000  men  in  excess  of 
our  own  loss,  and  the  German  retirement  of 
July  15th  shows  that  they  are  already  short 
of  reserves."  This  reasoning  would  be  right 
if  our  calculations  as  to  the  German  resources 
were  well  founded,  but  unfortunately  events 


HOW  THE  GERMANS  DECEIVE  37 

have  too  often  falsified  them  as  a  natural  re- 
sult of  our  mistaken  premises,  as  I  prove  in 
Chapter  III.  Also,  the  German  retirement 
from  France  and  Belgium  may  be  viewed  as 
a  necessary  part  of  the  great  pacifist  move- 
ment described  in  Chapter  II,  and  a  conse- 
quence of  the  great  Entente  success  in  the 
Balkans.  Even  if  the  Germans  do  lack  men 
on  a  local  front  in  consequence  of  their  losses 
since  July,  1918,  this  can  only  be  a  temporary 
condition.  Before  winter  they  can  bring  into 
the  field  the  class  of  1920,  a  contingent  reck- 
oned by  many  Allied  papers  at  400,000  men. 
I  consider  this  question  in  Chapter  III,  and 
will  explain  why  it  seems  to  me  that  this  class 
will  amount  to  much  more.  Finally  the  dis- 
organization of  Russia  has  opened  to  Ger- 
many sources  of  new  effectives  from  which 
she  can  probably  draw  fresh  troops.  For  these 
various  reasons,  we  were  not  justified  in  aflSrm- 
ing  in  August,  1918,  that  by  a  simple  excess  of 
losses  inflicted  on  the  Germans  in  the  west 
(unless  these  losses  surpass  enormously  the 
total  of  the  Allies,  of  which  we  have  as  yet 
no  instance)  we  can  bring  about  a  German 
defeat  adequate  to  insure  a  complete  Allied 
victory. 

Many  among  us  do  not  perceive  this  ab- 


38  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

solutely  essential  point  which  is,  nevertheless, 
easy  to  grasp  by  looking  at  the  map  (page 
14)  and  reading  the  following  chapter. 

Even  if  our  military  successes  had  con- 
tinued and  forced  our  enemies  out  of  France 
and  Belgium,  if  they  had  been  able  to  keep 
control  of  Austria-Hungary  the  Germans  would 
still  have  been  victorious,  because  the  war 
would  have  left  them  in  possession  of  their  ill- 
gotten  gains  and  would  have  given  them  the 
economic  monopoly  of  Central  Europe  and 
Russia,  all  enormously  rich  countries,  while  the 
Allies,  on  the  contrary,  would  have  come  out 
of  the  struggle  triumphant  in  the  w^est,  but 
reduced  in  population,  and  in  such  a  hopeless 
financial  position  that  they  could  not  enforce 
conditions  of  peace.  Within  very  few  months 
after  the  signature  of  such  a  treaty,  the  Allies 
of  western  Europe  would  have  become  vassals 
of  Germany.  This  inadmissible  result  could 
never  have  been  a  cause  of  apprehension  if, 
instead  of  concentrating  their  attention  on  the 
western  front,  the  Allies  had  kept  the  war  map 
— that  of  Pangermany — before  their  eyes.  For 
the  last  four  years  I  have  explained  in  every 
possible  way  that  on  the  eastern  side  there 
were  many  weak  points  wlicrc  the  Allies  could 
injure   Germany.     With    tlie  help  of  political 


now  THE   GERMANS  DECEIVE  89 

strategy,  they  could  prevail  there  in  a  shorter 
time,  and  at  much  less  cost  than  by  exerting 
military  pressure  in  the  west.  We  could  only 
win  a  complete  western  victory  by  annihilating 
the  German  army.  If  this  were  possible,  it 
would  entail  also  the  equal  destruction  of  the 
Allies  by  the  Germans.  A  mistake  was  after 
all  w^ithin  the  bounds  of  possibility;  it  is  under- 
stood at  last  that  we  must  insure  ourselves, 
against  it  by  working  on  Pangermany's  weak- 
nesses. This  was  the  only  way  to  destroy  her 
hold  on  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia,  a  task 
as  necessary  to  accomplish  as  the  libera- 
tion of  France  and  Belgium.  This  campaign 
against  the  causes  of  weakness  in  Pangermany 
could  have  been  prosecuted  without  slacken- 
ing our  efforts  on  the  western  front.  It  has 
even  proved  helpful  in  that  region.  The  defeat 
of  Bulgaria  has  besides  contributed  enormously 
to  weaken  the  morale  of  the  German  soldiers 
fighting  on  the  western  front.  The  insurrec- 
tions organized  among  peoples  oppressed  in 
Austria-Hungary  have  destroyed  the  indis- 
pensable communications  with  the  east,  and 
the  situation  of  the  German  armies  in  the 
west  has  become  materially  and  morally 
untenable.  These  immense  advantages  will 
have  their  vast  effects  on  condition  that  tlie 


40  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

Allies   act   to   the   end  in    the   most   decisive 
fashion  in  central  Europe. 


*     ^ 


The  mistaken  estimate  of  facts  which  I 
pointed  out  is  largely  produced  by  German 
influence,  which  has  tended  to  stupefy  public 
opinion  for  the  last  four  years.  I  dwell  on 
these  mistakes  because  I  am  convinced  that 
they  form  a  state  of  mind  in  Allied  countries 
which  widens  the  distance  between  us  and  real 
victory.  Throughout  history  an  exact  knowl- 
edge of  facts  has  brought  success,  not  illusions, 
and  these  erroneous  views  expose  us  at  this 
moment  to  these  serious  dangers. 

1.  Our  misinterpretations  play  the  game  of 
the  pacifist  and  the  Bolshevist  parties  among 
us.  To  take  the  most  favorable  hypothesis, 
if  the  German  retirement  lasts  for  weeks,  if 
France  and  Belgium  are  completly  evacuated, 
a  large  part  of  our  public  will  claim  the  vic- 
tory, as,  indeed,  it  has  already  begun  to  do, 
and  the  pacifists  and  Bolshevists  will  say:  "If 
we  are  the  victors,  you  have  no  right  not  to 
make  peace."  What  answer  is  there  to  their 
argument.'^  But  if  we  treat  with  Germany 
without  taking  the   most  extraordinary  pre- 


HOW  THE  GERMANS  DECEIVE  41 

cautions,  it  will  mean  our  ruin  and  leave  her 
dominant  in  Russia. 

2.  Teuton  propagandists  tell  the  Allies  that 
Germany  is  ruined  and  starving;  that  her 
man-power  is  exhausted  and  that  our  west- 
ern victories  are  decisive.  This  produces  the 
mistaken  views  of  which  I  speak,  raising  il- 
lusions in  the  public  mind  which  contribute 
to  the  success  of  the  great  pacifist  offensive 
which  Germany  continues  obstinately,  and  of 
which  I  shall  unmask  the  reasons  in  the  fol- 
lowing chapter.  As  a  preliminary  it  was  need- 
ful to  show  the  atmosphere  of  false  ideas 
caused  by  German  propaganda,  which  fur- 
nishes the  medium  in  which  these  dangerous 
intrigues  can  act  with  success. 


III. 

For  the  first  time  in  history  war  has  shown 
this  most  singular  characteristic  of  alternately 
prosecuting  military  and  peace  offensives,  some- 
times even  both  together.  We  must  bear  in 
mind  that  the  pacifist  advances  are  an  in- 
tegral part  of  war  technic  and  as  such  are  all 
launched  by  the  German  Government.  The 
Allies  have  followed  the  old  rules  and  act  on 
strategic  military  lines,  but  the  Berlin  General 


42  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

Staff  used  political  strategy  also;  this  is  more 
complicated  and  diflScult  and  demands  wide  and 
precise  information,  but  to  succeed  it  utilizes 
all  possible  factors,  especially  the  enemy's 
psychology,  his  lack  of  outside  information,  and 
his  imperfect  comprehension  of  the  nature  of 
a  modern  victory  where  economic  consequences 
bring  about  results  as  far-reaching  as  mihtary 
operations  themselves. 


We  often  hear  it  said  among  the  Allies  that 
"The  invasion  of  Belgium  brought  England 
into  the  war,  and  America  entered  because  of 
the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania.  The  German 
psychology  is  all  wrong !  '* 

Certainly,  the  Germans  have  committed 
psychological  faults;  I  should  be  the  last  to 
contradict  it,  for  I  have  had  only  too  much 
experience  of  their  lack  of  tact,  but  if  they 
have  made  blunders  of  this  sort  it  would  be 
a  mistake  to  suppose  that  they  are  always  at 
fault. 

In  truth,  the  German  has  a  pecuhar  psy- 
chology which  has  grown  out  of  slow  and  pa- 
tient observation  of  foreign  nations.  It  is 
based  on  exact  information,  and  from  it  he 
draws  immense  results.    His  minute  knowledge 


now  THE  GERMANS  DECEIVE  43 

of  those  best  able  to  aet  strongly  on  the  Rus- 
sian intellectual  proletariat  led  to  great  eon- 
sequences.  As  soon  as  the  revolution  broke 
out,  Lenine  was  hurried  from  Switzerland  to 
Russia  in  a  special  train,  as  the  man  fitted 
to  lead  the  proletariat  toward  Bolshevist  Pan- 
germanism.  This  utilization  of  Lenine  was 
undoubtedly  good  psychology.  Germans 
understand  that  some  French  and  English 
socialists  are  surprisingly  ignorant  of  geo- 
graphical, ethnographical,  and  economic  ques- 
tions, and  that  they  love  fine  words  and 
sonorous  phrases.  The  Bodies  made  dexter- 
ous use  of  this  state  of  mind  when  they  sug- 
gested the  formula,  "Peace  without  indemni- 
ties or  annexations,"  which  penetrated  to  the 
Allied  socialists  through  their  Russian  brethren. 
This  formula,  voted  by  the  Reichstag,  July 
19th,  1917,  was  a  psychological  manoeuvre,  as 
we  see  by  an  article  in  the  Germania,  quoted 
by  the  Paris  Temps,  April  18th  of  the  same 
year.  This  article  says  cynically:  "The  July 
resolution  was  a  question  of  tactics,  which 
tends  to  strengthen  the  Bolshevist  power  and 
increase  the  longing  for  peace  in  the  east. 
These  tactics  are  now  laid  aside,  and  our  pres- 
ent object  is  to  reach  a  victorious  peace  in 
the  west  bv  force  of  arms." 


44  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

Another  prominent  psychological  manoeuvre 
consists  in  utilizing  the  blind  optimism  of  the 
Allies  by  means  of  neutral  newspaper  propa- 
ganda. Contrary  to  their  hopes,  force  of  arms 
was  not  enough  to  impose  a  German  peace  in 
the  west,  chiefly  owing  to  the  size  and  value 
of  the  American  reinforcements;  now,  in  order 
to  deceive  the  AUies  and  trap  them  into  peace 
negotiations  without  complete  victory,  we 
see  the  Berlin  government  resort  to  an  astute 
combination  embracing  many  psychological 
elements. 

Let  us  admit  the  truth;  the  Germans  are 
capable  of  the  sort  of  psychology  which  grows 
out  of  exact  information  and  is  adapted  to 
war  aims  as  they  are  seen  in  Berlin.  The  real 
brain  of  the  German  General  Staff  is  General 
Ludendorff,  who  inspired  and  moulded  the 
pacifist  offensives  as  well  as  the  military  cam- 
paigns. These  offensives  proceeded  in  many 
ways;  through  the  German  press,  which,  like 
a  Prussian  soldier,  obeys  the  suggestions  of 
the  high  command,  or  through  neutral  jour- 
nals. Sometimes  a  man  hke  Hertling  dropped 
a  phrase  of  double  meaning,  or  a  word  came 
through  an  Austrian  intermediary  like  Burian 
or  Czernin.  Sometimes  agents  from  Bul- 
garia   (during   a   very   long   period),   Turkey, 


HOW  THE  GERMANS  DECEIVE  45 

or  Austria  entrapped  the  Allied  emissaries  in 
Switzerland,  or  a  bait  was  offered  to  the  Vati- 
can, which  simply  swallowed  it. 

All  these  pacifist  offensives  under  any  form 
start  from  the  General  Staff  in  Berlin.  The 
part  played  by  this  organization  in  pacifist 
plans,  which  at  first  sight  seem  so  different 
from  military  offensives,  ought  not  to  surprise 
us.  Those  who  really  understand  Germany — 
unfortunately  too  few — know  well  that  the 
Reichstag  has  no  real  power  in  the  empire, 
and  that  the  force  which  guides  German  policy, 
even  in  time  of  peace,  is  this  formidable  in- 
tellectual machine,  on  which  rests  the  fate 
of  the  Hohenzollerns  and  of  Prussian  mili- 
tarism. 

The  officers  who  compose  the  General  Staff 
are  carefully  selected.  They  not  only  control 
mihtary  affairs,  as  we  know,  but  there  are 
among  them  experts  on  all  questions.  These 
officers  are  certainly  accomplices  in  a  great 
scheme  of  robbery,  but  we  shall  be  wide  of 
the  truth  if  we  do  not  understand  that  they 
are  men  not  only  well  versed  in  military  sub- 
jects, but  also  in  applied  sciences;  geography, 
ethnography,  political  economy  and  national 
psychology.  This  stupendous  organization  is 
so  old,  so  well  suppHed  with  technical  informa- 


46  AN   ENDURING  VICTORY 

tion  brought  up-to-date,  that  the  General 
Staff  of  Berhn  is  able  to  pursue  a  political 
strategy  specially  adapted  to  the  conditions 
of  each  region.  This  strategy  often  misleads 
the  Allies  because  they  were  even  less  prepared 
for  the  intellectual  conduct  of  the  war  than 
they  were  in  a  material  sense. 

When  one  looks  at  the  German  General 
Staff  as  a  whole,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  it  initiates 
pacifist  offensives,  and  this  is  still  more  clearly 
realized  when  we  note  the  strong  pressure 
these  offensives  exert  on  the  conduct  of  the 
war,  and  the  many  technical  objectives  of 
a  particular  sort  at  which  they  invariably 
aim. 

The  first  object  of  a  German  pacifist  offen- 
sive has  been  to  hide  the  extent  of  the  gigantic 
Pangermanist  plan  from  the  Allies.  To  carry 
this  out,  the  General  Staff  knew  that  it  should 
conquer  its  many  adversaries  in  succession, 
employing  the  classical  tactics  of  the  Horatii 
against  the  Curiatii,  that  is  to  say,  beating 
them  one  after  the  other. 

To  reach  this  end  it  resolved  to  utilize  the 
undoul>ted  ignorance  of  the  Pangerman  plan 
which  the  Allies  had  shown  in  the  first  years 
of  the  war,  so  as  to  persuade  them  that  each 
large  mihtary  operation  against  Russia,  Serbia, 


HOW  THE  GERMANS   DECEIVE  47 

or  Roumania,  would  be  the  last.  This  is  wliy 
newspaper  articles  through  Holland  ufm! 
Switzerland  inspired  by  the  Berlin  General 
Staff  frequently  gave  out  that  Germany  was 
exhausted,  that  she  had  enough  of  it,  and  that 
she  lacked  food  or  munitions  to  carry  on  the 
struggle.  As  these  items  were  credulously 
quoted,  whenever  desired,  by  many  Allied 
papers,  during  the  first  three  years  of  the  war, 
a  large  part  of  public  opinion  in  France  and 
England  has  been  convinced  that  the  war 
would  be  over  in  three  months,  and  this  state 
of  mind  has  made  it  easily  possible  for  the 
Germans  to  carry  out  successive  military  of- 
fensives in  due  order.  The  pacifist  offensive 
is,  therefore,  a  w^ay  of  pursuing  a  military 
offensive. 

Secondly,  the  German  pacifist  offensives, 
with  their  suggestion  of  an  early  peace,  have 
made  it  possible  for  the  General  Staff  to  or- 
ganize Central  Pangermany,  that  is  to  say, 
to  put  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and  Tur- 
key in  a  position  to  support  a  long  war. 
Further,  these  three  countries,  particularly 
Austria-Hungary  and  Bulgaria,  were  in  every 
way  the  weak  strategic  points  of  the  Central 
Powers.  Berlin  had  therefore  a  strong  motive 
to  prevent  the  Allies  from  acting  in  these  re- 


48  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

glons.  This  third  object  has  been  attained 
for  four  years  by  pacifist  propaganda,  through 
agents  in  Switzerland,  who  persuaded  the  Al- 
lies that  Turkey,  Bulgaria,  or  Austria-Hungary 
desired  to  conclude  a  separate  peace  with 
them. 

Fourthly,  the  mission  of  the  German  pacifist 
offensives  was  to  act  on  the  pacifist  groups  in 
all  Entente  countries.  These  consist  often  of 
good  people  honestly  desirous  of  putting  an 
end  to  the  frightful  conflict,  but  these  worthy 
folks  are  profoundly  ignorant  of  technical 
problems,  and  know  next  to  nothing  about 
Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  or  the  Balkans, 
where  most  of  them  have  never  set  foot.  The 
result  is  these  pacifists  seize  on  the  smallest 
incident  which  seems  favorable  to  their  cause, 
and  which  is  really  a  Boche  pitfall.  They  say : 
"Peace  is  possible,  we  should  look  into  it, 
and  negotiate."  This  is  what  they  said  in 
1917,  at  the  time  of  the  interminable  discus- 
sions on  the  Stockholm  conference,  which  con- 
tributed greatly  to  consolidate  the  Bolsheviks, 
and  so  disintegrate  Russia.  This  they  repeated 
when  in  July,  1917,  the  Reichstag  voted  for 
**  Peace  without  annexations  or  indemnities," 
a  formula  hiding  the  most  treacherous  ma- 
nceuvres,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  article  from 


HOW  THE  GERMANS  DECEIVE  49 

Germania  above  quoted.  They  said  the  same 
thing  when  the  Emperor  of  Austria  pub- 
lished his  letters  about  Alsace-Lorraine  at  the 
very  moment  that  his  troops  invaded  southern 
Russia.  The  effect  of  this  persistent  credulity 
on  the  part  of  the  Entente  pacifists  has  been 
that  for  the  last  two  years  particularly,  the 
Allied  governments  have  lost  precious  time  in 
discussing  incidents  which  would  not  have  oc- 
cupied them  five  minutes  if  they  had  possessed 
exact  information,  as  subsequent  events  have 
shown  in  every  case.  The  general  result  from 
these  efforts  has  been  that,  dragged  in  all  di- 
rections by  contradictory  opinions,  the  Allied 
governments  could  not  make  the  best  use  of 
the  forces  of  the  Entente,  which  was  exactly 
what  the  Berlin  General  Staff  wished  to  bring 
about  by  its  pacifist  offensives. 

Now  that  the  war  is  at  last  entering  on  its 
decisive  phase,  now  that  the  number  and 
bravery  of  American  troops  obliges  the  Ger- 
mans to  admit  that  they  were  wrong  as  to 
the  value  of  help  sent  from  the  United  States, 
and  forces  them  to  renounce  the  hope  of  a 
speedy  and  brilliant  victory,  while  the  pro- 
longed struggle  has  produced  an  unprecedented 
financial  condition  in  the  west,  of  the  most  se- 
rious importance,  the  great  pacifist  manoeuvre 


50  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

has  for  its  first  object  to  stop  hostilities  before 
the  invasion  of  Germany. 

In  the  conduct  of  the  war  the  German  Gen- 
eral Staff  has  already  shown  a  high  order  of 
imagination:  asphyxiating  gas,  for  example, 
on  the  material  side,  Russia  destroyed  by 
pacifism  on  the  intellectual.  But  the  blow 
which  they  sought  to  make  successful  ex- 
ceeded all  the  others  in  audacity,  in  surprise, 
and  in  psychological  ingenuity.  They  in- 
tended to  compass  the  final  defeat  of  the  Allies 
by  means  which  I  shall  lay  bare  in  the  next 
chapter,  and  they  sought  to  make  them  ac- 
cept this  defeat  through  a  well-advised  camou- 
flage hiding  it  under  an  apparent  military 
victory. 

The  wide  reverberations  of  the  Bulgarian 
defeat  have  come  to  discredit  this  plan,  but 
nevertheless  it  still  has  its  dangers,  for  with 
the  help  of  the  Allied  pacifists  the  Boches  are 
making  persistent  efforts  to  prevent  at  any 
price  the  invasion  of  Germany. 


CHAPTER   II. 

HOW  THE  GERMANS.  IF  THEY  SECURE  AN  ARMIS- 
TICE, COUNT  UPON  CARRYING  OFF  THE  VIC- 
TORY AS  A  CONSEQUENCE  OF  JHE  ECONOMIC 
CONDITION  CREATED  IN  EUROPE  BY  FOUR 
YEARS  OF  WAR. 

I.  Germany's  war  profits  form  the  chief  basis  of  the  pacifist 
mancEUvres. 

II.  The  fact  that  the  circulation  of  paper  currency  in  Ger- 
many is  largely  measured  by  the  produce  of  her  gigan- 
tic thefts,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  that  of  the  Allies 
depends  on  their  complete  victory,  constitutes  the 
second  base  of  German  schemes. 

ni.  If  circumstances  make  it  feasible,  the  Alsace-Lorraine 
trick  will  be  tried  in  order  to  enter  on  the  practical 
realization  of  German  plans  by  dividing  the  Allies, 
and  leading  France  to  "peace  talk"  before  a  complete 
victory. 

IV.  Why  the  Germans  believe  that  if  the  Allies  are  led  into 
"peace  talk"  before  achieving  a  full  grasp  of  the  Eu- 
ropean situation  which  assures  their  victory,  their 
financial  ruin  will  ensue.  This  without  more  great 
battles  would  be  enough  to  bring  about  the  final  suc- 
cess of  Germany. 

As  Berlin  sees  it,  the  economic  situation 
caused  by  four  years  of  conflict,  will  make  it 
possible  for  Germany  to  win  the  war  on  the 
sole  condition  that  the  Allies,  even  if  victorious, 
confine  their  exertions  to  the  western  front- 
si 


52  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

that  of  France  and  Belgium — and  grant  to  Ger- 
many an  armistice  not  followed  by  a  deep 
invasion  of  her  territory. 

The  economic  situation  of  the  Allies,  does 
indeed  differ  so  materially  from  that  of  Ger- 
many that  the  General  Staff  can  try  something 
quite  new  in  the  way  of  pacifist  machinations. 
These  will  be  all  the  more  dangerous  because 
they  will  gain  the  advantage  of  a  surprise,  as 
the  close  connection  between  the  economic 
position  of  the  west  of  Europe  and  the  Allies' 
success  in  the  war  is  little  understood.  Ger- 
man blows  owe  most  of  their  effect  to  surprise; 
therefore,  if  the  conditions  necessary  to  the 
realization  of  the  policy  of  Berlin  were  made 
known  beforehand  to  the  great  Entente  public, 
it  would  render  much  of  this  policy  abortive. 

Germany  wants  to  make  a  western  Brest- 
Litovsk  treaty.  This  treaty  was  really  an 
operation  of  strategic  policy  in  two  acts.  First 
act,  Peace  in  appearance,  which  on  account  of 
the  nervous  tension  resulting  from  an  excep- 
tionally long  and  cruel  war  is  enough  to  shake 
the  morale  of  the  enemy.  Second  act.  Re- 
sumption of  hostilities  under  relatively  easy 
conditions,  the  spirit  of  the  adversary  being 
once  broken.  We  now  see  clearly  that  Ger- 
many overthrew  Russia,  without  the  need  of 


THE  GERMANS  AND  THE  ARMISTICE    53 

resorting  to  large  military  operations  because 
the  treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk  had  destroyed  the 
Russian  armies.  Now  that  they  see  where 
"peace"  with  Germany  has  led  them  many 
Russians  are  in  revolt,  but  the  lack  of  material 
means  weakens  their  rebellion,  and  it  is  now 
certain  that  the  Germans,  through  the  Bolshe- 
vists, can  act  directly  on  Russia  as  far  as  Si- 
beria. A  step  analogous  to  that  at  Brest- 
Litovsk  would  enable  Germany  to  gain  the  war 
easily  and  entirely,  even  if  she  wxre  previously 
forced  out  of  France  and  Belgium  by  military 
means.  This  step  could  be  taken  by  utilizing 
this  time  the  particular  economic  condition  of 
western  Europe,  favored  by  illusions  enter- 
tained by  a  section  of  the  Allied  public,  as  I 
have  shown  in  the  preceding  chapter. 

In  order  to  throw  into  relief  the  effects  of 
a  western  Brest-Litovsk,  we  will  take  in  turn 
the  essential  constituents  of  the  German 
manoeuvre,  viz.: 

1st.  The  profits  of  the  war  to  Germany. 

2d.  The  fact  that  the  circulation  of  i)aper 
currency  in  Germany  is  guaranteed  by  tlie 
produce  of  her  thefts. 

3d.  The  Alsace-Lorraine  trick. 


54  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

I. 

I  have  already  written  on  the  subject  of 
Germany's  profits  from  the  war,  but  in  order 
to  make  her  pacifist  manoeuvres  clear  I  will 
once  more  show  what  she  has  gained  by  her 
aggressions.  She  has  long  labored  with  a  view 
to  keeping  the  fruit  of  her  gigantic  thefts  after 
the  conclusion  of  peace.  In  order  to  hide  them 
as  much  as  possible,  she  uses  neutral  papers 
to  spread  abroad  the  idea  that  Germany  is 
ruined  by  the  war.  This  is  what  most  of  the 
Allies  beheve,  as  they  think,  on  just  grounds. 
When  they  read  in  the  Swiss  papers  that  the 
mark  has  depreciated  45  per  cent,  and  the 
franc  only  20  per  cent,  they  think  this  indicates 
the  proportion  in  which  France  and  Germany 
are  touched  financially  by  the  war.  But  such 
is  not  the  fact.  The  German  rate  falls,  first 
because  a  general  and  well-founded  feeling 
exists  that  Germany  will  be  beaten.  This  can 
only  come  about  if  the  Allies  fight  to  the 
end  with  all  the  resources  at  their  command, 
and  if  the  United  States  throw  their  whole 
weight  into  the  scale.  Secondly,  and  above 
all,  it  is  because  Germany  is  blockaded,  and 
has  no  exports,  conseciuently  she  is  paid 
nothin^r  from  the  outside  and  must  settle  in 


THE  GERMANS  AND  THE  ARMISTICE    .55 

gold  for  all  that  comes  to  her  from  neutrals. 
The  result  is  her  foreign  credit  shrinks  and 
causes  the  German  rate  to  fall.  But  this  posi- 
tion of  Germany  on  the  outside  does  not  at 
all  affect  her  credit  at  home.  This  we  never 
hear  spoken  of,  but  it  is  very  important  and 
increased  with  every  new  seizure  of  enemy 
territory.  Each  of  these  operations  yielded 
Germany  much  more  than  they  cost.  For 
instance,  when  she  laid  hands  on  Belgium  after 
long  premeditation,  it  was  because  of  the  ex- 
traordinary wealth  of  that  unhappy  country, 
from  which  the  Berlin  government  has  drawn 
sums  much  greater  than  the  expense  of  the 
conquest.  The  same  is  true  of  German  seizures 
in  northern  France,  Serbia,  Roumania,  Rus- 
sia, etc.,  which  were  carried  out  on  a  paying 
basis,  according  to  the  best  Boche  traditions. 
It  is  therefore  untrue  to  say,  as  the  Alhes  often 
do  without  having  really  looked  into  it,  that 
Germany  is  ruined  by  the  war.  In  the  first 
place,  this  is  contrary  to  fact,  as  I  shall  show, 
and  again  if  we  believe  this  we  play  into  the 
Boche  hands  by  believing  that  Germany  can 
never  repair  the  harm  she  has  done,  or  restore 
the  value  of  all  that  she  has  stolen. 

The  war  has  been  much  less  costly  to  Ger- 
many than  to  the  Allies,  because  of  her  long 


5d  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

preparation  and  her  thefts  in  all  directions, 
as  well  as  for  the  reason  that  the  Teuton  armies 
live  on  their  enemies'  country.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  AUies  were  obliged  to  improvise  the 
enormous  material  required  in  great  haste, 
and  they  pay  their  bills  honestly. 

The  proof  of  this  is  that  in  three  years  of 
war  the  cost  to  Germany  is  1,612  francs  per 
head,  608  francs  less  than  in  France.  The 
latter  has  spent  2,220  per  head,  38  per  cent 
more  than  in  Germany.  Therefore,  if  we  made 
peace  according  to  the  formula  "Peace  with- 
out indemnities,"  it  would  lead  to  an  unheard- 
of  injustice.  Every  peace-loving  Frenchman 
would  have  to  bear  a  financial  burden  a  third 
heavier  than  that  of  a  faithful  servant  of  the 
Kaiser,  who  wished  for  war.  If  this  difference 
in  war  expenditures  continues,  it  will  be  enough 
to  ruin  France.  Clearly,  if  the  Frenchman  has 
to  support  a  weight  38  per  cent  heavier,  he 
will  have  to  yield  before  the  German.  The 
latter  will  be  saved,  while  his  adversaries  suc- 
cumb, leaving  him  to  gather  in  the  spoils. 

On  the  whole,  at  the  end  of  the  third  year 
of  the  war,  the  Allies  had  spent  at  least  144 
milliards  of  francs  more  than  the  Central  Em- 
pires. During  the  fourth  year  this  figure  has 
increased  considerably  on  account  of  the  im- 


THE  GERMANS  AND  THE  ARMISTICE    57 

mense  expenditure  of  the  United  States,  which 
in  August,  1918,  amounted  to  50  milhons  of 
dollars  a  day. 

There  are  still  worse  economic  consequences 
to  be  feared  from  the  fact  that  if  the  existing 
situation  continues  in  eastern  Europe,  Ger- 
many will  be  secure  now  and  in  future  of  huge 
profits  much  greater  than  her  war  expenses, 
while  the  Allies  w^ill  stagger  for  many  years 
under  crushing  financial  burdens. 

Germany's  w^ar-profits,  as  they  appeared  be- 
fore the  victory  of  the  Allies  over  Bulgaria  (Oc- 
tober, 1918)  were: 

1st.  The  value  of  plunder  in  occupied  coun- 
tries, Serbia,  Roumania,  Russia,  Belgium,  and 
France  (materials  of  war,  foodstuffs,  raw  ma- 
terial, industrial^  plants,  furniture,  objects  of 
art,  war  contributions,  bonds,  securities,  etc.). 

2d.  The  accomplishment  of  the  Hamburg- 
Persian  Gulf  plan,  secured  by  Pangerman 
mortgages,  loans  made  by  Germany  to  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, Bulgaria,  and  Turkey.  These 
loans  are  only  made  on  paper,  and  have  cost 
Germany  nothing,  but  they  give  her  the  great 
advantage  of  entire  economic  control  over 
her  Allies,  the  three  Central  Pov/ers. 

3d.  The  treaty  signed  by  Turkey  at  Berlin, 
11th  of  January,  1917,  gives  Germany  a  mo- 


58  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

nopoly  in  the  Turkish  Empire,  a  country  enor- 
mously rich  in  agricultural  and  mineral  re- 
sources, of  which  she  has  begun  already  to 
take  advantage. 

4th.  The  realization  of  economic  Panger- 
many,  in  other  words,  the  orderly  development 
on  a  large  scale  of  all  its  productions,  mineral, 
vegetable,  animal,  and  industrial  (see  map, 
page  14),  transported  through  a  network  of 
canals  at  the  least  possible  cost.  The  Ger- 
mans could  thus  pay  large  wages  to  their  own 
workmen,  while  the  cost  price  would  be  so 
much  lowered  in  all  departments  of  produc- 
tion that  they  could  undersell  everywhere  in 
Europe,  and  perhaps  all  over  the  world. 

5th.  The  realization  of  military  Panger- 
many.  This  guarantees  the  permanence  of 
economic  Pangermany,  and  through  it  Berlin 
controls  all  its  forces  (about  30  millions  of 
soldiers)  occupying  Antwerp,  Riga,  Trieste, 
Cattaro,  the  Ottoman  straits,  the  eastern 
Mediterranean,  and  the  Black  Sea.  Never 
before  on  earth  has  there  been  so  vast  a 
strategic  whole  in  the  hands  of  a  single  power. 

6th.  The  exploiting  monopoly  in  European 
and  Asiatic  Russia,  great  regions  with  in- 
finitely rich  opportunities. 

7th.  The    actual    substitution    of    German 


THE  GERMANS  AND  THE  ARMISTICE    5!) 

credit  for  that  of  the  Allies  in  Russia  and  the 
east  represents  tens  of  milliards. 

Now,  in  four  years  of  war,  Germany  has 
spent  about  140  milliards  of  marks.  The  sum 
of  these  seven  war-profits  shows  a  difference 
in  her  favor  of  hundreds  of  miUiards,  as  we 
see  without  difficulty. 

The  war  profits  of  Germany  are  therefore 
much  greater  than  her  war  expenses;  this  is 
contrary  to  the  opinion  of  many  among  the 
Allies,  but  it  is  the  fact  that  the  war  is  exceed- 
ingly profitable  to  the  Germans,  and  for  this 
reason  their  government  directs  it  particularly 
from  the  economic  standpoint.  Without 
doubt  the  surrender  of  Bulgaria  has  begun 
to  get  back  some  of  the  oriental  profits  of 
Germany,  but  all  these  may  be  destroyed. 
Also  it  is  necessary  for  the  Allies  to  complete 
thoroughly  their  victory  in  the  east,  which 
would  have  the  practical  effect  of  loosening 
the  hold  of  Germany  on  Russia.  Besides, 
there  would  remain  to  the  Germans  all  the 
booty  that  they  have  stolen,  and  that  it  is 
our  business  to  make  them  restore. 

The  war  as  waged  by  the  German  people 
is  essentially  predatory;  it  is  the  largest  pirat- 
ical enterprise  known  in  history,  and  has  been 
carefully  planned  for  years. 


60  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

Long  before  the  war,  the  Berhn  government 
maintained  a  secret  propaganda  to  convince 
the  people  that  if  Greater  Germany  became 
an  accomplished  fact  it  would  materially  add 
to  the  prosperity  of  the  working  classes.  It 
was  this  hope  of  material  and  personal  ad- 
vantages to  be  gained  from  economic  Pan- 
germany  that  caused  the  great  majority  of 
the  socialists  to  stand  by  the  Kaiser  and  his 
General  Staff.  The  methods  of  obtaining 
these  rich  prizes,  were  clearly  thought  out 
beforehand;  as  an  example  read  the  remark 
of  Baron  von  Wangenheim,  German  ambas- 
sador at  Constantinople,  to  M.  Morgenthau: 
"Remember  that  this  time  we  will  make  war 
without  mercy.  .  .  .  We  will  carry  off  to 
Berlin  all  the  French  art  treasures  which  be- 
long to  the  state."  This  principle  has  been 
applied  wherever  possible,  and  even  private 
property  has  not  been  respected.  The  booty 
brought  in  by  the  war  has  exceeded  all  expec- 
tations, as  the  Germans  themselves  admit, 
though  it  is  the  policy  of  their  government 
to  conceal  the  truth  as  much  as  possible  from 
the  outside  world. 

Vllomme  Libre  of  February  16th,  1918, 
quotes  from  the  January  number  of  Die  Hilfey 
a  review  by  Frederic  Naumann,   the  man  of 


THE  GERMANS  AND  THE  ARMISTICE    (Jl 

Mitteleuropa.     Here  we  can  read  an  avowal 
which  should  be  known  to  every  Allied  citizen : 

"The  war  in  general  was  looked  upon  as  a 
piece  of  good  luck,  so  much  so  that  a  !)usiness 
man  in  good  standing  did  not  hesitate  to  say 
that  *a  man  who  does  not  make  money  out 
of  this  war  does  not  deserve  it.'" 

This  particular  Boche  ought  to  be  satisfied, 
for  his  compatriots  have  been  worthy  of  the 
struggle  they  provoked,  and  have  enriched 
themselves  beyond  measure  according  to  their 
deliberate  plans. 

The  truth  which  the  foregoing  facts  are 
meant  to  impress  on  the  American  mind  is 
that,  since  Germany  has  made  enormous  war- 
profits,  the  European  Allies  have  undergone 
unprecedented  losses  without  any  compensa- 
tion. Their  economic  position  is  therefore 
greatly  inferior  to  that  of  Germany,  but  un- 
fortunately this  state  of  things  is  but  little 
known.  It  must  be  seriously  considered,  how- 
ever, before  laying  down  the  conditions  of  a 
peace  which  shall  bring  restoration  and  jus- 
tice to  the  world. 

Great  losses  for  the  Allies,  great  gains  for 
Germany— this,  then,  is  the  situation  which 
lies  at  the  root  of  her  pacifist  plan. 


62  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

II. 

The  financial  reverberations  of  this  war  will 
have  deep  and  lasting  results  to  every  citizen 
of  the  belligerent  countries,  without  exception. 
Each  American  has  therefore  a  direct  personal 
interest  in  understanding  a  state  of  things 
which  will  affect  him  strongly  for  good  or  evil. 
As  we  have  seen,  Germany  is  so  far  the  only 
one  of  the  belligerents  whose  gains  by  the 
war  much  exceed  her  expenditures;  this  is 
the  first  thing  we  must  grasp  if  we  would 
understand  the  war  situation.  The  second  is 
that  this  enrichment  of  Germany,  dishonestly 
acquired,  but  real  none  the  less,  has  placed 
her  in  so  favorable  an  economic  position  that, 
even  if  the  Allies  drive  her  out  of  France  and 
Belgium,  she  can  still  discuss  peace  terms  with 
advantage.  This  is  hard  to  understand,  but 
is  elucidated  by  the  following  considerations: 

It  is  well  known  that  without  exception  all 
the  belligerents  have  much  extended  their 
fiduciary  circulation,  at  present  represented 
by  a  large  issue  of  bank  paper  and  currency. 
This  extension  is  so  great  that  the  specie  re- 
serves have  not  been  increased  in  the  same 
proportion,  so  that  with  each  new  issue  of 
paper   the  gold   and    silver  guaranty   shrinks 


THE  GERMANS  AND  THE  ARMISTICE    (JIJ 

equally.  There  are  even  countries  where  the 
specie  reserve  is  much  less  than  it  was  in 
1914,  while  paper  money  has  much  increased. 
The  following  table,  taken  from  the  figures  of 
the  circular  of  the  Schweizerische  Kreditan.stalt 
of  Zurich,  May  31st,  1918,  gives  a  review 
of  the  situation  from  the  end  of  June,  1914, 
to  the  end  of  April,  1918;  for  Germany  in 
millions  of  marks,  for  Austria-Hungary  in 
millions  of  crowns,  for  France  in  millions  of 
francs,  and  for  England  in  millions  of  pounds 
sterling. 


Country 

CurrcDcy 

Specie  Reserve 

Increase  or  shrink- 
age from  end  of 

June,  1914,  to  end 
of  April,  1018 

End  of 
June 
1914 

End  of 
April 
1918 

End  of 
June 
19U 

End  of 
April 
1918 

Specie 

Paper 

Germany 

Austria-Hungary 
France   

2,597 
2,325 
6,051 
29.78 

19,225 
18.440 
26,773 
287.50 

1,631 

1.609 
4,697 
40.08 

2,465 

382 

5,636 

89.86 

834 

-1,227 

939 

49.78 

16,628 

16,115 
20,682 

England 

257.72 

This  table  shows  that  Austria's  specie  re- 
serve has  shrunk  to  the  enormous  extent  of 
1,227  millions  of  crowns  in  the  period  that 
her  paper  increased  by  16  milliards,  and  it  is 
nearly  certain  that  this  1,227  millions  of  crowns 
were  handed  over  to  Germany  as  security  for 


64  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

the  heavy  loans  made  by  Berlin  to  Vienna  to 
carry  on  the  war,  an  indication  of  the  abso- 
lutely dependent  condition  of  the  latter. 

If  the  principal  ally  of  Germany  is  brought 
to  such  a  pass  as  this,  it  is  reasonable  to  sup- 
pose that  the  state  of  the  currency  in  Bulgaria 
and  Turkey  and  of  their  finances  is  even 
worse.  There  can  be  no  doubt  these  allies 
of  Germany,  considered  as  states,  are  ruined 
by  the  war,  for  the  immense  inflation  of  their 
paper  money  added  to  war  expenses  and  the 
huge  debts  owed  to  Berlin,  weaken  them  eco- 
nomically. But  it  is  well  to  observe  that  the 
ruin  of  friendly  states  does  no  harm  to  Ger- 
many; on  the  contrary,  if  the  Allied  troops 
do  not  materially  reorganize  central  Europe 
on  an  absolutely  new  basis,  Germany  profits 
by  it,  for  the  poverty  of  the  governments  of 
Vienna,  Sofia,  and  Constantinople  puts  them 
completely  in  the  power  of  Berlin,  which  dic- 
tates all  the  combinations  leading  to  the  sup- 
port of  Pangermany,  and  dominates  central 
Europe  and  the  Ottoman  Empire. 

England  has  more  than  doubled  her  gold 
reserve,  but  her  output  of  paper  money  and 
Bank  of  England  notes,  according  to  the  figures 
of  the  Swiss  Bank  above  quoted,  have  in- 
creased in  round  numbers  from  30  to  287  mil- 


THE  GERMANS  AND  THE  ARMISTICE    (j.5 

lions  of  pounds  sterling,  that  is  to  say,  9  times 
more  than  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 

As  for  France,  as  she  is  the  pivot  of  the  coali- 
tion, and  her  richest  territory  is  invaded,  tlio 
war  has  caused  her  nothing  but  loss.  IIct 
specie  reserve  has  indeed  increased  by  nearly 
a  milHard,  but  of  the  5.636  milliards  which 
made  up  this  reserve  in  gold  and  silver  at  the 
end  of  April,  1918,  2  milliards  were  set  aside 
as  security  for  debts  contracted  in  foreign 
countries,  while  the  increase  at  this  date  of 
notes  of  the  Bank  of  France  exceeded  20  mil- 
liards. 

We  can  see  by  the  above  table  that  the 
bank  paper  of  the  European  belligerents  is 
nowhere  sufficiently  secured  by  gold  reserves; 
therefore  the  value  of  this  paper  depends  on 
victory,  which  will  affect  profoundly  the  credit 
of  the  various  states,  and,  consequently,  the 
money  issued  by  them.  In  practice,  then, 
when  peace  is  concluded  It  will  be  then  that 
the  notes  and  paper  money  of  all  the  countries 
in  Europe  will  show  their  strength  or  weak- 
ness, and  very  shortly  too,  for  then  the  situa- 
tion in  which  each  one  is  left  by  the  war  ^\ill 
stand  out  clearly. 

From  now  on,  we  can  see  a  result  brought 
about  by  the  war,  most  unjust  but  none  tlie 


66  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

less  certain:  when  we  come  to  discuss  con- 
ditions of  peace  Germany  will  be  in  a  much 
more  advantageous  position  than  the  other 
belligerents  because  her  fiduciary  circulation 
will  be  sounder,  consequently  her  issue  of  bank- 
notes more  secure.  While  France  has  con- 
tracted enormous  foreign  debts  to  buy  large 
amounts  of  raw  material  for  manufactures 
and  food  necessary  to  her  population,  the 
Allied  blockade,  curiously  enough,  has  been 
of  service  to  Germany.  She  could  buy  nothing 
outside,  and  therefore  could  not  run  in  debt, 
but  was  forced  to  supply  her  needs  either  by 
substitutes  or  products  of  Pangermany.  These 
products,  as  a  rule,  cost  her  nothing  because 
they  were  simply  stolen  from  invaded  coun- 
tries: food,  crops,  metals,  coal,  etc.  It  stands 
to  reason  that  a  shell  made  of  stolen  French 
iron,  with  stolen  Belgian  coal,  costs  Germany 
less  than  a  shell  costs  the  French  Government, 
which  is  made  with  coal  bought  in  England 
and  steel  from  the  United  States.  This  ex- 
ample might  be  multiplied  indefinitely,  but 
it  serves  to  explain  how  Germany  makes  war 
more  cheaply  than  the  Allies,  and  why  she 
has  kept  her  money  at  home,  while  that  of 
France  is  sent  abroad. 

The  circulation  of  bank-notes  of  the  Ger- 


THE  GERMANS  AND  THE  ARMISTICE    67 

man  Empire  had  increased  during  the  war  by 
16,628  millions  of  marks  at  the  end  of  April, 
1918.  At  this  date,  the  specie  guarantee  of 
these  notes  was  2,465  millions  of  marks.  This 
was  not  enough  to  secure  about  20  milliards 
of  notes,  a  figure  which  includes  those  issued 
before  the  war;  observe,  therefore,  that  for 
special  reasons  this  considerable  increase  in 
bank-notes  does  not  cause  as  great  risk  and 
inconvenience  to  Germany  as  to  other  coun- 
tries; this  is  a  point  not  before  touched  upon, 
but  very  necessary  to  consider.  In  point  of 
fact,  the  bank-notes  of  the  empire  are  not 
only  secured  by  the  government  reserve  in 
gold  and  silver  but  by  the  material  profits 
Germany  has  gained  by  the  war.  These  are 
of  different  kinds,  and  consist  of  money  taken 
from  Belgium,  France,  Serbia,  Roumania,  or 
Russia,  of  which  the  government  of  Berlin 
is  careful  to  say  nothing.  Other  values  are 
not  represented  by  gold  and  silver,  precisely 
because  these  are  a  purchasing  medium.  The 
immense  war  material  and  the  ships  which 
the  Germans  took  from  Russia,  the  rolling- 
stock  of  railways  everywhere  seized  by  them,  re- 
present milliards.  Again,  colonial  monopolies 
cost  millions  to  acquire,  which  were  paid  by 
great  companies  hoping  to  grow  rich  by  de- 


68  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

veloping  such  territories.  The  war  has  given 
to  Germany  the  economic  control  perhaps  of 
the  Balkans  and  of  the  Turkish  Empire,  but 
certainly  of  Russia,  all  rich  countries  which 
she  is  already  opening  up,  and  where,  if  she 
can  maintain  her  hold,  she  can  realize  a  profit 
of  many  milliards  on  a  relatively  small  out- 
lay, for  this  monopoly  cost  her  only  what 
she  has  paid  in  war  expenditures — little  com- 
pared with  the  stupendous  results  obtained. 
It  is  obvious  that  the  value  of  all  this  loot  is 
infinitely  greater  than  the  20  milliards  of  notes 
issued  by  the  German  Bank,  even  if  one  adds 
about  84  milliards  of  marks  borrowed  in  Ger- 
many up  to  July  1st,  1918.  The  Germans 
have  long  been  led  by  their  government  propa- 
ganda to  look  upon  war  as  a  "get-rich-quick'* 
scheme;  they  feel,  therefore,  that  the  war 
gains  constitute  an  additional  security  for 
the  credit  of  the  empire.  The  result  is  that, 
within  their  own  borders,  and  because  Ger- 
mans believe  firmly  that  their  conquests  will 
be  permanent,  particularly  those  in  the  east, 
government  loans  and  the  circulation  of  paper 
currency  are  thought  safer  than  ever,  resting, 
as  they  do,  on  two  firm  supports;  first,  the 
specie  reserve,  and  second,  the  immense  wealth 
gained  by  the  war.    Certainly  the  most  recent 


THE  GERMANS  AND  THE  ARMISTICE    C9 

events  compel  the  Germans  to  give  up  a 
notable  part  of  their  gains,  but  those  which 
remain  are  yet  so  great  that  Germany  is  still, 
in  spite  of  everything,  in  an  advantageous  situ- 
ation to  discuss  peace. 

England,  Italy,  and  France  have  had  to 
increase  their  paper  money  enormously  over 
peace-times  without  adding  to  their  security 
proportionally;  there  is  necessarily,  there- 
fore, a  wide  difference  between  the  economic 
position  of  Germany  and  that  of  the  Allies 
not  understood  among  us,  but  which  the  Ger- 
mans comprehend  perfectly.  Ullomme  En- 
chaine  quotes  from  an  article  in  the  Rhine 
and  Westphalia  Gazette,  August  24th,  1917: 
"Every  milliard  extorted  from  Belgium, 
France,  or  Serbia  is  just  so  much  gain  to  us 
and  loss  to  the  enemy." 

Germany  tries  to  draw  advantage  from 
this  difference  by  peace  parley  and  armistice 
before  the  Allies  can  completely  reverse  the 
situation  in  central  Europe  and  force  her  to 
disgorge  her  prey,  dishonestly  come  by,  but 
valuable  as  security  for  her  bank  issues. 
Berlin  will  endeavor  to  lead  the  Allies  into 
premature  peace  negotiations,  in  order  that 
their  swift  economic  downfall,  resulting  from 
the  difference  of  security  of  the  German  bank- 


70  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

notes  and  that  of  the  bank-notes  of  the  Euro- 
pean Entente  Allies  may  suffice  to  secure  to 
Germany  a  real  victory,  not  by  military  means, 
but  by  the  ruin  of  her  adversaries  at  the  mo- 
ment when  they  believe  themselves  victorious 
on  the  strength  of  a  brilliant  success  without 
taking  into  account  the  economic  diversities. 

III. 

Let  us  try  now  to  find  out  how  the  astute 
government  of  Berlin  makes  use  of  differences 
in  economic  conditions  which  four  years  of 
war  have  made  between  her  and  the  Allies. 

This  difference,  as  already  shown,  has  two 
notable  characteristics: 

1st.  Germany  has  gained  and  the  Allies  lost 
largely  by  the  war. 

2d.  The  German  circulation  of  paper  money 
is  safely  secured  by  the  booty  she  has  seized, 
and  her  commercial  monopolies  in  the  east, 
especially  in  Russia.  The  security  of  the 
Allies,  on  the  contrary,  depends  on  a  victory 
tliorough  enough  to  force  Germany  to  restore 
what  she  has  stolen,  and  repair  the  profound 
injuries  her  aggression  has  wrought  on  Europe. 

The  German  plan  will  succeed  only  if  the 
Allies   are   surprised   and   can   be   induced   to 


THE  GERMiVNS  AND  THE  ARMISTICE    71 

parley  without  full  comprehension  of  their 
precarious  financial  position,  outlined  above. 
They  must  comprehend  not  the  western  situa- 
tion only,  with  a  view  to  victory,  but  all  Eu- 
rope as  the  sole  method  of  forcing  Germany 
to  relinquish  completely  her  eastern  gains, 
which  form  the  chief  basis  of  her  war  profits. 
Berlin  counts  on  the  Alsace-Lorraine  trick 
to  bring  the  Allies  into  peace  negotiations 
before  the  time.  I  predicted  this  two  years 
ago,  but  since  then  several  Austrian  or  German 
personalities  have  baited  the  hook  with  such 
assurances  as  *'the  Alsace-Lorraine  question 
is  the  sole  obstacle  to  peace."  The  letter 
written  by  the  Emperor  of  Austria  as  to  French 
rights  in  Alsace-Lorraine  was  part  of  the  same 
plot,  which  has  been  taken  up  again  recently. 
According  to  the  paper  La  Suisse  of  July  30th, 
1918,  "the  German  people  are  willing  to 
cede  Alsace-Lorraine,  in  order  to  make  peace 
before  it  is  too  late."  The  mass  of  the  French 
nation  is  ready  to  thwart  this  Boche  manoeuvre, 
but  Americans  should  know  that  there  are 
groups  of  Frenchmen  who  would  let  themselves 
be  deceived  in  all  good  faith,  and  the  German 
General  Staff  has  learned  by  experience  in 
Russia  and  Caporetto  that  in  countries  worn 
out  by  a  long  and  cruel  strain  one  may  sue- 


72  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

ceed  by  acting  on  a  relatively  small  number 
among  civilians  or  in  the  army. 

There  are  three  groups  in  France  who  may 
be  taken  in  by  the  Alsace-Lorraine  trick: 
First,  those  who  only  wish  to  thrust  the  in- 
vader from  the  soil  of  France.  These  do  not 
look  at  the  war  in  Europe  as  a  whole,  nor  do 
they  at  all  understand  that  France  would  be 
irretrievably  ruined  if  Germany  retained  con- 
trol of  central  Europe  and  her  eastern  war 
gains. 

The  second  group  is  composed  of  well-mean- 
ing people  also,  but  who  fix  their  eyes  on 
Alsace-Lorraine,  forgetting  the  vital  impor- 
tance of  the  money  questions  raised  by  the 
war.  If  after  four  years  of  exhausting  struggle 
an  undoubted  military  success  should  force  the 
Germans  back,  and  oblige  them  to  restore 
Alsace-Lorraine,  many  among  this  group  would 
think  us  wrong  to  lose  the  opportunity  to  put 
an  end  to  such  carnage. 

Finally  the  third  group,  the  smallest  but 
the  most  dangerous  because  it  makes  the 
most  noise,  composed  of  peace-at-any-price 
members  and  a  few  very  active  French  Bol- 
sheviks. These  two  sets  of  people  have  not 
dwelt  on  tlie  restoration  to  France  of  her  lost 
provinces,  but  they  would  eagerly  accept  sug- 


THE  GERMANS  AND  THE  ARMISTICE    73 

gestions  coming  from  Germany,  as  they  are 
in  agreement  with  her  action.  We  cannot 
doubt  this  when  we  read  a  demand  that  **no 
peace  proposition  should  be  rejected,  no  matter 
what  its  source"  (see  Le  TempSy  June  28th, 
1918).  This  demand  was  contained  in  a  letter 
dated  June,  1918,  addressed  to  the  French  Par- 
liament by  the  Confederation  Generate  du  Tra- 
vail, the  only  large  union  in  France,  but  which 
really  represents  a  small  number  of  French 
workers.  This  state  of  mind  is,  moreover,  that 
of  some  Socialist  deputies,  careless  of  realities 
to  such  a  degree  that  they  have  even  declared 
that  the  war  map  means  nothing. 

A  part  at  least  of  the  French  population 
could  be  influenced  by  these  pushing  groups, 
ready  to  listen  to  "peace  proposals  from  any- 
where," even  from  Germans,  whose  word  is 
worthless,  and  without  waiting  till  the  mili- 
tary situation  advances  far  enough  to  force 
Germany  to  keep  her  engagements  toward 
oppressed  peoples,  and  indemnify  France  for 
her  stupendous  losses. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  should  completely 
misapprehend  the  Germans  if  we  supposed 
that  after  their  victories  and  seizures  of  three- 
quarters  of  Europe  and  part  of  Asia  they 
mean   to   yield   Alsace-Lorraine   permanently 


74  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

to  France.  They  will  probably  use  Alsace- 
Lorraine  as  a  bone  of  contention  among  the 
Allies,  to  tempt  the  French  to  a  premature 
peace  talk,  which  will  destroy  their  union 
and  morale.  This  result  obtained,  they  will 
say:  "We  will  not  restore  Alsace-Lorraine 
to  you,  for  you  are  ruined  and  unable  to  take 
it."  All  of  German  tactics  is  contained  in  this 
sentence  from  the  Frankfort  Gazette ,  December, 
1916,  "Negotiation  does  not  mean  renuncia- 
tion." 

Even  if  it  were  true  that  Germany  might 
be  disposed  to  return  for  the  moment  Alsace- 
Lorraine  to  France,  France  would  be  incapable 
of  holding  it  if  Greater  Germany  still  con- 
trolled Austria-Hungary,  the  Balkans,  and 
Turkey,  a  group  strong  politically  and  com- 
mercially, with  30  millions  of  soldiers  under 
the  orders  of  Berlin. 

The  map  here  inserted  and  the  accompany- 
ing table  shows  Alsace-Lorraine  restored  to 
France  and  Central  Pangermany,  so  that 
we  can  see  clearly  why  the  former  would  be 
too  weak  to  keep  her  provinces  under  such 
circumstances.  According  to  the  figures  of 
1914,  without  counting  men  killed  in  the  war, 
Franco,  iiu  liiding  Alsace-Lorraine,  could  raise 
ill  the  outside  an  army  of  8,300,000  men,  while 


THE  GERMANS  AND  THE  ARMISTICE    75 


76  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

Pangermany  would  have  nearly  22  million 
more.  France,  however,  could  not  keep  up 
her  army  on  account  of  the  ruin  brought  her 
by  the  war,  while  Germany  would  flourish  on 
the  fruits  of  her  vast  robberies.  These  sup- 
positions show  that  the  underlying  problem  of 
the  war  which  touches  us  all  is  not  the  ques- 
tion of  Alsace-Lorraine,  but  that  of  Central 
Pangermany,  the  foundation  of  Prussian  mili- 
tarism, which  has  threatened  the  entire  world. 
No,  neither  France  nor  the  Allies  are  fighting 
for  Alsace-Lorraine — part  of  a  great  whole — 
they  are  fighting  for  the  triumph  of  peaceful 
democracy,  and  this  implies  the  necessity  of 
setting  free  the  peoples  enslaved  by  Germany 
and  her  allies.  Undoubtedly,  Alsace-Lorraine 
has  a  right  to  freedom;  she  is  a  symbol  of  op- 
pressed peoples,  but  only  a  symbol,  for  her 
p()j)ulation  is  a  small  part  of  those  enslaved. 
True,  in  1871,  1,500,000  Frenchmen  were  torn 
from  their  country,  against  their  will;  but  in 
central  and  eastern  Europe,  there  are  now  close 
to  100  millions  of  Slavs,  Latins,  and  Semites 
who  are  reduced  to  a  frightful  slavery  by  the 
pro-Germans.  Their  servitude  is  an  obstacle 
to  the  establislinient  of  democracy,  and  so  is 
that  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  Our  map,  then,  shows 
us   thai   the  fate  of  the  latter  depends  upon 


THE  GERMANS  AND  THE  ARMISTICE    77 

the  overthrow  of  Central  Pangermany,  which 
will  put  an  end  to  the  Prussian  military  system. 
Pangermany  can  be  permanently  destroyed 
only  by  the  liberation  of  the  people  she  op- 
presses; we  can  therefore  say  justly  that  the 
complete  freedom  of  the  Poles,  Czechs,  Jugo- 
slavs, Roumanians,  etc.,  is  the  first  and  un- 
avoidable condition  on  which  Alsace-Lorraine 
can  be  lastingly  restored  to  France. 

It  is  possible  that  some  ill-informed  groups 
in  France  may  drift  toward  the  Alsace-Lor- 
raine snag;  we  should  therefore  guard  against 
it,  and  we  have  everything  needful  to  this 
end. 

The  restoration  of  Alsace-Lorraine  depends 
on  an  Allied  victory  which  will  reconstruct 
Europe  on  the  principle  of  nationalities;  we 
must  therefore  set  on  foot  the  necessary  propa- 
ganda to  instruct  those  in  France  who  have 
not  yet  grasped  this  fact.  America  has  begun 
this  propaganda  in  the  most  convincing  way, 
for  the  spectacle  of  masses  of  soldiers  from 
the  United  States  fighting  with  enthusiasm 
on  French  soil  gives  the  greatest  imaginable 
encouragement  to  war- weary  men,  and  makes 
them  feel  anew  that  no  stop  is  possible  before 
the  war  is  brought  to  a  righteous  conclusion. 
President  Wilson  has  also  partly  blunted  the 


78  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

edge  of  the  Alsace-Lorraine  stroke  in  advance. 
In  a  speech  dehvered  July  4th,  1918,  he  says: 
"The  settlement  must  be  final.  There  can 
be  no  compromise.  No  half-way  decision  is 
conceivable."  Again  Lansing's  note  of  May, 
1918,  defines  with  justice  and  clarity  the  atti- 
tude of  the  United  States  toward  the  oppressed 
Slavs  and  Latins  of  Central  Europe;  thus 
the  Alsace-Lorraine  trick  is  already  checked 
in  the  best  way  imaginable.  But  with  the 
Bodies  one  can  never  be  too  sure,  and  the 
more  our  press  insists  on  the  perfidy  hidden 
under  this  cloak,  the  more  its  success  will  be 
rendered  impossible. 

IV. 

We  have  explained  the  situation  resulting 
from  four  years  of  war,  and  we  will  now  show 
how  the  Germans  could  exploit  it.  Let  us 
assume  that  the  Allies  have  driven  them  out 
of  France  and  Belgium,  that  Alsace-Lorraine 
is  restored,  and  that  peace  negotiations  are 
going  on,  but  that  Gernumy  continues  to  pre- 
dominate over  central  Europe  and  Russia. 

On  I  his  liyi)()thesis,  how  can  the  bankruptcy 
of  the  Allied  EiirojxNin  states  be  l)rouglit  about, 
according   to  the  German  design.^     It  is  not 


THE  GERMANS  AND  THE  ARMISTICE    79 

necessary  in  this  connection  to  touch  upon 
the  financial  situation  of  Great  Britain  and 
Italy;  it  will  be  sufficient  to  sketch  broadly 
the  efFect  of  the  German  aggression  in  this 
respect  on  France.  In  the  first  place,  her  posi- 
tion is  particularly  striking,  for  she  has  borne 
the  burden  and  heat  of  the  day.  She  is  the 
bulwark  of  civilization  and  has  made  greater 
money  sacrifices,  and  endured  losses  much 
heavier  than  those  of  her  allies.  Secondly, 
as  France  is  the  pivot  of  the  Entente  coalition, 
it  is  at  her  finances  that  the  Germans  aim,  in 
order  by  reflex  action  to  reach  Italy  and  Great 
Britain. 

At  the  opening  of  hostilities  France  had 
issued  6  milliards  of  bank-notes,  and  in  July, 
1918,  this  circulation  had  increased  to  29  mil- 
liards of  francs.  In  June,  1914,  France  had 
3  milliards  in  gold  and  silver,  and  in  July,  1918, 
the  specie  reserve  of  the  Bank  of  France 
amounted  in  round  numbers  to  5  milliards,  600 
millions,  of  which  2  millions  in  gold  was  abroad 
as  security  for  war  debts.  The  French  national 
debt  was  30  miUiards  before  the  war;  when 
this  is  over,  what  with  huge  war  expenditures, 
reconstruction  of  railways,  etc.,  it  will  amount 
to  200  milliards  of  francs.  Now  prior  to  1914, 
the  entire   fortune   of  France   was   estimated 


80  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

by  economists  at  between  250  and  325  mil- 
liards. The  pensions  alone  for  the  wounded 
and  for  the  widows  of  soldiers,  with  interest 
on  the  war  debt,  will  bring  the  annual  budget 
up  from  the  former  figure  of  5  milliards  to  at 
least  12  milliards  of  francs,  an  increase  of  not 
less  than  7  milliards  which  will  have  to  be 
raised  by  permanent  taxation. 

The  German  invasion,  besides,  has  ravaged 
and  pillaged  the  northeast  of  France,  the  chief 
industrial  region,  and  so  rich  that  before  the 
war  it  paid  a  fourth  of  the  French  taxes. 
French  citizens  also  have  lost  nearly  20  mil- 
liards in  Russian,  Balkan,  and  Ottoman  securi- 
ties. 

It  has  been  stated,  that  in  the  first  three 
years  of  war,  French  imports  exceeded  exports 
by  about  25  milliards,  and  finally  France  has 
borrowed  large  sums  abroad  to  buy  raw  ma- 
terial and  feed  her  population. 

Every  inlclligent  Frenchman  therefore  un- 
derstands that  the  29  milliards  in  paper-money 
at  the  above  date,  must  have  for  their 
security  not  only  5  milliards  in  specie  (2  of 
tluMu  abroad),  but  a  victory  sufficiently  real 
to  force  Germany  to  make  good  her  thefts, 
and  progressively  repair  the  injuries  she  has 
caused. 


THE   GERMANS  AND  THE   ARMISTICE    81 

This  conforms  to  the  most  elementary  idea 
of  justice,  and  is  also  the  sole  economic  pos- 
sibility. While  Germany  is  gorged  with  riches 
as  the  fruit  of  her  crimes,  how  could  our  brave 
French  soldiers  pay  a  tax  increase  of  7  mil- 
liards, when  they  come  back  from  the  trenches 
after  such  years,  the  country  torn  by  the 
struggle,  while  Germany  preserves  the  greater 
part  of  her  immense  profits  ? 

We  must  face  the  truth  and  speak  it  plainly: 
only  annuities  paid  by  the  Germans,  for  dam- 
age inflicted,  used  to  back  French  national 
loans,  will  enable  France  to  save  her  people 
from  taxes  that  would  soon  be  fatal,  and  to 
keep  engagements  which  she  holds  sacred. 

The  French  believe  firmly  that  a  just  peace 
will  bring  restitution,  and  that  is  why  they 
have  not  lost  faith  in  their  paper  currency, 
w^hich  in  spite  of  its  increase  retains  its  full 
purchasing  power.  This  economic  and  psy- 
chologic position  is  watched  carefully  by  the 
cunning  Boches,  for  they  hope  to  make  use 
of  it  through  their  pacifist  manoeuvres. 

The  Berlin  Deutsche  OeJwnomist,  May  4th, 
1918,  says:  "The  money  situation  in  France 
is  worse  now  than  at  any  time  during  the 
World  War.  The  printing-press  is  the  only 
source  of  revenue  for  M.  Klotz,  Minister  of 


82  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

Finance,  and  he  makes  liberal  use  of  it.  .  .  . 
If  this  goes  on,  fresh  notes  will  have  to  be  is- 
sued in  France  to  pay  interest  on  the  national 
debt,  just  as  in  Russia." 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Boches  know  well 
enough  that  these  difficulties  are  as  naught, 
as  long  as  France  remains  the  corner-stone 
of  the  coalition,  for  the  Entente  as  a  whole, 
especially  since  the  United  States  entered  the 
war,  has  large  financial  resources.  To  succeed, 
then,  in  their  scheme,  they  want  to  isolate 
France,  leaving  her  to  cope  single-handed 
with  her  money  difficulties. 

To  understand  and  thwart  this  Boche  plot 
we  must  presuppose  a  state  of  things  best 
adapted  to  its  success,  as  follows:  Seeing  the 
influx  of  American  troops,  the  German  Govern- 
ment will  admit  that  a  military  decision  is  not 
immediately  possible,  and  will  endeavor  to 
bring  a})out  a  treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk  suitable 
to  western  conditions.  The  Berlin  General 
Staff  will  then  adopt  the  following  tactics. 
Tlicir  armies  will  fall  back  slowly  on  the 
western  front,  destroying  all  behind  them,  so 
that  the  ground  regained  may  cost  the  Allies 
as  much  as  possible.  France  and  Belgium  will 
be  evacuated,  while  we  advance  slowly  but 
continuously.     Meanwhile,  our  papers  will  be 


THE  GERMANS  AND  THE  ARMISTICE    83 

filled  with  accounts  of  victory,  and  the  public 
will  believe  that  the  German  army  is  con- 
quered because  it  has  certainly  retired  before 
the  onslaught  of  the  Allies,  the  German  press 
will  not  deny  this,  it  will  even  offer  Alsace- 
Lorraine  as  the  price  of  peace.  Our  pacifists 
and  Bolschevists,  encouraged  by  these  events 
will  urge  their  views  more  strongly  than  ever, 
and  the  majority  of  people  in  Entente  coun- 
tries will  be  so  influenced  that  at  last  they 
will  say:  "Why  accept  new  sacrifices  since 
we  are  now  victorious  ?  We  can  talk  of  peace 
on  our  own  terms."  The  Allied  governments 
feel  the  danger  of  negotiations  while  Germany 
still  holds  Central  Europe  and  Russia,  but  on 
our  hypothesis  we  will  imagine  them  over- 
borne by  public  opinion.  Military  operations 
would  then  cease,  and  parleys  would  begin. 

Nothing  would  suit  the  Germans  better, 
for  they  would  then  be  sure  of  the  success  of 
their  western  Brest-Litovsk.  They  believe 
that  the  money  position  of  the  Allies  is  such 
that  peace  conversation  would  be  no  sooner 
begun,  than  it  would  give  rise  to  the  follow- 
ing chain  of  circumstances: 

The  Germans  argue  thus:  "Suppose  we 
engage  the  Allies  in  talk,  we  are  none  the  less 
masters  of  Central  Europe  and  Russia.    Shortly 


84  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

after  the  opening  of  negotiations,  the  French 
will  be  brought  to  see  that  Germany  will  not 
act  as  she  expects,  and  repair  the  harm  done 
by  the  war.  As  the  purchasing  power  of  the 
French  notes  rests  entirely  on  the  public  con- 
fidence in  German  restitution,  if  this  confidence 
disappears,  at  the  same  time,  the  purchasing 
power  of  the  notes  will  also  vanish,  while  the 
cost  of  living,  already  high,  will  rise  still 
further.  This  effect  is  bound  to  follow  since 
to  buy  the  same  article  a  larger  amount  of 
paper  money  will  be  required  continually, 
as  was  the  case  in  Russia.  This  drop  in  the 
purchasing  power  of  notes  of  the  Bank  of 
France  will  cause  wide-spread  troubles  in  daily 
life  over  even  now  invaded  districts,  w^hich 
will  soon  grow  inextricable.  The  people,  worn 
by  the  long  nervous  strain,  will  lose  their 
heads;  there  will  be  riots  before  which  the 
government  will  be  helpless,  because  the  vitia- 
tion of  its  currency  will  have  undermined  the 
national  credit.  Bonds  of  the  National  De- 
fense and  French  rents  will  fall  with  the  same 
rapidity,  and  this,  joined  to  the  hardships  of 
the  winter  months,  will  at  least  destroy  the 
morale  oi  the  French,  rendering  further  mili- 
tary resistance  out  of  the  (luestion.  Under 
these    circumstances,    the    British    troops   and 


THE  GERMANS  AND  THE  ARMISTICE    85 

the  two  million  Americans  in  France  could 
be  of  no  use.  'From  this  moment,'  argue  the 
Germans,  'we  have  only  to  repeat  the  trick 
which  worked  so  well  in  Russia  after  our  nego- 
tiations with  the  Bolshevists  had  broken  the 
national  spirit.  The  financial  crisis  leaving 
France  at  our  mercy,  having  carefully  saved 
our  effectives,  reinforced  by  a  new  class,  we 
will  resume  the  offensive,  this  time  without 
serious  resistance,  and  penetrate  to  the  very 
heart  of  France.  We  can  then  control  the 
material  wealth  of  the  hitherto  uninvaded 
districts,  and,  with  the  whole  country  in  our 
power,  will  use  it  as  a  base  against  the  United 
States  according  to  programme.'  " 

Such  is  a  bird's-eye  view  of  the  plot  the 
Germans  are  working  at  this  moment  in  try- 
ing by  every  means  in  their  power  to  secure 
an  armistice  which  would  save  them  from  in- 
vasion and  would  open  a  period  of  negotia- 
tions. If  our  lack  of  foresight  allows  them 
to  carry  it  into  effect,  the  results  will  be  in- 
finitely disastrous.  The  success  of  this  plan 
in  France  would  entail  the  downfall  of  Eng- 
land, and  of  Italy  also,  on  account  of  her  de- 
pendence on  France.  Berlin  has  built  up  this 
clever  scheme,  on  which  she  counts  to  give 
her  victory,  just  at  the  moment  that  the  Allies 


86  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

think  they  have  won.  She  trusts  that  these 
economic  methods  will  prevail,  even  if  she  is 
driven  back  in  the  west,  as  long  as  she  can 
hold  the  rest  of  her  war  booty  and  retain  her 
grip  on  Russia. 

From  the  foregoing,  we  draw  three  impor- 
tant conclusions: 

1st.  The  Allied  credit  depends  on  a  true 
victory  implying  restitution  from  Germany 
and  the  relinquishment  of  her  control  of  cen- 
tral Europe,  which  implies  the  dismemberment 
of  Austria-Hungary. 

2d.  Four  years  of  war  have  produced  an 
unprecedented  economic  situation;  therefore 
the  purchasing  power  of  the  Allied  currency 
must  necessarily  diminish  if  negotiations  are 
entered  on  before  an  economically  restorative 
and  really  decisive  victory  from  the  European 
point  of  view. 

3d.  These  dangers  threaten  us  only  because 
the  Allies  have  not  argued  as  they  should  on 
peace  as  it  would  affect  the  extraordinary 
state  of  finance  resulting  from  the  war. 

This  omission  in  most  of  our  peace  pro- 
^'rammos  would  end,  if  these  programmes  were 
appli(>(l,  in  a  disaster  more  hopeless  than  any 
military  catastrophe.  This  sword  hangs  over 
our   heads   because  many  of  us   think  of  the 


THE  GERMANS  AND  THE  ARMISTICE    87 

Germans  as  impoverished  instead  of  being 
enriched  by  the  war.  It  is,  however,  easy  to 
parry  this  blow  and  to  make  its  success  im- 
possible; we  must  undertake  a  campaign  of 
popular  education  to  instruct  the  whole  Allied 
public  as  to  the  reality  and  extent  of  the  Ger- 
man war  profits.  All  will  then  see  that  the 
war  must  not  end  till  Germany  has  restored 
the  fruit  of  her  enormous  thefts  and  repaired 
the  vast  damages  which  she  has  caused,  not 
only  by  the  destruction  she  has  carried  out, 
but  by  the  war  costs,  much  greater  than  her 
own,  which  her  aggression  has  forced  upon  her 
adversaries. 


CHAPTER  III. 

PANGERMANY'S  PROBABLE  INHLITARY  STRENGTH, 
AND  ITS  WEAKNESS  AT  THE  OUTSET  OF  THE 
FIFTH  YEAR  OF  WAR. 

I.     The  annual  military  contingent  of  Germany. 
II.     Approximate  strength  of  German  mobilized   forces  in 
August,  1918. 

III.  Critical  discussion  of  the  figures  found  to  represent  the 

man-power  of  Germany. 

IV.  The  probable  total  forces  of  Pangermany  in  August, 

1918. 

V.     How  new  sources  of  effectives  could  have  been  used  to 

offset  the  American  numbers,  if  the  Allies  had  not  acted 

in  the  Balkans  and  time  had  been  left  to  the  Germans. 

VT.     How  it  is  the  successes  of  the  Allies  in  the  Balkans  that 

secure  the  superiority  in  man-power  to  the  Entente. 
VII.     The  teachings  of  the  recent  past  and  of  the  present 
prove  the  immense  power  of  political  strategy,  and 
that  for  the  Allies  the  Danube-Central  Europe  front 
exerts  a  decisive  influence  on  the  issue  of  the  war. 

The  progressive  evacuation  of  France  and 
of  Belgium  })y  the  Germans,  the  surrender  of 
Bulgaria,  of  Turke}^  of  Austria-Hungary,  must 
not  prevent  us  from  studying  thoroughly  the 
military  forces  of  tlie  states  which  have  made 
u]>  nu(\  may  again  make  up  Pangermany. 

This  study  is  necessary  to  avoid,  in  esti- 
mating   the   German    man-power,    any   error, 

88 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     89 

at  the  conclusion  of  peace,  which  would  be 
fatal  to  the  cause  of  democracy.  We  shall  see 
in  effect  that  the  Germans  have  still  more  men 
than  the  Allies  generally  believe,  and  that  con- 
sequently the  Allies  ought  still  to  be  cautious. 


The  opinion  prevailing  in  Entente  coun- 
tries is  that  victory  will  fall  to  the  group  of 
belligerents  possessing  the  greatest  man-power, 
but  this  opinion  is  not  altogether  in  harmony 
with  the  teachings  of  history.  Thanks  to 
superior  strategy.  Napoleon  often  conquered 
even  with  numbers  against  him,  and  in  the 
first  four  years  of  the  World  War,  success  has 
not  fallen  to  the  largest  numerical  group,  as 
the  following  table  will  show: 


Entente 

Central  Powers 

Russia 

Millions  of 
Inhabitants 

182 
46 
40 
36 

8 

7 

6 

5 
_^ 
334 

Germany 

Millions  of 
Inhabitants 

68 

England 

France 

Austria-Hungary . . 

Turkey 

Bulgaria 

50 
20 

Italy 

5 

Roumania 

Belgium 

Portugal 

Serbia 

Total 

Greece 

Total 

143 

90  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

Great  Britain  certainly  was  short  of  men 
when  the  war  broke  out,  but  by  1916  she  had 
raised  a  considerable  army,  and  it  is  equally 
true  that  Austria-Hungary  was  of  but  little 
assistance  to  Germany,  owing  to  the  fact  that 
the  majority  of  her  Slav  and  Latin  popula- 
tion— about  28  millions — was  averse  to  the 
war.  Turkey  and  Bulgaria  also  were  exhausted 
and  stripped  of  their  armaments  by  the  Balkan 
Wars,  so  that  they  did  not  really  come  into 
line  before  1915.  As  a  whole,  then,  the  Entente 
had  an  enormous  numerical  advantage  of  191 
millions  of  inhabitants  over  the  Central  Em- 
pires, which  of  course  meant  reserves  of  man- 
power much  greater  than  those  of  the  Boches, 
but  in  spite  of  this  a  glance  at  the  map  of  Pan- 
germany  in  August,  1918  (page  14),  shows 
that  the  latter  had  the  upper  hand. 

Numbers,  then,  do  not  insure  victory,  which 
may  rather  depend  on  the  strategic  use  made 
of  forces  covering  the  whole  theatre  of  war. 

It  was  necessary  to  show  the  relative  value 
of  numbers  in  a  campaign,  but  there  should 
be  no  misconception  as  to  the  extreme  im- 
portance of  large  reserves,  for,  the  strategic 
(lualities  of  the  contestants  being  equal,  it  is 
obvious  that  victory  will  fall  to  the  share  of 
the  larger  armies.     The  question  of  effectives 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     91 

Is  most  important  to  the  Allies,  and  rightly 
so,  but  many  of  them  think  erroneously  that 
since  the  American  reinforcements  assure  our 
superiority  in  man-power,  nothing  can  over- 
throw it.  If  this  is  so,  it  is  only  by  reason  of 
certain  political-strategic  conditions  in  the 
east,  which  I  will  explain  at  the  end  of  this 
chapter. 

During  the  first  three  years  of  the  war. 
Allied  opinion  on  the  question  of  German 
reserves  was  influenced  chiefly  by  Colonel 
Repington,  military  critic  of  the  London 
Times;  this  paper,  however,  no  longer  pub- 
lishes his  articles.  In  these  fateful  three  years, 
most  Allied  papers  incHned  to  the  views  of 
the  greatest  and  most  devoted  to  the  cause  of 
the  Allies  of  the  British  dailies,  but  Colonel 
Repington's  premonitions  have  been  falsified 
by  the  events.  He  announced  many  times 
that,  according  to  his  calculations,  German 
reserves  would  be  soon  exhausted.  This  mis- 
take as  to  the  enemy's  effectives  has  done  an 
infinite  amount  of  harm  to  our  cause,  as  I 
pointed  out  in  an  article  published  by  La 
Vidoire,  Paris,  October  28th,  1916.  The  ar- 
ticle is  here  exactly  reproduced: 

*'In  the  London  Times  of  Jan.  10,  1916,  we 
read: 


92  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

"'Col.  Repington  estimates  the  German 
losses  at  200,000  men  a  month;  if  therefore 
the  struggle  continues  with  the  same  intensity, 
up  to  a  date  between  May  and  October,  1916, 
Germany  will  be  unable  to  stop  the  gaps  made 
in  her  lines  by  the  fighting  of  each  day.  Be- 
fore that  date,  then,  she  must  try  to  obtain 
a  decision,  on  one  front  or  the  other. 

*"Four  weeks  later  Col.  Repington  made 
statements  not  only  entirely  opposed  to  the 
above,  but  much  more  reasonable,  and  which 
showed  on  what  slender  grounds  his  earlier 
calculations  had  been  made.  This  is  clear 
from  his  letter  to  the  Times  of  the  9th  of  Feb. 
1916,  in  which  he  asserts  that  the  "Berlin 
government  now  has  at  its  disposal  reserve 
forces  amounting  to  2,700,000  men.'"  (See 
L' I nformation,  Paris,  February  10th,  1916.) 

"A  month  before,  when  Colonel  Repington 
stated  that  the  Germans  were  losing  200,000 
a  month,  and  that  sometime  between  May 
and  October  they  would  find  themselves  with- 
out reserves,  he  made  a  serious  mistake.  The 
extreme  carelessness  of  his  judgment  appears 
yet  more  clearly  when  we  read  a  statement  in 
The  Times  of  April  30tli,  which  ignores  his 
previous  estimate  of  the  number  of  German 
reserves,  for  he  writes  exactly  as  if  these  re- 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     93 

serves  did  not  exist  when  he  says:  'The  Ger- 
man armies  on  the  Russian  front  do  not 
amount  to  more  than  1,300  men  to  the  mile 
.  .  .  and  to  sum  up,  the  eastern  front  is  a  new 
wall  of  China  with  nothing  behind  it.'  U In- 
formation,  Paris,  May  %,  1916,  accepts  Rep- 
ington's  miscalculation  copying  TJie  Times 
article,  with  the  headline,  'The  German  armies 
have  no  more  reserves.' 

"By  the  end  of  August,  1916,  Colonel  Rep- 
ington  decides  that  Germany  is  reduced  ev- 
erywhere to  the  defensive  {Le  Journal,  Paris, 
August  25th,  1916),  the  lack  of  reserves  ren- 
dering it  impossible  for  the  Kaiser  to  make 
a  serious  offensive.  A  flat  contradiction  to 
this  was  soon  shown  when  Berlin  overthrew 
Roumania,  with  fresh  troops  which  poured  in 
from  Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  Turkey,  and 
Bulgaria  (see  Journal  de  Geneve,  19th  of  Oc- 
tober, 1916,  quoting  from  VIdea  Nazionale). 

"The  contrast  between  the  actual  facts  in 
1916  and  Repington's  calculations  of  the  Ger- 
man reserves  alone  will  prove  to  the  least  in- 
formed that  even  if  these  estimates  were 
serious,  they  were  quite  insufficient  to  give 
so  much  as  an  approximate  idea  of  the  truth. 

"In  point  of  fact,  when  we  speak  of  German 
reserves,  we  must  surely  mean  to  include  ef- 


94  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

fectives  contributed  by  Austria-Hungary,  Tur- 
key, and  Bulgaria,  all  under  orders  from  Ber- 
lin; for  as  far  as  we  can  see,  without  these 
vassals,  Germany  could  not  keep  up  the 
struggle.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the 
Bulgars  work  for  the  King  of  Prussia  in 
Monastir,  and  the  Turks  in  Galicia  and  the 
Dobrudja.  Thus,  at  the  lowest  estimate 
there  must  be  1,500,000  Turco-Bulgars  to  be 
subdued  by  the  Allies,  just  as  much  as  the 
Austro-Boches.  These  1,500,000  Turco-Bul- 
gars deserve  particular  consideration  from 
Colonel  Repington,  for,  as  we  all  know,  he  has 
contributed  to  place  them  at  the  service  of 
William  II  by  his  strenuous  opposition  to 
the  Allied  attempt  to  preserve  the  Danube 
front;  though  this  was  the  only  operation 
which  could  have  prevented  the  junction  of 
the  Germans,  Bulgars  and  Turks,  and,  there- 
fore, the  hold  of  the  Kaiser  on  this  1,500,000 
people.  The  colonel,  however,  does  not  in- 
clude them  in  his  calculations,  any  more  than 
the  2  millions  of  prisoners  held  by  the  Ger- 
mans, who  work  in  their  munition  factories 
or  behind  the  military  fronts,  thereby  setting 
free  just  so  many  Austro-Boches,  who  without 
these  jirisoners  would  have  themselves  to  carry 
on  these  labors  indispensable  to  the  army. 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH    95 

"Colonel  Repington's  carelessness  and  inco- 
herence on  these  points  must  be  clear,  then,  to 
the  meanest  capacity.  His  estimates  as  to  the 
enemies'  effectives  are  full  of  mistakes,  for  he 
neglects  the  essential  factors  to  be  considered; 
and  these  mistakes  have  produced  the  worst 
practical  consequences.  The  great  weight  at- 
tached to  The  Times,  has  caused  numerous  Al- 
lied newspapers  to  quote  Repington's  articles 
in  the  fullest  confidence,  and  this  has  filled  the 
public  mind  in  Entente  countries,  with  the 
most  dangerous  notions  about  the  duration  of 
the  war,  and  the  extent  of  effort  necessary  to 
defeat  the  barbarians  from  beyond  the  Rhine." 

These  fines  were  written  at  the  end  of  1916. 
Since  then  the  German  offensives  in  different 
directions  have  proved  how  much  Colonel 
Repington  was  mistaken  as  to  the  enemy's 
reserves,  but  these  errors  have  contributed 
materially  to  the  cruel  disappointments  of  the 
Allies  and  the  prolongation  of  the  war,  for 
his  statements  fostered  the  opinion  that  the 
conflict  would  certainly  end  in  three  months, 
as  Germany  was  near  exhaustion,  and  that  all 
that  was  needful  was  to  push  the  fight  on  the 
western  front  until  her  reserves  gave  out,  when 
our  victory  was  sure  to  follow. 


96  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

Four  years  of  war  and  the  fact  that  the  pro- 
gressive evacuation  of  France  and  of  Belgium 
was  decided  upon  by  the  Germans  only  after 
the  defeat  of  Bulgaria  at  the  end  of  September, 
1918,  demonstrate  the  depth  of  these  errors, 
and  as  the  interest  of  America  is  identical 
with  that  of  the  Allies,  she  should  grasp  the 
situation  clearly  that  she  may  avoid  the  mis- 
take made  in  Europe  as  to  the  man-power  of 
Germany,  which  has  ahvays  been  greatly 
underestimated,  so  that  even  to-day,  after  the 
German  retreat  on  the  west  front,  it  is  placed 
at  much  less  than  it  is  in  reality. 

The  Allies  were  so  much  surprised  at  the 
numerical  superiority  of  the  Germans  during 
their  great  offensive  on  the  western  front  in 
April-June,  1918,  that  in  order  to  account  for 
it,  certain  Allies  explained  that  before  the  war 
Germany  gave  out  false  reports  as  to  her 
population,  which  was  much  larger  than  the 
official  figures,  and  now  supplied  her  from 
resources  greater  than  had  been  believed. 
The  truth  is  really  much  simpler,  for  mistakes 
about  the  German  forces  arise  from  superficial 
ideas  existing  among  the  Allies  on  many  sub- 
jects, not  only  about  Austria-TTungarj^  Bul- 
garia, and  Turkey,  countries  difficult  to  un- 
derstand, but  about  Germany  as  well. 


PANGERMANY'S   MILITARY  STRENGTH     97 

We  are  apt  to  think  it  a  sign  of  weakness 
when  we  see  boys  of  seventeen  in  the  German 
army,  and  from  the  early  days  of  the  war  our 
press  often  mentioned  this,  saying:  "Germany 
must  be  in  a  bad  way,  if  she  has  to  use  recruits 
only  seventeen  years  old."  It  is,  however, 
perfectly  natural,  and  long  before  the  war  it 
was  the  law  that  every  German,  able  to  bear 
arms  should  be  liable  to  military  service,  that 
is,  he  might  be  obliged  to  join  the  colors  at 
seventeen  years  of  age.  In  time  of  peace  these 
joined  at  twenty,  but  the  circumstance  of 
their  enlistment  during  the  war  at  seventeen, 
far  from  being  a  proof  indicative  of  German 
exhaustion,  shows,  on  the  contrary,  that  the 
Berlin  government  resolved  long  ago  to  make 
war  with  all  the  means  at  its  command,  and 
thus  to  deal  its  enemies  the  deadliest  blows. 

In  July  and  August,  1918,  when  our  brilhant 
counter-offensives  forced  the  Teutons  back 
from  the  Soisson-Rheims  salient,  even  as  early 
as  the  first  day  of  August,  many  of  the  Allies 
returned  to  the  opinion  that  his  retirement 
was  owing  to  lack  of  men,  and  that  complete 
victory  would  result  automatically  from  the 
destruction  of  the  German  army  on  the  west- 
ern front.  It  is  now  hard  to  understand  such 
fixed  and  definite  ideas.     On  the  IGth  of  Au- 


98  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

gust  many  Allied  papers  estimated  the  German 
losses  since  July  15tli  at  250,000  men,  -a  large 
number,  no  doubt;  but  to  judge  sanely  of  the 
effect  of  this  on  the  war  we  must  set  against 
it  the  loss  the  Germans  have  inflicted  on  us 
since  April,  a  loss  certainly  not  negligible,  as 
everything  in  war  is  a  question  of  comparison 
between  the  two  contestants. 

The  above  figure  for  German  losses  is  not 
high  enough  to  allow  us  to  conclude  that  the 
enemy  at  this  period,  when  the  Bulgarian 
disaster  had  not  yet  taken  place,  was  al- 
ready short  of  reserves,  especially  as  we  were 
assured  that  he  had  about  7  millions  of  men 
on  all  the  western  front.  This  retirement 
may,  perhaps,  be  interpreted  as  part  of  the 
shrewd  pacifist  manoeuvre  of  which  I  have 
spoken  in  the  preceding  chapter,  and  which 
I  had  foreseen  two  years  ago  (see  my  pref- 
ace). 

Color  is  given  to  this  idea  by  an  extract 
from  the  Stuttgart  Neiies  Tagblatt,  dated  Au- 
gust 19th,  1918,  which  quotes  from  the 
Schwdbische  Tagwacht,  a  statement  that  Ger- 
many's soldiers  are  exhausted,  and  agree  with 
the  civil  population  in  demanding  peace  at 
any  price.  I  do  not  say  this  is  not  true;  I 
uHTcIy  state  that,  given  the  German  censor- 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     99 

ship  at  this  period,  an  item  of  this  sort  could 
only  have  been  published  on  the  other  side 
of  the  Rhine  with  permission  of  the  General 
Staff,  which  must  certainly  have  had  some 
purpose  to  serve  in  authorizing  the  appear- 
ance of  such  a  statement.  There  is  at  least 
ground  for  suspicion. 

However  this  may  be,  four  years  of  war 
have  not  justified  these  opinions  held  in  the 
Entente,  notably  by  Colonel  Repington,  as  to 
German  reserves.  The  only  way  of  reaching  a 
fair  conclusion  on  this  question,  always  ex- 
tremely important,  even  at  this  moment  when 
the  Germans  are  beginning  to  evacuate  France 
and  Belgium,  is  to  start  fresh,  renouncing  all 
former  opinions  which  stand  in  need  of  proof, 
and  seeking  corroboration  from  reliable  sources 
as  to  Germany's  man-power  and  her  military 
strength  at  the  threshold  of  this  fifth  year  of 
the  war,  remembering  always  that  this 
strength  is  exerted  over  the  entire  war-field 
subject  to  the  direction  of  Berlin. 

To  approximate  as  nearly  as  possible  to  the 
truth,  we  must  study  successively  the  two  es- 
sential elements  of  this  problem. 

1st.  What  is  the  annual  military  contingent 
of  Germany  ? 

2d.  Making   proper   deductions,    what   was 


100  AN  ENDURING  \^CTORY 

the    present    state    of    Germany's    mobilized 
military  forces  in  August,  1918. 

I. 

The  mistake  of  the  Allies  as  to  German  re- 
serves arises  from  an  inexact  valuation  of  their 
annual  military  contingent.  Many  people  of 
importance  put  this  contingent  at  about 
400,000,  and  this  figure  is  generally  accepted 
b}"  the  Allies.  According  to  German  reports 
dating  from  before  the  war,  these  figures  are 
much  below  the  truth.  According  to  the 
best-known  German  military  publication,  Loe- 
belVs  Jahresherichte  for  1911,  published  in  the 
spring  of  1912,  the  number  of  recruits  for 
1910  was  1,245,363,  the  population  of  the 
empire  being  then  exactly  65  millions.  On 
looking  at  these  figures  carefully,  we  see  that 
they  include  the  class  coming  up  for  examina- 
tion as  well  as  those  adjourned  from  preceding 
classes.  Taken  in  the  lump,  they  can  be 
analyzed  thus: 

Excluded  on  account  of  criminal  conviction 890 

Invalided 34,067 

Men  in  advance  of  their  time 39,970 

Service  deferred  {ajournes) 715,952 

Men  fit  fur  service 454,484 

Ix't  us  analyze  these  figures,  so  as  to  ascer- 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     101 

tain  the  annual  contingent  of  Germany  if  she 
had  wished  to  make  war  in  1910,  instead  oj 
merely  keeping  up  her  peace  establishment. 

To  keep  down  expenses  before  the  war, 
Germany  did  not  enhst  by  any  means  all  the 
men  fit  for  service,  so  it  is  plain  that  if  she 
had  brought  on  war  in  1910,  she  would  first 
have  taken  into  the  army  the  whole  number 
ready  for  that  year;  say  454,484  men.  Now 
let  us  examine  the  list  of  those  whose  service 
was  deferred,  715,952,  a  very  high  figure.  We 
must  first  understand  the  conditions  under 
which  men  are  deferred  (or  adjourned)  from 
the  German  army.  This  does  not  happen  in 
cases  of  sickness,  but  where  the  men  are  phys- 
ically fit,  but  suffering  from  some  temporary 
weakness.  It  was  easy  to  get  an  adjournment 
before  the  war,  as  there  were  more  men  fit  for 
service  than  the  state  could  afford  to  enlist. 
Moreover,  excuse  is  granted  in  Germany  for 
any  one  of  a  number  of  reasons,  depending  on 
family  or  commercial  considerations,  so  that 
men  obtain  it  as — 

1st.  The  necessary  support  of  a  family. 

2d.  The  sons  of  a  landed  proprietor,  farmer, 
or  manufacturer  incapable  of  work. 

3d.  Next  of  kin  to  soldiers  killed,  or  dead 
of  wounds  in  the  service. 


102  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

4th.  Having  inherited  property  or  land, 
which  can  only  be  managed  by  themselves. 

5th.  Owners  of  factories  or  important  busi- 
ness houses  where  their  presence  is  indispen- 
sable. 

6th.  Young  men  preparing  for  any  pro- 
fession, study  or  trade  to  which  interruption 
would  be  prejudicial. 

7th.  Young  men  living  abroad. 

From  this  it  is  clear  that  the  men  exempted 
in  peace-time  are  all  physically  capable  of 
bearing  arms  for  the  Kaiser,  or  of  work  in 
the  many  branches  of  service  in  the  rear  of  an 
army.  Observe  also  that  according  to  mili- 
tary law  adjournment  lasts  only  three  years, 
so  that  the  number,  715,952  men  for  1910, 
mentioned  above  includes  only  three  classes 
adjourned;  consequently^  taking  a  third  of  this 
figure — 238,650,  we  reach  the  mean  number  of 
men  adjourned  in  1910,  who  would  unques- 
tionably have  entered  the  army  in  that  year. 

In  1910,  Germany  had  also  34,067  rcformes 
(men  invalided),  and  of  course  in  all  the  bellig- 
erent countries  it  is  much  harder  to  be  invalided 
in  time  of  war;  therefore  we  can  allow  a  third  of 
the  figure  34,067,  say,  11,355,  men  who  would 
hav(»  been  part  of  the  war  contingent  in  1910. 

To  sum  up,  if  Germany  had  begun  the  war 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     103 

in  that  year,  her  war  levy  would  have  been 
made  up  of  three  categories,  as  follows: 

Fit  for  service  in  1910 454,484  men 

A  third  of  those  adjourned  in  1910 238,650  men 

A  third  of  those  reformSs  in  1910 11,355  men 

Total 704,489  men 

Let  us  say  in  round  numbers  300,000  men 
besides  the  400,000  generally  allowed  to  be 
the  regular  annual  levy. 

This  total  of  700,000  men  is  probably  less 
than  the  present  annual  war  contingent  in 
Germany,  as  it  pertains  to  the  year  1910,  and 
according  to  the  Almanack  de  Gotha,  page  531, 
in  1910  Germany  had  exactly  64,925,993  in- 
habitants, in  1913  she  had  66,835,000;  in- 
dicating an  average  increase  for  each  of  the 
three  years  of  636,335  inhabitants.  On  this 
basis,  without  considering  effects  resulting 
from  the  war,  the  population  of  Germany  was: 

In  1911 65,562,328  inhabitants 

In  1912 66,198,663  inhabitants 

In  1913 66,835,000  inhabitants 

In  1914 67,471,335  inhabitants 

In  1915 68,107,670  inhabitants 

In  1916 68,744,005  inhabitants 

In  1917 69,380,340  inhabitants 

In  1918 70,016,675  inhabitants 

These  figures  provide  a  basis  for  calculations 


104  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

of  great  practical  interest  because  the  two 
causes  which  at  present  diminish  these  figures — 
the  German  losses  and  the  decline  in  the  birth- 
rate caused  by  the  war — certainly  do  not  in- 
fluence the  increase  of  the  annual  military  con- 
tingent of  Germany.  Since  1915,  those  who 
have  reached  the  military  age  of  seventeen  are 
not  less  in  number  owing  to  events  now  taking 
place,  because  they  were  born  after  1898,  that 
is,  during  a  period  in  which  the  German  birth- 
rate was  steadily  rising  from  year  to  year; 
hence  we  can  fairly  consider  that  the  above 
figures  reflect  accurately  the  size  of  the  popu- 
lation from  which  Germany  has  drawn  recruits 
since  1915,  but  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  on 
account  of  the  high  birth-rate  after  1898  re- 
sources in  men  are  considerable,  and  will  con- 
tinue for  some  years  to  come.  Consequently, 
from  the  recruiting  point  of  view,  the  figures 
showing  the  growth  of  the  German  population 
from  1911  to  1918  will  allow  us  to  estimate  as 
closely  as  possible  the  annual  military  contin- 
gent of  (iermany  for  the  same  period.  If  this 
amounted  to  700,000  men  in  1910,  as  against 
()5  millions  of  inhabitants,  that  is,  about  10.77 
for  every  1,000,  it  would  have  been: 

In  1011 700,05.5  men 

In  1J)I2 71'i,!)08  men 

III  l!)i;J 719,7()1  men 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     105 

In  1914 726,614  men 

In  1915 733,467  men 

In  1916 740,320  men 

In  1917 747,172  men 

In  1918 754,025  men 

This  gives  a  total  of  5,840,322  men  for  these 
eight  years.  As  the  Entente  usually  reckons 
the  annual  German  levies  at  400,000,  in  the 
light  of  the  facts  just  presented,  based  on  the 
latest  German  official  figures  obtainable,  their 
last  eight  military  contingents  would  have  been 
calculated  as  only  3,200,000  men,  making  an 
underestimate  of  apparently  about  2,600,000. 

This  showing  explains  in  a  striking  manner 
some  of  the  events  of  the  last  four  years — up  to 
the  moment  when  the  Bulgarian  debacle  and 
the  Allied  advance  toward  the  Danube  have 
compelled  the  German  General  Staff  abruptly 
to  shorten  the  western  front  to  rush  to  defend 
central  Europe — particularly: 

1st.  How  Germany  has  been  able,  up  to  the 
time  of  the  Bulgarian  defeat,  to  continue  her 
penetration  in  Russia,  while  maintaining  de- 
fensive pressure  in  the  west. 

2d.  How  the  Germans  have  been  able  to 
keep  up  their  long  lines  of  communication,  a 
feat  rarely  mentioned,  but  which  must  re- 
quire a  large  personnel. 

3d.  How  for  the  last  four  years  the  Ger- 


106  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

mans  have  surprised  the  Allies,  always  op- 
posing them  with  forces  superior  to  their  cal- 
culations at  any  critical  moment. 

II. 

The  annual  military  levy  of  Germany  since 
1910,  being  known  by  means  of  the  foregoing 
calculations,  let  us  now  estimate  her  mobilized 
forces  at  the  beginning  of  the  fifth  year  of 
war,  August,  1918. 

In  Mr.  Gerard's  book,  My  Four  Years  in 
Germany,  he  says  that  there  were  12  millions 
of  soldiers  mobilized  by  William  II  when  he 
declared  war.  As  Germany  had  a  population 
of  about  68  millions  in  1914,  this  would  mean 
17^  per  cent  of  the  people.  The  French  ex- 
generalissimo,  General  de  Lacroix,  estimated 
the  whole  German  mobilization  at  13  millions 
of  men,  say  19  per  cent  of  the  population. 
According  to  law  every  German  is  liable  to 
military  service  from  17  years  to  the  end  of 
the  45th  year  of  age.  Compare  the  official 
figures  of  the  French  census  of  1910  showing 
that  the  male  population  from  17  to  45  inclu- 
sive represents  21  in  100  of  the  French  people, 
the  general  average  in  most  countries — we  can 
therefore  reckon  the  entire  German  mobiliza- 
tion   at  20  j)er  cent  of  the  inhabitants,  which 


PANGERIVLVNY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     107 

gives  us  13,600,000  men,  it  being  more  prudent 
to  put  the  German  strength  at  rather  more 
than  less.  This  figure  of  13,(j00,000  men  mo- 
bihzed  is  very  conservative,  as  it  relates  to  the 
number  of  inhabitants  in  1914 — 68  millions. 
In  the  last  four  years  the  German  population 
has  increased  on  an  average  of  636,335  a  year, 
deducting  war  losses,  of  which  we  will  speak 
later.  These  figures  are  taken  from  the  Al- 
manack de  Gotha,  1914,  page  531,  above  quoted 
(see  page  103). 

In  1918,  then,  Germany  contained  70,016,675 
inhabitants.  Hence,  taking  as  a  basis  the 
mobilization  of  20  in  100  on  the  round  number 
of  68  millions  of  people  in  1914,  we  are  prob- 
ably if  anything  short  of  the  truth. 

In  this  number  of  13,600,000  men  are  in- 
cluded, of  course,  soldiers  on  the  various  fronts, 
and  those  in  the  innumerable  service  depart- 
ments of  all  kinds  of  the  German  army. 

This  lump  sum  of  13,600,000  has  been  modi- 
fied in  two  ways.  First,  it  has  been  diminished 
by  war  losses.  Secondly,  these  losses  have  been 
partially  compensated  for  by  the  German 
annual  recruitment. 

Let  us  consider  the  value  of  each  of  these 
factors.  According  to  an  authority  which  I 
am  bound  to  hold  as  particularly  trustworthy, 


108  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

on  the  1st  of  June,  1918,  the  German  loss 
may  be  estimated  by  the  use  of  the  following 
data. 

Figures  carefully  collated  state  their  loss 
to  have  been  exactly  3,400,000  on  April  1st, 
1917.  Add  to  this  the  losses  from  April  to 
the  31st  of  December,  1917.  Battles  of  the 
Aisne,  Flanders,  etc.,  say  1,100,000  men,  which 
brings  the  total  on  January  1st,  1918,  up  to 
about  4,500,000.  By  June  1st  of  this  year,  the 
list  was  estimated  at  300,000 — making  4,800,- 
000  men;  then  we  must  include  the  sick  and 
wounded,  a  constant  figure  estimated  at  about 
500,000.  Putting  all  these  together,  according 
to  those  in  a  position  to  know  best,  we  reach 
the  total  of  a  loss  of  5,300,000  men  to  Ger- 
many by  the  1st  of  June,  1918. 

We  might  add  subsequent  losses  incident 
to  our  victorious  counter-offensive  since  July 
15th,  but  from  the  1st  of  June  to  the  1st  of 
August  data  are  lacking  for  an  exact  computa- 
tion, and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  problem  be- 
fore us  consists  in  the  attempts  to  ascertain 
the  average  annual  loss  of  Germany.  Relying 
on  the  autlioritative  sources  of  information 
above  mentioned,  we  have  brought  our  esti- 
mates to  the  1st  of  June,  1918,  and  from  this 
point  we  can   reach   an  average  for  the  four 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     109 

years  of  war  within  a  month,  or  very  nearly 
exact. 

Now  let  us  see  how  much  the  annual  levies 
of  Germany  have  compensated  for  her  losses. 

These  annual  contingents  (see  page  105) 
amount  to  about — 

733,000  men in  1915 

740,000  men in  1916 

747,000  men in  1917 

754,000  men in  1918 

a  total  of  2,974,000  men  for  the  four  years  of 
war. 

The  mobilized  strength  of  Germany  in  1914 

was 13,600,000  men 

Ascertained    losses    resulting    from    the    war, 

June  1st,  1916 5,300,000  men 

reduce  this  to 8,300,000  men 

Four  military  levies,  1915-1916-1917-1918,  in 

round  numbers 2,900,000  men 

bring  this  to 11,200,000  men 

Eleven  millions  of  men  mobilized  were, 
therefore,  at  the  disposal  of  Germany  at  the 
opening  of  the  fifth  year  of  war.  The  modera- 
tion and  probability  of  this  statement  can  be 
verified  by  the  following  reasoning.  The  Al- 
Hed  High  Command  and  Senator  Berenger,  of 
the   Committee  on  Effectives  of  the  French 


110  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

Senate,  in  their  figures  estimated  the  num- 
ber of  Germans  on  all  the  western  front  at 
7  millions  in  June,  1918.  From  our  estimates 
that  would  leave  only  4  millions  to  carry  on 
all  the  work  in  the  interior  of  Germany,  to 
supply  the  armies  in  Russia  and  Turkey,  and 
secure  extended  communication  in  hostile  dis- 
tricts. For  all  these  purposes  4  millions  is 
rather  an  insufficient  number,  so  our  calcula- 
tions are  probably  not  too  high. 

We  can  now  see  clearly  two  causes  for  the 
misapprehension  of  the  Allies  as  to  German}^ 's 
military  resources.  First  mistake:  The  Ger- 
man annual  contingent  is  usually  reckoned 
at  400,000  men,  })ut  according  to  German 
statistics  (page  103)  it  ought  to  be  about 
700,000.  Second  mistake :  German  losses  on 
June  1st,  1918,  are  counted  as  positively 
5,300,000  men,  without  reflecting  that,  if  this 
figure  is  right  with  regard  to  the  total  popu- 
lation of  Germany,  it  is  not  so  when  it  is 
compared  with  the  figures  of  the  initial 
mobilization.  It  is  important  to  remember 
that  the  length  of  the  war  feeds  the  war,  that 
is,  four  annual  military  contingents  have  filled 
up  in  a  great  measure  the  gai)s  made  by  losses 
in  the  German  army.  Our  task  is  to  destroy 
the  riKMi   who  compose  this  army  faster  than 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     111 

they  can  be  replaced  by  the  German  people. 
It  is  wrong,  then,  to  speak  of  the  absolute 
German  loss  (5,300,000  on  the  1st  of  June, 
1918),  for  this  implies  a  corresponding  dimi- 
nution in  the  mobilized  forces  of  Germany, 
which  is  not  the  state  of  the  case.  Her  strength 
being  kept  up  by  annual  enlistments,  her  real 
losses  after  four  years  of  war  would  be:  5,300,- 
000  less  2,900,000  recruits,  giving  2,400,000 
men.  Keeping  in  mind  the  comparison  ivith  the 
amount  of  the  initial  mobilization,  the  actual 
loss  of  the  German  army  to  August,  1918,  was 
in  round  numbers  only  a  fourth  of  that  num- 
ber, say  600,000  men  a  year,  a  very  much 
lower  figure  than  is  generally  allowed. 

This  number  of  men  annually  lost,  if  ad- 
mitted as  right,  accounts  for  much  that  was 
obscure  in  the  evolution  of  the  war,  and  ex- 
plains the  disappointments  of  the  Allies  at 
finding  superior  forces  always  before  them, 
contrary  to  their  calculations.  These  figures 
also  prove  the  falsity  of  Colonel  Repington's 
theories,  for  he  has  always  maintained  that 
Germany  can  be  completely  conquered,  driven 
out  in  the  west,  and  forced  to  yield  central 
and  eastern  Europe,  as  well  as  Turkey.  To 
this  end  he  would  pursue  a  concentrated  war 
of  attrition  on  the  western  front,  destroying 


112  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

successively  and  surely  the  German  effective 
force,  and  by  this  means  arriving  at  a  complete 
victory  for  the  Allies.  The  weakness  of  this 
conception  must  be  made  clear  by  the  fact 
that  it  was  the  victorious  offensive  of  the  Allies 
in  the  Balkans  which  compelled  the  German 
General  Staff  to  evacuate  more  quickly  France 
and  Belgium. 

If  any  doubt  remains  let  us  remember  that 
if  Germany  has  lost  600,000  men  a  year,  she 
has  also  reached  great  results,  for  this  sacri- 
fice, combined  with  her  political  strategy,  has 
gained  for  her  the  use  and  control  of  the  wealth 
of  three-fourths  of  Europe  and  a  part  of  Asia. 
The  Allies,  on  the  other  hand,  underestimating 
the  importance  of  the  eastern  front,  neglected 
for  four  years  the  great  strategic  possibilities 
of  a  campaign  on  the  Danube,  and  thus  de- 
prived themselves  of  the  resources  of  Russia 
and  the  Balkans,  which  they  controlled  at 
the  outset.  They  have  been,  for  this  reason, 
])l()(kaded  in  eastern  Europe,  and  obliged  to 
bring  from  Australia  and  America  at  great 
expense  most  of  the  food  and  raw  material 
of  which  they  stand  in  need.  x\gain,  in  i)ro- 
portion  to  her  first  m()l)ilized  army,  Germany 
has  lost  (>00,()0()  men  a  year,  but  the  war  map 
(see  page  14)  shows  how  nearly  she  has  ap- 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     113 

proached  to  the  Pangermanist  standard,  and 
also  that  she  has  inflicted  on  her  adversaries 
losses  equal  to  her  own.  This  cannot  be 
denied,  for  we  know  the  Russians  lost  many 
more  men  than  the  Germans;  the  French 
losses  have  not  been  made  public,  but  we 
know  that  in  April,  1918,  there  were  more 
French  prisoners  in  Germany  than  there  w^ere 
Germans  in  France,  which  shows  at  the  very 
least  that  the  French  have  certainly  lost  pro- 
portionately more  than  the  Germans.  It  is 
not  easy  to  demonstrate,  therefore,  that  we 
can  gain  the  victory  through  the  exhaustion  of 
Germany's  man-power,  since  it  is  proved  that 
the  military  and  political  strategy  finally 
carried  out  by  the  Allies  in  the  Balkans  has 
accomplished  in  a  few  days  results  which  four 
years  of  persistent  effort  on  the  western  front 
could  not  secure. 


III. 

The  figures  given  by  our  deductions:  13,600,- 
000  for  the  whole  mobilized  German  army,  and 
700,000  for  its  probable  war  contingent,  being 
much  higher  than  those  generally  accepted  by 
the  Entente,  are  of  a  nature  to  cause  great 
surprise    and    raise    objections.     A    profound 


114  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

scrutiny  of  these  figures  is  therefore  not  only 
needful  but  indispensable,  for  if  finally  it  is 
well  established  that  they  certainly  approxi- 
mate to  the  truth  it  will  demonstrate  a  fact  of 
great  value  to  the  Entente,  of  which  the  practi- 
cal importance  will  appear  logically  at  the  end 
of  this  verification.  In  order  to  go  to  the  root 
of  the  analysis  of  our  figures,  I  will  review  my 
statements  from  the  beginning,  following  an  en- 
tirely different  method,  by  means  of  which  the 
results  of  the  first  can  be  checked.  First,  I  will 
prove  that  a  grave  error  has  been  most  certainly 
made  by  the  Allies  in  their  calculations  of  Ger- 
man man-power.  Second,  I  will  point  out  the 
different  objections  likely  to  present  themselves 
to  the  mind  of  my  readers,  and  present  the  an- 
swers which  can  be  given. 

1st.  The  Misapprehension  of  the  Allies 
AS  TO  THE  Annual  German  Contingent 
IS  Certain  and  Important. 

The  number  of  400,000  men  for  Germany's 
annual  contingent  is  generally  accepted  by  the 
Allies.  On  June  10th,  1918,  an  article  ap- 
jx'an^d  in  the  Paris  Temps  by  Lieutenant 
(rKiitraygues,  in  which,  speaking  of  the  Ger- 
man class  of  1020,  which  in  June,  1918,  was  in 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     115 

the  Kaiser's  instruction-camps,  he  said:  "This 
class  will  yield  an  eft'ective  of  400,000  men." 
On  the  7th  of  September,  1918,  the  New  York 
Times  published  a  despatch  by  an  American 
correspondent  in  Paris,  who  had  evidently 
gained  his  information  in  France.  He  says: 
"What  the  American  factor  now  means  may 
be  judged  from  one  fact.  During  the  month 
of  August  400,000  American  soldiers  landed  in 
France.  This  number  is  as  nearly  as  possible 
equivalent  to  the  whole  German  1920  class, 
on  which  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  enemy  has 
been  very  largely  counting  to  compensate  him 
for  the  enormous  cost  in  man-powder  which 
the  Allies  are  causing  him  at  present." 

Now  w^e  wdll  show^  why  it  is  quite  impossible 
that  the  German  class  of  1920  should  amount 
to  only  400,000  men.  The  figures  of  LoebeWs 
Jahreshcrichte,  on  which  I  have  based  all  my 
calculations,  are  to  be  found  in  a  pamphlet 
called  The  Military  Situation  of  all  Nations, 
published  in  1914,  before  the  war,  by  Berger- 
Levrault,  the  foremost  French  military  pub- 
lisher, whose  technical  works  are  brought  out 
wdth  the  assistance  of  qualified  officers.  To 
demonstrate  that  I  have  made  no  mistake, 
either  in  the  sources  or  the  conclusions  drawn 
from  the  figures  which  formed  the  starting-point 


116  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

ALLBMAQNK  7 

ns  ne  le  sont  g6n6ralement  que  pour  une  seule 
p6riode  Dans  la  landwehr  du  2"  ban  et  dans  le 
landsturm,  il  n'est  plus  fait  aucune  convocation. 

11  importe  de  remarquer  que  les  diverses  regies 
qui  pr6c6dent  ne  sont  pas  absolues  ni  imperatives;  ce 
qui  caract6rise  essentieJlement  les  lois  de  recrute- 
ment  en  Allemagne,  c'est  leur  grande  61asticit6  et,  en 
m6me  temps,  le  souci  predominant  de  rint6r6t  mili- 
taire.  Les  ressources:  considerables  et  toujours  crols- 
santes  du  rccrutement  permettent  de  m6nager,  dans 
une  large  mesure.  la  population  civile,  tout  en  n'in- 
corporant  dans  les  troupes  que  des  jeunes  gens 
parfaltement  aptes  au  service  anii6. 

Aussi  Tautorlte  militaire  jouit-elle  de  la  latitude  la 
plus  complete  dans  I'examen  des  cas  d'ajournement, 
d'exclusion  et  de  rfeforme  prfevus  par  la  loi. 

Vajournement  peut  rfesulter,  en  premier  lieu, 
d'une  aptitude  physique  incomplete ;  11  ne  peut  6tre 
prolonge  au  dela  de  trois  ans.  11  peut  aussi  6tre  pro- 
nonce,  sur  la  demande  des  interesses  ou  de  leur 
famille,  en  faveur  ;  1"  des  soutiens  indispensables 

of  my  calculations,  I  will  reproduce  photograph- 
ically the  essential  passages  of  this  pamphlet, 
showing: 

1st.  That  according  to  German  military  law 
adjournment  of  service  can  only  last  three 
years. 

2d.  That  the  figures  on  which  I  rely  are 
really  taken  from  LoehelVs  Jahresberichtc,  which 
is  held  to  be  the  most  authoritative  German 
publication. 

If,  thcroforo,  Germany  had  declared  war  in 
1910,  without  counting  young  men  who  had 
presented  themselves  in  advance,  or  those  she 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     117 

8  fiTAT  MILITAIRB  DE  TODTES  LES  NATIONS 

tfes  physiques  ou  morales;  mais  les  jeunes  gens  qui 
ont  cherche  a  se  soustraire  a  robligatiou  du  service 
par  mutilation  ou  autrement  sent  vers6s  dans  les 
sections  de  travailleurs. 

(Pour  le  m6canisme  et  le  fonctionnement  du  service 
de  RECRUTEMBNT  cu  Allcmagne,  se  reporter  d  ce  mot 
dans  le  corps  du  Dlctionnaire.) 

Voici,  maintenant;  un  aper^u  des  r6sultats  du  re- 
crutement  pour  rann6e  1910,  extraits  des  LcebelVs 
Jahresherichte  (pour  1911  ;  publics  au  printemps 
1912),  en  rappelant  que  ces  op6rations  embrassent 
non  seulement  les  bommes  de  la  classe  incorporable, 
jnais  encore  les  nombreux  ajouxnfes  des  classes  pr6- 
c6dentes  ; 

Jeunes  gens  ayaui  pris  part^aux  operations 
du  recrutonieot.  ............<•.•      1.246.368 

donl : 

Exclus  (ITntuurdtpe).  ......  890 

R6form6s  {Untaugliche) .  ..  ...        34.067 

Ajoumes •       715.952 

Aydnt  devanc6  rappol.  .....        39.960 

DSclar6s  bons .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  •  •      454.484 

could  make  up  out  of  her  reforme  list,  she 
could  have  utilized  in  the  various  branches  of 
her  mobilized  army: 

1st.    Men  fit  for  service 454,484   men 

2d.  One-third  of  715,952.  This  figure,  accord- 
ing to  German  law,  can  only  include 
3  classes  of  adjourned,  equal,  therefore, 
to 238,650   men 

Total 693,134    men 

If,  in  1910,  Germany,  which  then  had  but 
65  millions  of  inhabitants,  could  raise  a  war 
contingent  of  about  693,000  men,  how  can  it 


118  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

be  believed  that  in  1918,  when  Germany,  from 
the  recruiting  standpoint,  has  70  milHons  of  in- 
habitants, and  forms  her  classes  not  at  20  but 
at  17  years  of  age — that  is,  without  having  to 
take  account  of  the  deaths  between  17  and  19 
inclusive — should  have  a  class  of  only  400,000 
men,  that  is,  about  293,000  less  than  the  war 
class  of  1910  ?  It  is  impossible  that  this  should 
be  true. 

A  serious  mistake  has  therefore  been  made. 
It  is  hard  to  explain  logically,  because,  as  we 
have  just  seen,  the  figures  which  prove  it  were 
published  in  France,  even  before  the  war.  The 
only  explanation  of  this  extraordinary  miscon- 
ception is  that  it  is  of  the  same  nature  as  those 
held  by  the  Entente  regarding  many  other 
problems — the  Bulgar  question,  the  question 
about  the  King  of  Greece,  the  question  of  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, the  Bolshevists — all  questions  on 
which  for  a  long  time  the  Allies  were  misled  by 
superficial  preconceived  ideas,  lacking  proof, 
and  which  events  have  demonstrated  to  be  as 
contrary  to  facts  as  to  the  interests  of  the 
Entente.  The  problem  now  is  to  discuss  thor- 
oughly the  extent  of  the  error  committed,  and 
in  what  it  consists. 


PANGERJVLVNY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     110 


2d.     Objections  and  Replies. 

1st  Objection. — The  man-power  of  Germany 
(70  millions  of  inhabitants)  cannot  be  greater 
than  that  of  the  Allies  put  together  (France  40 
millions,  England  40,  Italy  30,  United  States 
100),  etc. 

Answer. — Certainly  this  is  true,  but  we  must 
compare,  not  the  man-power  of  the  Allies  only 
as  against  that  of  Germany,  but  the  number 
of  Allied  soldiers  able  to  serve  in  Europe,  op- 
posed to  the  man-power  of  all  the  Central 
Powers,  as,  since  the  war,  they  form  a  group  of 
forces  directed  by  Berlin,  to  the  advantage  of 
Germany,  who  without  them  must  have  yielded 
long  ago.  By  this  comparison  alone  can  be 
discerned  which  are  the  weak  points  of  the 
effectives  of  Germany's  allies,  on  which  the 
Entente  should  consequently  bring  pressure  to 
bear.  The  great  successes  achieved  since  the 
Entente  finally  decided  to  attack  Bulgaria,  show 
the  absolute  necessity  of  this  method  of  pro- 
cedure. 

M  Objection.— The  figures  of  13,000,000  men, 
which  we  found  to  represent  the  number  of  the 
entire   mobilized   German   army,   and   that  of 


120  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

700,000  for  the  German  contingent,  are  so 
much  larger  than  those  generally  accepted 
that  they  cannot  be  correct. 

Answer. — It  is  unfortunate  not  only  regard- 
ing the  German  effectives  that  considerable 
errors,  reaching  50  per  cent,  have  been  made 
by  the  Entente  on  questions  nevertheless  of 
capital  importance  for  the  winning  of  the  war. 
For  instance,  when  the  war  began  the  opinion 
prevailed  in  dominant  circles  of  western  Europe 
that  Germany  had  only  50  army  corps.  Now 
it  is  a  fact  that  she  began  the  fight  with  100, 
that  is  with  50  more,  the  existence  of  which  was 
not  even  suspected.  This  was  clearly  recog- 
nized, particularly  in  several  articles  which 
appeared  in  France  about  two  years  ago,  there- 
fore authorized  by  the  censors.  The  error, 
very  serious  at  that  time,  was  in  this  case  of 
50  per  cent.  Granting  the  above,  it  is  not  im- 
possible, a  priori,  that,  instead  of  estimating 
the  annual  German  contingent  at  about  700,- 
000  men,  it  should  have  been  wrongly  placed 
at  only  400,000. 

3d  Objection. — It  is  improbable,  a  prioriy 
that  Germany's  man-power  should  be  esti- 
mated at  13,()00,00()  fi,<,rliiing  men. 

Answer. — It  is  absolutely  necessary  to  come 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     121 

to  an  understanding  as  to  the  meaning  one 
should  give  to  the  expression  man-power,  for  it 
seems  to  be  imperfectly  understood  in  the 
Entente. 

Many  of  the  Allies,  in  fact,  imagine  that  the 
man-power  of  a  country  consists  alone  in  its 
ability  to  place  so  many  combatants  on  the 
firing-line.  This  idea  of  man-power  is  incom- 
plete and  gives  rise  to  serious  mistakes.  An 
army  is  not  made  up  of  fighting  men  only.  At 
the  present  day,  the  mobilized  army  of  a  state 
comprises  innumerable  departments;  the  fight- 
ing units,  services  immediately  behind  the 
front,  home  services,  war  factories,  working  of 
mines  necessary  to  the  war,  sometimes  even 
agricultural  production,  and  numbers  of  bu- 
reaus. Now,  all  these  services,  being  indis- 
pensable to  the  working  of  the  army,  in 
consequence  are  equally  necessary  to  victory. 
Soldiers  fighting  at  the  front  are  therefore  only 
a  part  of  the  man-power  required,  and  their 
number  is  itself  the  reflex  and  the  result  of 
the  strength  of  the  organizations  of  non- 
combatants  in  the  rear. 

If,  further,  we  should  attempt  to  estimate 
Germany's  man-power  by  counting  simply  the 
number  of  fighting  men,  we  should  find  our- 
selves certainly  mistaken.     On  the  one  hand, 


122  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

the  Allies'  information  services  had  to  be  made 
out  of  the  whole  cloth  since  the  war,  and  have 
therefore  inevitable  defects;  and  on  the  other, 
the  Germans  are  past  masters  in  the  art  of 
dissimulation.  The  result  is  that  all  the  iden- 
tifications that  the  Allies  can  make  of  German 
divisions  fighting  on  the  different  fronts,  only 
reach  an  approximation,  and  leave  unreckoned 
elements  of  the  enemy's  strength,  which  it  is 
indispensable  to  take  into  account. 

For  all  these  reasons,  the  man-power  of  a 
nation  is  represented  by  the  whole  number  of 
men  it  is  able  to  mobilize,  no  matter  to  what 
service  these  men  are  attached.  I  have  taken 
great  care  to  specify  (see  page  107)  that  the 
figure  of  13,600,000  included,  of  course,  the 
fighting  men  on  the  various  fronts  and  those 
in  the  innumerable  service  departments  of  all 
kinds  of  the  German  army. 

Jfth  Objection. — Ought  not  the  number  of 
13,600,000  to  be  reduced  by  15  to  20  per  cent 
to  allow  for  these  rcjormcs? 

Answer. — In  Germany  the  number  of  these 
rejormes  must  be  much  less  than  the  above 
percentage.  The  war  has  been  so  premedi- 
tated and  the  study  of  military  things  by  the 
General  Slall"  has  gone  on  for  such  a  length  of 


PANGERMANY'S  MILIT.VRY  STRENGTH     123 

time  that  it  is  only  natural  that  of  all  the  bel- 
ligerents Germany  should  know  how  to  get 
the  best  results  out  of  the  men  who  come  up 
for  mobilization.  The  system  by  which  mo- 
bilized men  are  utilized  in  Germany  is  quite 
unlike  that  which  obtained  in  France,  for  in- 
stance, at  least  during  the  two  first  years  of 
the  war. 

In  France,  through  a  false  notion  of  equality 
and  of  the  modern  needs  of  war,  in  the  begin- 
ning, they  tried  to  act  on  the  principle  that 
each  mobilized  man  should  be  exposed  to  the 
same  danger,  no  matter  what  might  be  his  par- 
ticular aptitudes.  Intellectual  power  of  the 
first  rank  which  could  have  done  much  toward 
a  speedy  victory,  was  sacrificed  to  this  idea, 
to  the  great  detriment  of  the  common  cause. 
Thus,  for  example,  Jean  Gravier,  who  was 
probably  the  Frenchman  who  knew  most  about 
Serbia,  because  he  had  long  made  a  special 
study  of  the  country  on  the  spot,  was  recalled 
to  France  by  the  mobilization,  and  killed  as  a 
sergeant  before  Souchez,  when  he  might  have 
rendered  invaluable  services  in  the  Balkans. 
The  forces  thus  uselessly  sacrificed  have  been 
very  great,  and  it  was  only  toward  the  third 
year  of  the  war  that  France  began  to  remedy 
this  fatal  error. 


124  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

If  Jean  Gravier  had  been  a  German  he 
would  have  been  assigned  as  technical  adviser 
to  the  Staff  charged  to  prepare  for  the  inva- 
sion of  Serbia,  because  in  Germany,  from  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities,  the  utilization  of  mobil- 
ized men  has  been  arranged  on  the  principle 
that  each  man  should  be  employed,  not  neces- 
sarily where  there  are  the  most  risks  to  be 
run,  but  w^here  his  personal  aptitudes  would 
allow  him  to  render  the  best  service  with  a 
view  to  victory. 

The  application  of  this  principle  explains 
why  mobilized  Germans,  30  years  old,  strong 
and  well,  have  been  kept  away  from  the 
firing-line  and  attached  at  home  or  abroad  to 
propaganda  service,  from  which  the  Berlin 
government  has  derived  so  much  advantage. 
Striking  examples  are  the  cases  of  Von  Papen 
and  Boy-Ed,  who  were  the  German  officers 
retained  as  long  as  possible  in  the  United 
States  because  Berlin  considered  that  they 
were  much  more  useful  to  the  German  cause 
in  this  way  than  if  they  had  been  killed  on  the 
western  front. 

This  principle  carried  out  explains  why  the 
Germans  make  reformcs  of  a  relatively  small 
mnnber  of  men  among  tliose  subject  to  mobil- 
ization.    It    is,   in  fact,  clear    that,  with  the 


PANGERIVL\NY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     125 

exception  of  those  seriously  ill,  any  man  merely 
weak  or  delicate  who  is  employed  in  civil  life 
can  be  used  in  some  sedentary  service  in  one 
of  the  innumerable  departments  of  the  Ger- 
man army.  The  number  of  those  reformes 
varies  according  to  age,  as  is  shown  by  the 
following  table  drawn  up  according  to  the 
official  figures  of  German  mortality  for  1901 
(see  page  134). 


Out  of  100 

Number  of 

Out  of  100            Number  of 

Germans  of 

Deaths 

German 

s  of             Deaths 

1  year 

20.23 

24  years                  0.50 

2  years 

3.98 

25     ' 

0.50 

3 

1.49 

26     ' 

0.51 

4 

0.94 

27     * 

0.52 

5 

0.69 

28     ' 

0.52 

6 

0.52 

29     • 

0.53 

7 

0.42 

30     ' 

0.54 

8 

0.35 

31     ' 

0.55 

9 

0.30 

32     * 

0.57 

10 

0.26 

33     ' 

0.59 

11 

0.24 

34     * 

0.62 

12 

0.22 

35     ' 

0.66 

13 

0.21 

36     ' 

0.70 

14 

0.21 

37     ' 

0.74 

15 

0.23 

38     ' 

0.78 

16 

0.27 

39     ' 

0.83 

17 

0.32 

40     ' 

0.88 

18 

0.38 

41     ' 

0.91 

19 

0.43 

42     ' 

0.99 

20 

0.48 

43     ' 

1.05 

21 

0.50 

44     • 

1  11 

22 

0.50 

45     • 

1.17 

23 

0.50 

126  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

This  table  is  very  interesting  because  it 
shows : 

1st.  That  the  mortaHty  is  enormous  the 
first  year,  and  great  for  the  second  and  third 
years. 

M.     That  at  45  it  is  1.17  per  cent. 

3d.     That  at  16  it  is  only  0.27  per  cent. 

It  is  therefore  evident  that  those  reformes 
among  men  of  45,  already  worn,  and  suffering 
from  serious  complaints,  are  much  more  nu- 
merous than  the  reformcs  among  young  men, 
of  just  17,  who  are  full  of  life. 

Applying  the  principles  which  govern  the 
German  mobilization,  which  start  from  the 
theory  that  every  man  is  of  some  use,  except 
those  seriously  ill,  we  can  understand  how  it 
happens  that  those  reformes  are  relatively 
few,  even  among  men  of  45,  and  fewer  still 
among  the  youths  of  17,  who  in  time  of  war 
constitute  each  annual  German  contingent. 

To  make  this  plainer  still,  let  us  take,  for 
example,  100,000  young  Germans  17  years  old 
who  have  come  before  the  examining  board  to 
form  the  class  of  1920.  The  reason  why  so 
few  among  these  youths  are  reformcs  is  that, 
according  to  the  above  figures  (see  page  125), 
from  16  to  17  the  death-rate  is  only  0.27  per 
cent;  that  is,  that  among  400  young  Germans 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     127 

of  this  age  only  about  one  dies,  because  at  16 
or  17  the  serious  maladies  which  attack  men  of 
more  advanced  years  naturally  do  not  exist. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  sufficiently  large  number 
of  boys  of  17  are  not  yet  strong  enough  physi- 
cally to  make  good  fighting  men,  but  even 
these  are  quite  able  to  fill  useful  places  in  some 
of  the  numerous  branches  of  the  army  services, 
work  which  would  not  be  too  exacting  for  boys 
of  that  age.  In  this  way,  we  see  how  those 
reformes  among  the  youths  of  17  who  make 
up  the  war  contingent  should  not  exceed  5 
per  cent  at  the  most.  Allowing  this  to  be 
the  probable  figure,  we  will  understand  how 
the  Germans  make  use  of  the  95,000  boys  of 
17  remaining  from  the  100,000  whom  we  have 
supposed  as  coming  before  the  Kaiser's  board 
of  examination. 

Out  of  these  95,000  probably  70,000  are 
strong  enough  to  be  sent  at  once  to  instruction- 
camps  and  to  the  front  in  six  months.  The 
remaining  25,000  fall  into  two  categories:  The 
first  is  composed  of  specialists,  workmen: 
miners,  mechanics,  electricians,  tailors,  etc. 
The  second  is  formed  of  young  men  who  need 
to  be  built  up  for  some  months,  or  perhaps  a 
year,  before  they  can  be  made  fighting  men. 

The  specialized  workmen  of  17  are  sent  to 


128  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

different  departments  or  to  the  workrooms  of 
their  trades,  where  they  take  the  places  of  older 
men  who  go  to  the  front.  As  for  those  who 
need  strengthening,  they  are  either  sent  to 
camps  for  physical  training  or  divided  among 
the  different  offices  where  there  is  sedentary 
work,  and  where  they  relieve  young  men  of 
the  preceding  year  who  are  now  strong  enough 
to  join  the  fighting  force,  or  older  men  no 
longer  necessary  behind  the  lines,  who  are 
sent  forward.  The  result  of  this  system  is 
that  if  the  95,000  German  soldiers  at  17  esti- 
mated in  our  hypothesis  do  not  at  once  enter 
the  fighting  ranks,  their  numbers  make  it  pos- 
sible to  form  a  rotation  from  one  year  to  the 
next  by  means  of  which  men  able  to  fight  can 
be  taken  out  of  the  various  services.  In  this 
way,  the  military  authorities  can  send  to  the 
front  a  number  of  fighting  men  virtually  equal 
to  that  of  the  annual  contingent,  which  thus 
acts  as  a  sort  of  reservoir,  supplying  the  differ- 
ent branches  of  the  German  army,  which  draws 
upon  it  as  much  as  possible,  allowing  for  the 
small  number  rcformcs. 

5th  Objection. — If  there  had  been  no  war  the 
effect  of  natural  causes  would  have  diminished 
the  number  of  men  from  17  to  45  years  old. 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     V29 

We  should  therefore  take  into  account  this 
cause  of  diminution  of  the  German  army, 
which  must  have  considerably  lowered  its 
numbers  during  the  last  four  years. 

Answer. — Of  course  deaths  from  natural 
causes,  as  in  time  of  peace,  would  occur  among 
men  mobilized  from  17  to  45,  but  practically 
the  effects  of  this  cause  of  diminution  of  the 
German  army  are  confounded  with  losses  pro- 
duced by  the  war.  If  a  mobilized  German 
dies  of  bronchitis,  of  pleurisy,  or  of  heart-dis- 
ease, he  might  certainly  have  succumbed  from 
such  causes  without  the  war,  but  they  might 
equally  have  resulted  from  it.  In  any  case, 
nothing  is  known  about  it,  and  nothing  can  be 
found  out,  because  every  mobilized  soldier  in 
the  German  army,  if  he  falls  ill,  is  sent  to  a 
military  hospital.  If  he  dies,  from  no  matter 
what  cause,  his  death  is  included  among  the 
war  losses  reckoned  above,  as  we  have  seen, 
including  a  constant  figure  of  500,000  men  in 
hospital  (see  page  108). 

6th  Objection. — If  the  German  army  in- 
creased by  about  700,000  men  each  year,  we 
must  reckon  also  an  annual  loss  of  men  re- 
leased from  military  service,  on  reaching  the 
age  of  45  inclusive. 


130  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

Answer. — This  would  be  true  in  peace-time, 
but  not  in  war.  In  France  military  service  is 
obligatory  up  to  the  end  of  the  48th  year,  but 
now  mobilized  men  have  been  kept  with  the 
colors  beyond  this  age;  this  is  why  France  has 
had  soldiers  more  than  50  years  old  who  have 
gone  back  only  recently  to  civil  life.  In  Ger- 
many, also,  men  have  been  kept  in  the  service 
at  more  than  45  years  of  age,  and  therefore 
this  cause  for  the  diminution  of  the  German 
army,  in  which  many  Allies  believe,  does  not 
really  exist. 

7th  Objection. — Is  not  the  estimate  of  13,600,- 
000  men,  based  on  20  per  cent  of  the  popula- 
tion, too  high  a  figure.^ 

Answer. — 1st.  There  is  nothing  extraordi- 
nary in  the  mobilization  figure  of  20  per  cent 
of  the  German  population.  Even  little  Serbia 
with  her  rudimentary  organization  mobilized 
at  14  per  cent  of  her  inhabitants  in  1912-13. 
The  Germans'  theory  of  mobilization  enables 
them  to  get  the  best  possible  results  from  their 
resources  in  man-power,  their  powers  of  organ- 
ization are  not  to  be  doubted,  and  therefore  we 
ought  not  to  l)c  surprised  that  they  can  mobilize 
at  20  per  cent  of  tlicir  people,  dividing  the  men 
among  the  many  branches  of  their  service. 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     131 

2d.  This  figure  only  gives  a  difference  of 
about  600,000  men,  against  that  stated  by- 
General  de  Lacroix  in  an  article  published  in 
the  Paris  Temps  nearly  two  years  ago,  in  which 
he  studies  the  numbers  yielded  by  the  Ger- 
man mobilization.  Thus,  the  amount  of 
13  millions  has  been  fixed  by  the  ex-generalis- 
simo of  the  French  armies,  after  proper  de- 
ductions for  reformes. 

3d.  This  sum  of  13  millions,  fixed  by  Gen- 
eral de  Lacroix,  is  drawn  from  the  year  1914, 
when  the  population  of  Germany  was  only 
68  millions,  but  in  1918,  from  the  recruiting 
point  of  view,  she  had  70  million  inhabitants. 

4th.  As  we  know,  men  at  the  close  of  their 
45th  year  are  theoretically  free  from  all  mili- 
tary obligations,  but  they  have  been  kept  with 
the  colors  during  the  war,  and  thus  the  Ger- 
man army  has  increased  beyond  the  limits 
which  were  at  first  set. 

5th.  The  statistics  of  the  German  Empire 
only  give  the  number  of  German  subjects  pres- 
ent in  Germany,  and  the  German  effectives 
are  generally  calculated  w^ith  this  number  only 
in  view,  forgetting  that  there  are,  besides,  many 
Germans  scattered  all  over  the  world  who  are 
subjects  of  the  empire,  and  therefore  those 
from  17  to  the  end  of  the  45th  year  owe  mili- 


132  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

tary  service  to  Germany.  Owing  to  the  Allied 
blockade,  it  is  true  that  nearly  all  Germans 
of  this  category  living  in  America,  Africa,  or 
Asia  have  not  been  able  to  reach  Germany  to 
perform  their  military  duty,  but,  per  contra, 
some  German  subjects  living  abroad  have  cer- 
tainly obeyed  the  order  of  mobilization  since 
the  beginning  of  hostilities.  These  Germans 
are  those  domiciled  either  in  countries  allied 
to  Germany — Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and 
Turkey — or  in  countries  occupied  by  German 
troops,  such  as  Serbia,  Roumania,  Belgium,  and 
Russia.  There  are  besides  those  in  states  in 
direct  geographic  contact  with  Germany,  like 
Switzerland,  Holland,  Denmark,  Sweden,  and 
Norway,  or  in  European  countries  which  were 
for  a  time  neutral,  like  Italy  and  Spain. 

The  statistics  of  the  AlldeutscJier  Atlas^  by 
Paul  Langhans,  published  in  1900  at  Gotha, 
by  Justus  Perthes,  enable  us  to  calculate  the 
number  of  Germans  living  abroad  under  con- 
ditions which  would  certainly  have  allowed 
them  to  join  the  German  army. 

German  su))jects  of  the  empire  resident  in — 

Austria 103,433 

IlnriKary (5,597 

Switzerland 112,342 

Liixcmbiirg 10,712 

Belgium 47,338 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     133 

Holland 28,767 

Denmark 31,107 

Sweden 4,006 

Norway 1,471 

Russia 00,000 

Italy 25,000 

Spain 1,826 

Total 432,659 

In  round  numbers 432,000 

These  figures,  however,  date  from  a  period 
reaching  from  1888  to  1898,  on  the  average 
from  1893.  From  this  date  till  1918,  that  is, 
for  25  years,  this  total  should  be  augmented 
in  proportion  to  the  mean  annual  increase  of 
the  German  population. 

In  1910,  according  to  the  figures  of  the 
Almanack  de  Gotha  above  cited  (page  103), 
Germany  had  exactly  64,925,993  inhabitants, 
and  at  this  date  her  population  increased  by 
636,335  =  9.8  per  1,000  inhabitants.  There- 
fore during  25  years — without  even  counting 
the  progressive  increase,  which  gives  higher 
figures — the  augmentation  per  1,000  is  245; 
say,  for  432,000  it  would  be  105,840,  which, 
added  to  432,000  in  1893,  proves  that  in  1918 
there  were  about  537,840  Germans— 538,000 
in  round  numbers — in  foreign  countries  who 
could  have  joined  the  German  army. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  proportion  of  males 
from  17  to  45  is  at  least  21  per  cent  of  a  whole 


134  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

population ;  consequently,  the  538,000  Germans 
living  in  neighboring  states  must  have  furnished 
to  the  German  army  112,980  men — about 
113,000  in  round  numbers. 

To  sum  up,  the  foregoing  five  reasons  justify 
amply  the  number  of  600,000  in  excess  of  13 
million  men  at  which  General  de  Lacroix  esti- 
mated the  yield  of  the  German  mobilization, 

8th  Objection. — The  number  of  births  in 
Germany  in  1901  was  2,032,000 — that  is,  about 
1  million  of  males.  The  Carlisle  insurance 
tables  state  that  in  20  years  there  will  remain 
only  600,000  men  out  of  this  million.  If  those 
in  the  reformcs  class  are  deducted  from  this 
figure,  it  is  therefore  impossible  that  the  Ger- 
man moyen  (average)  war  contingent  could 
have  reached  700,000  men. 

Answer. — This  objection  appears  very  strong, 
but  in  reality  it  only  shows,  on  the  part  of 
those  who  make  it,  a  complete  misunderstand- 
ing of  the  nature  of  an  insurance  company, 
and  of  the  conditions  under  which  should  be 
accepted  the  mortality  of  a  country  in  esti- 
mating its  man-power. 

The  (Carlisle  insurance  computations  show 
that    in    1,00(),(K)0   of   men   only   600,000  sub- 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     135 

sisted  at  the  age  of  20;  this  would  seem  to 
mean  that  the  death-rate  for  the  first  20  years 
is  40  per  cent,  but  this  is  a  much  higher  figure 
than  that  of  the  German  death-rate  at  the  age 
of  20,  as  we  shall  prove  by  a  German  authority 
of  the  most  conclusive  kind,  quoted  later. 

We  must  be  careful  also  to  note  that  we 
cannot  trust  to  tables  of  mortality  drawn  up 
for  insurance  to  discuss  questions  of  man- 
power, and  for  the  following  reason :  To  avoid 
risks  to  which  they  are  exposed,  insurance 
companies,  in  making  their  tables,  take  ac- 
count of  special  considerations  which  have 
nothing  at  all  to  do  with  fitness  for  military 
service.  To  know  how  many  youths  of  a 
generation  can  pass  a  physical  examination, 
the  only  tables  we  need  to  consult  are  those 
of  the  general  mortality  of  the  country  whose 
contingent  is  in  question. 

According  to  the  French  annual  statistics 
for  1913  (2d  part,  page  1G8)  there  were  in 
Germany,  in  1901,  2,032,000  births— the  fe- 
males slightly  more  numerous  than  the  males — 
therefore,  in  round  numbers,  1,000,000  boys. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  general  mortality  in 
Germany  from  1901  to  1910  for  the  male  sex 
is  shown  by  official  figures  on  page  34  of  the 
Statistisches  Jahrbuch  fur  das  Deutsche  Reich, 


136  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

published  by  Putkammer  &  Muhlbrecht,  Ber- 
lin, 1915. 

Of  100,000  births— 

At    1  year  there  are  79,766  survivors  and  20,234  deaths 


2  vears  " 

76,585 

<< 

" 

3,181 

3  '  "   " 

75,442 

(< 

<< 

1,143 

4  "   " 

74,727 

c< 

<c 

715 

5  "   " 

74,211 

<c 

i( 

516 

6  "   " 

73,820 

<c 

(< 

391 

„     i<       «< 

73,506 

<< 

(< 

314 

8  "   " 

73,244 

" 

<( 

262 

9  "   " 

73,023 

<< 

c< 

221 

10  "   " 

72,827 

<< 

<c 

196 

11   "   " 

72.650 

" 

<c 

177 

12  "   " 

72,487 

<c 

" 

163 

13  "   " 

" 

72,334 

<< 

<< 

153 

14  "   " 

72,179 

<c 

<c 

155 

15  "   " 

<< 

72,007 

<  < 

<< 

172 

At  the  end  of  the — 

16th  year  there  are  71,808  survivors  and  199  deaths 

17th     "         "       "  71,573         "  "  235      " 

18th     "         "       "  71,300         "  "  273      " 

19th     "         "       "  70,989         "  "  311      " 

As  this  officiiil  German  report  gives  in  the 
I  wo  first  columns  of  the  table  ages  and  sur- 
xivors,  il  is  easy  to  deduce  the  number  of 
deaths  at  each  age,  according  to  government 

fiLHires. 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     137 

Out  of  100  boys  born  in  Germany,  at  19 
years  of  age  there  were — 

29.011  per  cent  deaths 
Leaving      70.989    "       "     survivors 

To  be  exact,    100.000  per  cent 

But  to  make  a  calculation  with  an  immediate 
practical  interest  we  should  finally  consider 
the  death-rate  at  the  end  of  the  16th  year,  as 
it  is  from  boys  of  just  17  years  of  age  that  the 
annual  German  class  is  formed  in  war-time. 
Thus  at  the  end  of  the  16th  year  out  of  100 
boys  born  in  Germany  there  are — 

28.192  per  cent  deaths 
71.808    "       "     survivors 


Which  gives  just  100.000  per  cent 

These  figures  are  the  best  procurable  on 
German  mortality. 

Let  us  first  examine  the  result  with  reference 
to  the  number  of  754,000  men,  which  we  found 
to  be  (see  page  105)  that  of  the  theoretic  mili- 
tary contingent  of  Germany  in  1918.  We 
assume  that  this  class  was  composed  of  young 
men  of  20,  because  according  to  the  figures  of 
the  German  report  on  which  we  based  our  cal- 


138  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

culations,  the  class  of  1910  was  formed  in  a 
period  of  peace  from  young  men  of  20,  and 
besides  included  all  young  Germans  living 
abroad  who  in  that  year  were  theoretically 
able  to  return  to  Germany.  Now,  in  1901 
there  were  in  Germany  about  1,000,000  male 
births.  The  mortality  at  the  completion  of 
the  19th  year  was  29.011  per  cent;  therefore, 
out  of  this  total  290,011  died,  and  709,989 
survived.  To  this  we  should  add  the  number 
of  young  Germans,  sons  of  German  subjects 
of  the  empire  living  in  foreign  European  coun- 
tries (see  page  133). 

This  figure  can  be  verified  with  sufficient 
accuracy.  If  the  German  war  contingent  was 
700,000  in  1910 — a  round  number  which  we 
reached  (see  page  103)  through  German  reports 
when  Germany  had  only  05  million  inhabi- 
tants, it  follows  that  1,000  Germans  yield 
about  10.70  men  to  the  annual  draft.  On 
this  basis  the  113,000  Germans  abroad,  whose 
children  are  so  situated  geographically  that 
they  arc  able  to  feed  the  German  army  (see 
page  134),  furnish  to  the  annual  contingent 
1,21.5  men. 

We  know,  therefore,  tluit  in  1918  the  Ger- 
man examining  boards  had  before  them  709,989 
-1-  1,215  =  711,204  young  (u-rmans  about  19 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     139 

years  old.  From  this  we  should  deduct  5  per 
cent  for  those  reformes  who  for  reasons  above 
indicated  (page  127)  probably  do  not  exceed 
that  rate.  We  must  then  deduct  for  those  re- 
formes  35,560  men,  leaving  certainly  about 
675,644— in  round  numbers,  676,000— boys  20 
years  old  absolutely  fit  to  make  up  Germany's 
war  contingent  for  1918.  We  reached  (see 
page  105)  the  number  of  754,000,  which  gives 
a  difference  of  78,000  men,  but  this  difference 
can  be  to  a  great  extent  logically  explained. 

We  see  by  the  Alldeutscher  Atlas  that  in  1893 
there  were  of  German  subjects  of  the  empire: 

In  America 2,842,744 

"  Asia 2,366 

"  Africa 3,877 

"  Australia 43,861 

Total 2,892,848 

Out  of  this  number,  since  1895,  a  part  of 
these  German  subjects  have  become  natural- 
ized citizens  of  the  countries  where  they  live. 
It  is  difficult  to  arrive  at  the  exact  number,  but 
allowing  that  it  amounts  to  about  a  third,  say, 
964,282  of  our  total,  there  remain  1,928,566. 
From  1893  to  1918,  that  is,  for  25  years,  this 
last  figure  has  been  augmented  in  proportion 
to  the  average  increase  in  the  German  popu- 


140  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

lation,  which  is  annually  9.8  per  1,000  =  say, 
18,894  per  year,  and  therefore  for  25  years 
472,350;  consequently,  our  total  in  1893  of 
1,928,566,  in  1918  becomes  2,400,000  in  round 
numbers. 

In  addition,  as  we  have  shown  (page  104), 
that  1,000  Germans  furnish  about  10.76  men 
to  the  annual  German  contingent,  it  follows 
that  the  2,400,000  German  subjects  in  Amer- 
ica, Asia,  Africa,  and  Australia  could  have 
yielded  an  annual  contingent  to  the  empire 
amounting  to  25,824  men,  or  26,000  in  round 
numbers — if  their  children  of  military  age 
could  have  reached  Germany.  We  noted 
(page  102)  that  deferred  service  is  permitted 
in  Germany  in  favor  of  young  Germans  liv- 
ing abroad.  It  is  nearly  certain,  therefore, 
that  these  26,000  German  youths,  outside  of 
Europe,  must  have  been  included  in  the  fig- 
ure of  238,650  men  for  deferred  service  of  the 
year  1910  (see  page  103)  and  consequently 
form  i)art  of  our  total  of  754,000  which  we 
reached  for  the  contingent  of  1918,  starting 
from  the  figures  of  Germany's  annual  report 
for  1910. 

We  should  then  subtract  these  26,000  young 
Germans  living  in  America,  Asia,  Africa,  and 
Australia  from   the  number  of  754,000  men, 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     141 

as,  the  communication  by  sea  with  Germany- 
being  cut,  they  have  certainly  not  been  able 
to  reach  that  country  and  contribute  to  the 
contingent  of  1918.  This  figure  26,000  reduces 
by  just  so  much  the  difference  of  78,000  that 
we  found  between  the  number  of  754,000  men 
and  the  estimate  of  676,000  we  made  by  means 
of  the  tables  of  mortality.  This  difference, 
therefore,  is  not  more  than  78,000  minus 
26,000,  or  52,000  men,  which  one  must  admit 
is  a  discrepancy,  or  a  mistake  if  you  choose 
to  call  it  so,  which  is  very  slight  for  a  figure 
like  754,000  and  a  calculation  of  this  sort. 

We  must  furthermore  bear  in  mind  that  in 
reality  if  all  the  Germans  overseas  had  been 
able  to  defer  their  mobilization  orders  this  dif- 
ference would  probably  even  then  be  less  than 
52,000  men.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  I  have  esti- 
mated at  one-third  the  Germans,  subjects  of 
the  Empire  in  foreign  countries,  who  within 
twenty-five  years  have  been  naturalized  in 
their  foreign  residence  without  reckoning  on 
the  fact  that  according  to  Delbriick's  law 
naturalized  Germans  can  secretly  preserve  or 
resume  their  condition  as  subjects  of  the  Ger- 
man Empire  and  as  such  become  subject  to 
German  military  service. 


142  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

Let  us  again  make  use  of  the  mortality  tables 
to  analyze,  no  longer  in  theory,  but  in  practice, 
the  military  contingent  of  Germany  in  1918, 
remembering  that  now  it  is  made  up  of  youths, 
not  of  20  years  of  age,  as  in  peace-times,  but 
of  boys  completing  their  16th  year — that  is, 

just  17. 

The  German  death-rate  being  28.192  per 
cent  at  the  end  of  the  16th  year,  out  of  1,000,000 
boys  born  in  1901,  281,920  die  at  17.  The 
number  of  survivors  in  1918  is,  therefore, 
718,080,  and  to  this  we  must  add  1,200  young 
Germans  contributing  to  the  annual  contin- 
gent as  subjects  of  the  empire  living  in  foreign 
European  countries  (see  page  138). 

718,080  +  1,200  make  719,280—720,000  in 
round  numbers,  who  come  up  before  the  Ger- 
man examining  boards  in  1918.  Deducting  5 
per  cent,  say,  36,000,  for  those  rcformcs,  there 
remain  in  1918  720,000  -  36,000  =  684,000 
young  Germans  who  are  certainly  capable  of 
service  in  the  various  branches  of  the  German 
army.  This  is  within  16,000  of  the  figure  of 
700,000,  which  was  our  estimate  for  the  Ger- 
man contingent,  in  round  numbers.  This  dif- 
ference is  relatively  insignificant,  therefore  a 
thorough  scrutiny  shows  that  my  figures  of 
13,600,000  men  for  the  entire  mobilized  Ger- 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     143 

man  army  in  June,  1918,  and  700,000  in  round 
numbers  for  the  annual  contingent  of  the 
same  year,  are  by  no  means  an  exaggeration, 
but  as  close  as  possible  to  the  truth. 

One  error  alone  in  the  preceding  calculations 
consists  in  the  estimation  of  the  sum  of  the 
four  military  contingents  of  1915-18  at  2,900,- 
000  men  (see  page  109),  while  at  the  least  in 
round  numbers  they  come  to  700,000,  say, 
2,800,000,  for  the  four  contingents. 

The  only  effect  of  this  mistake  on  the  num- 
ber of  absolute  losses  of  Germany,  which  we 
calculated  in  June,  1918,  is  tjiat  instead  of 
having  been  for  each  of  the  four  years  of  war 
at  least  600,000  men  annually,  they  have  been 
625,000. 

But  in  the  general  discussion  of  German 
man-power  it  is  well  to  keep  this  mistake  in 
mind.  No  war  can  be  managed  without  mis- 
takes, and  these  are  of  two  kinds,  the  helpful 
and  the  injurious.  In  order  to  be  sure  that  we 
are  not  deceived  in  war-time,  we  must  sys- 
tematically try  to  make  only  helpful  mistakes, 
that  is,  those  which  tend  to  overestimate  the 
enemies'  forces,  and  in  this  way  we  are  led  to 
make  the  most  strenuous  efforts,  which  lead 
to  a  more  speedy  victory.  Therefore,  if  the 
minutest  calculations  show  that  100,000  men 


144  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

are  necessary  for  an  operation,  it  is  best  to 
allow  for  it  125,000,  so  as  to  get  the  advantage 
of  the  helpful  mistake.  That  is  why  in  discus- 
sing the  German  reserves  it  is  more  to  the 
interest  of  the  Entente  to  err  on  the  side  of 
estimating  the  German  losses  at  600,000  men 
a  year,  than  to  believe  that  they  were  625,000. 
In  a  case  like  this  the  error  is  advantageous 
to  the  Allies,  while  a  miscalculation  in  the 
opposite  direction  might  lead  to  the  worst 
consequences. 

In  conclusion,  practical  proofs  can  be  added 
to  the  results  of  our  calculations  to  make  it 
certain  that  Germany  is  not  yet  in  so  much 
need  of  men  as  too  many  among  the  Allies 
believe. 

The  Temps  of  August  7th,  1916,  quotes  the 
following  intercepted  letter  from  a  man  in  the 
76th  Landwehr,  dated  June  16th:  "I  am  still 
at  Kief,"  he  says;  "the  people  are  so  hostile 
to  us  that  they  would  make  an  end  of  us  if 
they  could,  but  there  are  too  many  German 
and  Austrian  troops  here,  so  they  can  do 
nothing.     There  arc  police  posts  everywhere." 

We  see  by  this  letter  that  there  were  still 
many  Germans  in  Russia,  and  in  addition  Le 
Journal  dc  Geneve — quoted  by  the  Temps  on 
August  80th,  1018 — summed  up  various  state- 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     145 

merits  made  by  travellers  who  had  recently 
made  some  stay  in  Germany,  as  follows: 

"Militarily  Germany  seems  to  us  still  very- 
strong,  and  in  no  need  of  men.  Even  after  the 
great  Allied  offensives,  the  large  cities  arc  full 
of  men  on  leave." 

Would  not  this  lead  any  fair-minded,  unprej- 
udiced person  to  see  that  mistakes  existed 
and  are  still  made  among  the  Allies  as  to  the 
numbers  of  the  forces  of  Germany,  and  that  it 
is  to  the  great  advantage  of  the  Entente,  in 
order  to  avert  any  surprise  and  win  the  war 
with  speed  and  certainty,  that  these  mistakes 
should  be  corrected  ? 

In  any  case,  these  different  statements  lead 
to  the  following  practical  results: 

1st.  It  was  unreasonable,  therefore  ex- 
tremely dangerous,  for  the  Allies  to  believe  that 
they  could  win  the  war  only  through  the  ex- 
haustion of  the  German  reserves,  reduced  by 
battles  on  the  western  front,  a  theory  of  Colonel 
Repington's  which  was  shared  by  many  Allies, 
who  still  hold  this  opinion.  This  way  of  think- 
ing does  not  make  success  impossible,  but  it 
tends  to  prolong  the  war  enormously,  as  has 
actually  happened,  for  if  Repington  had  been 
right  the  war  would  have  been  over  long  since. 


146  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

2d.  The  Allies  must  be  convinced  that  mili- 
tary action  should  not  be  limited  to  the  west 
front,  but  that  the  value  of  the  other  war-fields, 
those  of  Italy  and  Salonika,  should  also  be 
thoroughly  understood.  The  far-reaching  suc- 
cessful effects  of  the  rapid  advance  of  the  Allied 
army  in  Serbia,  though  obtained  with  rela- 
tively small  forces,  are  a  striking  proof  of  this. 

3d.  The  Allies  must  be  persuaded  that,  to 
bring  victory  quickly  and  with  lighter  burdens 
in  men  and  money,  it  is  absolutely  necessary 
to  have  recourse  not  only  to  military  strategy, 
but  also  to  political  strategy,  which  enables 
them  to  act  even  within  the  boundaries  of  Pan- 
germany  in  order  for  the  common  good  to 
work  upon  the  numerous  weaknesses  there  to 
be  found.  That  this  view  is  correct  is  proved 
by  the  insurrection  which  has  already  taken 
place  in  Bohemia  and  is  extending  in  all  the 
Slav  and  Latin  regions  of  Austria-Hungary, 
greatly  facilitating  the  penetration  of  Allied 
troops  into  Central  Europe. 

IV. 

In  order  that  Allied  public  opinion  may 
appreciate  the  immense  importance  of  the 
complete  success  of  the  Entente  operations  in 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     117 

the  Balkans  in  October,  1918,  and  may  grasp 
the  absolute  necessity  of  using  this  situation 
to  the  fullest  extent  without  delay — a  course 
calculated  to  hasten  in  a  considerable  degree 
the  complete  defeat  of  Germany — it  is  neces- 
sary to  call  to  mind  again  what  were  approxi- 
mately the  probable  mobilized  forces  of  Pan- 
germany  at  the  beginning  of  August,  1918, 
the  opening  of  the  fifth  year  of  war. 

Germany  alone  could  not  make  head  against 
the  Entente.  She  has  only  done  so  by  the 
help  of  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and  Tur- 
key, whose  armies  were  controlled  from  Berlin. 
The  troops  of  these  powers  held  central  Europe, 
the  Balkans,  and  southern  Russia,  thus  assur- 
ing to  Germany  the  food  and  material  neces- 
sary to  her  war  industries,  and  leaving  her 
free  to  concentrate  all  her  energies  on  the 
western  front.  To  know  nearly  what  total 
forces  were  probably  at  the  disposal  of  the 
German  General  Staff,  we  must  now  scrutinize 
the  strength  of  Pangermany,  that  is,  the  Ger- 
man Empire  and  its  allies. 

We  have  seen  (page  109)  that  after  four 
years  of  war  the  actual  forces  of  Germany, 
mobilized  on  the  basis  of  20  per  cent  of  the 
inhabitants,  amounted  to  11  millions  of  men. 


148  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

This  is  in  round  numbers,  deduction  being 
made  of  actual  definitive  losses  up  to  June 
1st,  1918.  We  come  to  the  conclusion  (page 
111)  that  these  German  war  losses — taking 
into  computation  the  annual  number  of  re- 
cruits— amounted  in  four  years  to  2,400,000 
men.  This  represents  a  diminution  of  176  in 
1,000  in  proportion  to  the  figure  for  the  gen- 
eral mobilization  of  Germany,  which  we  placed 
at  13,600,000  men.  This  valuation  will  bring 
us  probably  close  to  the  truth,  if  used  as  a 
basis  from  which  to  estimate  the  military  con- 
dition of  Germany  and  her  allies  before  the 
catastrophe  of  Bulgaria. 

In  1914,  the  population  of  Austria-Hungary 
was  about  50  millions,  exclusive  of  foreigners, 
Bulgaria  had  5  millions,  and  Turkey  20;  but 
the  Ottoman  mol)ilization  was  not  extended 
to  Arabia,  for  the  most  part  in  rebellion, 
and  the  presence  of  British  troops  in  Bagdad 
and  Jerusalem  hampers  the  action  of  the  Con- 
stantinople authorities;  also  great  numbers  of 
Greeks  and  Armenians  massacred  by  the  Turks 
obviously  could  not  be  included  in  the  figures 
of  the  Ottoman  mobilization.  For  these 
reasons,  and  to  keep  well  within  the  mark, 
we  will  place  the  mobilization  list  in  Turkey 
at  half  the  population,  about  10  million  men. 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     149 

It  is  certain  that  Germany  made  as  great 
demands  on  the  man-power  of  her  alHes  as 
those  she  accepted  for  herself.  It  is,  there- 
fore, reasonable  to  assume  that  the  basis  of 
mobilization  in  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria, 
and  Turkey  was  the  same  as  in  Germany,  viz. : 
20  in  100  inhabitants,  hence — 

Austria-Hungary  would  have  mobilized  10  million  men. 
Bulgaria  would  have  mobilized    1  million  men. 

Turkey  would  have  mobilized    2  million  men. 

For  these  three  countries  the  losses  from 
the  war  must  have  been  approximately  those  of 
Germany  herself.  Keeping  the  true  propor- 
tion in  mind,  the  Bulgars,  up  to  August,  1918, 
were  in  much  the  same  military  condition;  the 
Austrians  have  not  fought  so  many  battles,  but 
they  have  lost  many  more  prisoners,  for  the 
Czechs  and  the  Jugo-Slavs  pressed  into  the 
Austrian  armies  gave  themselves  up  by  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  to  the  Russians  and  Ser- 
bians. Comparing  the  Turks  with  the  Ger- 
mans, fewer  have  been  killed,  but  their  inferior 
sanitary  organization  had  led  to  a  high  death- 
rate  from  disease,  which  equalized  the  losses. 

For  these  different  reasons  the  number  of 
mobilized  effectives  of  Germany's  allies  can 
be  reduced  in  the  proportion  of  176  to  1,000, 


150  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

which  represents  the  really  definitive  losses  of 
the  German  army  at  the  end  of  the  fourth 
year. 

Austria-Hungary...  10,000,000  -  1,760,000  =    8,240,000  men. 

Bulgaria 1,000,000  -      176,000  =       824,000  men. 

Turkey 2,000,000  -     352,000  =     1,648,000  men. 

Total 10,712,000  men. 

This  gives  the  probable  number  of  mobilized 
men  at  the  disposal  of  Germany's  allies,  Au- 
gust 1st,  1918,  including  not  only  fighting 
men,  but  also  those  attached  to  all  other 
branches  of  the  war  service,  direct  or  indirect. 
We  may  allow  that  these  together  amount  to 
11  millions,  which  added  to  11  millions  already 
attributed  to  Germany  gives  a  total  of  22 
millions  of  men  marching  under  the  orders  of 
Berlin.  We  shall  see  later  on  that  these  11 
millions  furnished  by  Germany's  friends  were 
not  entirely  a  source  toi  strength  to  the  staff 
at  Berlin,  but  through  them  Pangermany  was 
vulnerable  in  many  ways,  from  the  beginning 
of  the  war  indeed,  if  the  Entente  knew  how  to 
act  so  as  to  take  advantage  of  it. 

V. 

The  summary  of  the  new  sources  of  effec- 
tives on  which  GenuMny  could  freely  draw,  if 
the   Bulgarian   colla])se   luid    not   taken   i)lace 


PANGERIVIANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     151 

goes  to  show  (1)  how  the  Allied  successes  in 
the  Balkans,  by  bringing  about  the  impotence 
of  Turkey,  made  it  impossible  for  Germany 
from  that  time  on  to  deal  successfully  with 
the  sources  of  Mussulman  effectives;  (2)  the 
absolute  necessity  that  the  Allies  should  l)ring 
about  such  a  peace  that  it  should  be  entirely 
impossible  for  Germany  to  deal  with  the  Rus- 
sian masses,  sources  of  considerable  numbers 
of  effectives,  which  are  still  in  a  great  degree 
subject  to  the  influence  of  German  recruiting 
agents. 

The  ever-increasing  number  of  Americans 
landing  in  France  has  forced  the  Teutons  to 
modify  their  plans.  We  see  that  they  have 
been  forced  to  abandon  the  hope  of  a  rapid 
advance  on  Paris  and  the  Channel  coasts, 
and  thence  have  been  driven  to  take  up  the 
defensive  tactics  on  the  western  front,  which 
has  become  a  much  more  emphatic  retreat 
since  the  Bulgarian  disaster  has  begun  to  make 
its  favorable  results  felt.  But  if  this  event 
had  not  taken  place  Berlin,  fertile  in  re- 
sources, would  have  looked  to  the  east  for 
means  to  parry  the  blow  dealt  by  the  Ignited 
States.  What  these  means  were  we  may  pos- 
sibly discover. 


152  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

Among  the  many  consequences  of  the  mili- 
tary disintegration  of  Russia  is  the  fact  that 
Germany  has  been  brought  into  direct  contact 
with  new  recruiting-grounds  in  Europe  and 
Asia,  from  which  she  would  have  drawn  as 
largely  and  quickly  as  possible,  hence  the  Allies 
would  have  had  to  face  a  new  and  great  danger. 

Let  us  first  inquire  who  are  the  people  from 
among  whom  Germany  could  have  recruited 
her  armies,  directly  or  through  the  help  of  Tur- 
key, if  Central  Pangermany  had  continued  to 
exist  in  its  entirety.     (See  map,  p.  154.) 

In  the  Christian  population  of  Russia  men 
or  allies  would  be  most  readily  drawn  from — 

1.  Germans.  Russian  subjects:  about 2,400,000 

2.  Finns,  about 3,100,000 

3.  Ukrainians,  about 30,000,000 

Total 35,500,000 

Among  the  Moslem  populations  in  the  Eu- 
ropean and  Asiatic  provinces  of  Russia  an 
intense  Turkish  propaganda  was  going  on, 
nominally  based  on  the  idea  of  the  solidarity 
of  the  Turanian  race,  but  really  emanating 
from  Berlin  by  way  of  Constantinople;  there- 
fore Germany  could  have  drawn  men  from — 

1 .  Tlio  Tartars,  ul)()iit 5,000,000 

2.  Tlic  Caucasians,  about 1.(500.000 

3.  Tlie  Ba.slikirs,  about 1,800,000 


PANGERIVIANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     153 

4.  The  Kirghiz,  about 6,000,000 

5.  The  Turkomans,  about 400,000 

6.  Turks  and  other  Moslem  peoples 3,000,000 

Total 17,800,000 

In  Asia,  beyond  the  Russian  frontier,  Ger- 
many could  have  secured  help  from — 

1.  Persian  Mussulmans,  about 9,000,000 

2.  Afghan  Mussulmans,  about 5,000,000 

3.  Northern  Indian  Mussulmans,  about.  .  66,000,000 

4.  Chinese  Mussulmans,  about 30,000,000 

Total 110,000,000 

There  may  be,then,35  +  18  +  110,say  163  mil- 
lions of  men,  in  round  numbers,  among  whom — 
owing  to  the  suppression  of  the  Russian  front 
— Germany  could  have  found  means  of  various 
kinds  to  assist  her  in  carrying  on  the  war. 

The  Germans  certainly  could  not  have  hoped 
to  draw  effectives  from  such  populations  in 
proportion  to  their  size;  also  the  military 
qualities  of  these  people  vary  considerably, 
and  the  use  that  could  be  made  of  soldiers 
thus  recruited  would  depend  much  on  geo- 
graphical situation. 

For  instance,  Persians  as  a  rule  do  not  make 
good  soldiers,  but  in  Aserbedjan  there  are 
about  400,000  men  from  whom  might  be  formed 
a  first-rate  army.  Afghans  are  all  warlike, 
and  German  influence  was  so  strong  among 


154 


AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     155 

them  that  the  Emir  recently  sent  an  ambassa- 
dor to  Berlin,  in  sign  of  friendship.  In  north- 
ern India  the  Moslems  have  hitherto  been 
loyal  to  England,  but  the  Pan-Islam  agitation 
as  well  as  the  attitude  of  their  Afghan  neigh- 
bors might  have  inclined  them  in  a  German 
direction;  also  German  influence  has  been  at 
work  for  years  among  the  30  millions  of  Chi- 
nese Mussulmans,  with  the  view  of  counter- 
balancing the  part  of  China  which  leans 
toward  the  Entente.  In  central  Asia  there 
are  the  Bashkirs,  Turkomans,  Kirghiz,  and 
Tartars,  who  could  furnish  excellent  troops, 
well-placed  geographically  to  act  against  the 
Trans-Siberian  (see  map),  as  their  provinces 
border  on  it  for  nearly  its  whole  length. 

For  its  operations  in  Europe  the  Berlin 
General  Staff  could  have  found  soldiers: 

1st.  Among  the  30  milhons  of  Ukrainians — 
this  was  already  begun — and  a  good  many 
Ukrainian  officers  are  still  being  instructed  in 
Germany. 

2d.  Among  the  3  millions  of  Finns,  the  ma- 
jority of  whom  are  strongly  Germanophile,  and 
above  all  among  the  9>A  millions  of  Germans, 
subjects  of  the  former  Russian  Empire,  but  as 
Pangermanist  as  the  Germans  of  Berlin  them- 
selves. 


156  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

We  thus  see  how  the  Bolshevist  treachery 
had  opened  fresh  sources  of  suppHes  for  Prus- 
sian armies,  and  these  recruits  would  have 
helped  Germany  to  consolidate  her  new  pos- 
sessions in  eastern  Europe  and  Asia.  As  we 
have  stated  above,  Germany's  annual  loss  in 
men — in  proportion  to  her  first  mobilization — 
was  about  600,000,  and  if  she  could  have 
drawn  on  all  the  sources  of  effectives  pointed 
out  above  she  could  have  made  up  her  losses 
at  least  in  part,  thus  resolving  the  problem  of 
effectives  once  more  in  her  own  favor  and 
finding  a  way  to  offset  the  American  forces. 
But  the  strategic  success  of  the  Allies  in  the 
Balkans  by  the  taking  of  Nish  and  of  the 
Danube  put  it  almost  entirely  out  of  the  power 
of  Turkey  to  be  a  dangerous  source  of  new 
Mussulman  effectives.  It  only  remains  to  cut 
off  Germany  from  Russia  by  creating  a  Po- 
land and  a  Bohemia  so  strongly  organized 
that  in  the  future  Germany  can  no  longer 
have  any  dealings  with  Russian  troops. 

VI. 

Let  us  now  point  out  how  the  Allied  victory 
in  the  Balkans,  if  wc  know  how  lo  develop  it 
quickly  in  the  direction  of  Vienna-Prague-Ber- 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     157 

lin,  will   solve  the  problem  of  effectives  def- 
initely and  peremptorily  in  favor  of  the  Allies. 

The  positions  heretofore  established  will  al- 
low us  now  to  answer  this  all-important  ques- 
tion: Would  the  Entente  have  been — even 
with  the  help  of  American  troops  to  the  great- 
est extent  we  can  imagine  in  1919 — certain 
to  have  on  the  European  battle-field  forces 
superior  to  those  of  the  Central  Powers  if  she 
had  been  content  to  fight  on  the  western 
front?  The  greater  part  of  the  Allies  have 
believed  this.  Their  conviction  has  received 
powerful  confirmation  in  the  eyes  of  Ameri- 
cans by  the  statements  of  General  Peyton  C. 
March,  chief  of  the  United  States  General 
Staff,  before  the  House  Committee  on  Mili- 
tary Affairs,  in  Washington.  He  said:  "If 
you  put  80  divisions  of  Americans  in  France 
of  approximately  45,000  men  to  a  division,  you 
will  give  marked  superiority  in  rifle-power,  and 
we  should  be  able  to  bring  the  war  to  a  suc- 
cessful conclusion  in  1919." 

The  New  York  Times,  as  late  as  August  30th, 
1918,  pubhshed  the  following: 

"The  efforts  of  the  Allied  Powers  and  the 
United  States,"  General  March  said,  "would 
be  confined  to  actual  fighting  on  the  western 


158  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

front,  where  the  war  would  be  won  or  lost, 
without  taking  into  consideration  conditions 
in  Russia." 

Let  us  see  if  it  was  true,  as  many  of  us  be- 
lieved, that  the  American  assistance  on  the 
western  front  certainly  assured  man-power  and 
complete  victory  to  the  Entente,  without  the 
need  to  consider  seriously  the  situation,  not  of 
Russia  only,  but  of  the  whole  of  Europe  behind 
the  western  front  and  especially  in  the  Balkans. 

In  order  to  reach  as  close  an  approximation 
to  the  truth  as  possible  with  the  aid  of  suc- 
cessive deductions,  we  will  proceed  as  follows: 

We  will  first  estimate  at  the  highest  allow- 
able figure  the  mobihzed  forces  of  the  Entente. 
In  order  to  do  so  we  will  assume  that  the  Eu- 
ropean Allies  who  were  still  in  control  of  their 
own  territory,  that  is.  Great  Britain,  France, 
Italy,  Portugal,  and  Greece,  had  made  as 
stupendous  efforts  as  Germany  and  her  allies, 
and  had  mobihzed  on  a  basis  of  20  per  cent 
of  their  population.  We  will  allow  also  that 
in  four  years  the  Allies  have  suffered  losses 
proportionally  identical  with  those  of  the 
Germans.  We  will  take  the  figures  for  mobili- 
zation obtained  from  the  European  Allies,  on 
the  basis  of  20  per  cent  of  their  poi)u]ation, 
and  reduce   them  by   17G   in   1,000,  a  figure 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     159 

which,  as  wc  have  seen  above  (page  148),  rep- 
resents probably  the  really  definitive  losses  of 
the  German  army  after  four  years  of  war. 
This  figure  being  laid  down  after  compensa- 
tion of  war  losses  by  the  annual  military  con- 
tingents of  Germany,  the  amount  of  the  Allies' 
loss  that  we  shall  reach  will  be  for  them  also 
the  sum  of  losses  taken,  not  from  their  popu- 
lation, but  from  their  armies  alone,  these  latter 
having  been  fed  as  in  the  case  of  the  German 
army  during  the  last  four  years,  by  four  an- 
nual levies,  which  have  filled  up  to  a  consid- 
erable extent  gaps  made  by  the  war. 

By  subtracting  the  actual  definitive  losses  of 
each  Allied  state  from  the  amount  of  its  first 
mobilization — which  we  will  suppose  at  the 
maximum,  we  reach  the  greatest  possible 
number  of  Allied  soldiers  which  would  have 
been  ready  to  march  at  the  opening  of  the  fifth 
year  of  war. 

To  make  sure  of  these  figures  we  will  not 
count  colonial  contingents  of  the  European 
Allies,  though  they  have  been  of  great  value. 

1st.  Because  there  was  no  conscription  in 
Ireland,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  her  popula- 
tion (4,400,000)  is  included  in  that  of  Great 
Britain,  on  which  our  estimates  of  the  total 
British  mobihzation  are  based. 


160  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

2d.  Both  France  and  England  were  obliged 
to  maintain  large  forces  in  their  colonies^-this 
is  especially  true  of  India — and  the  conse- 
quences of  these  two  drawbacks  diminish  in 
a  striking  degree  the  effective  assistance  ren- 
dered by  Anglo-French  colonials  in  the  Eu- 
ropean war-field. 

As  mobilization  in  the  United  States  is  not 
based  on  population,  to  the  total  obtained 
of  the  Allied  European  forces  mobilized  at 
the  threshold  of  the  fifth  year  of  war  we  must 
add  4  millions  of  Americans  as  the  maximum 
number  which  the  United  States  is  pledged 
to  place  in  Europe  by  the  end  of  1919.  On 
account  of  the  difficulties  of  marine  transport 
and  food-supply,  the  presence  in  France  in 
August,  1918,  of  1,500,000  American  soldiers 
was  a  remarkable  feat,  but  it  will  be  a  new 
world's  wonder  if  the  United  States  by  July, 
1919,  succeeds  in  transporting  and  victualling 
in  Europe  4  millions  of  men,  according  to 
promise.  If,  then,  we  include  in  our  present 
calculations  4  millions  of  American  soldiers 
who  cannot  land  in  Europe  before  July,  1919, 
and  proceed  as  we  have  done  in  the  case  of 
the  European  Allies,  we  are  certain  to  put 
at  the  highest  possible  figure  the  man-pov/er 
which    the   Allies   would   have   been   able    to 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     IGl 

oppose  to  the  22  millions  of  mobilized  troops 
of  the  Central  Powers;  which  figure  we  fixed 
as  the  probable  one  in  August,  1918,  and 
reached  by  the  foregoing  methods  (page  150). 
Reckoning  in  the  same  way,  we  obtain  the 
following  table: 


Population  of  Entente 
countries 

Supposed  mobiliza- 
tion at  20  per  cent 

Supposed  losses,  176 
in  1,000,  to  be  de- 
ducted    from    first 
mobilization 

Total  man-pow- 
er  of    Allies   in 
the  fifth  year  of 
the  war 

Great  Britain..  46 

France 40 

Italy 36 

Portugal 6 

Greece 4 

Americans 

9,200,000  - 
8,000,000  - 
7,200,000  - 
1,200,000  - 
800,000  - 

1,619,200  = 

1,408,000  = 

1,267,200  = 

211,200  = 

140,800  = 

7,580,800 
6,592,000 
5,932,800 
988,800 
659,200 
4,000,000 

25,753,600 

If  this  were  correct,  in  1919  the  Allies  would 
have  in  round  numbers  26  millions  of  mobi- 
lized men  against  22  millions  of  the  Central 
Empires.  Hence,  under  the  most  favorable 
circumstances,  the  Allies  as  a  whole  could 
have  only  4  million  more  men  altogether  than 
the  Central  Powers.  That  is  to  say,  a  num- 
ber equal  to  118  Allied  mobilized  against  100  in 
the  mobilized  armies  directed  from  Berlin.  It 
is  already  plain  that  this  Allied  advantage  in 
men  of  18  per  100  was  too  small  to  be  held  as 


162  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

an  absolute  guaranty  of  victory  by  weight  of 
numbers  alone.  But  we  will  now  show  that 
this  numerical  superiority  of  the  Allies  did  not 
really  exist,  for  the  following  reasons: 

1st  reason.  It  is  well  known  that  in  July, 
1918,  there  were  many  more  prisoners  of  the 
European  Allies  in  Germany  than  there  were 
Teuton  prisoners  in  Allied  hands.  This  larger 
amount  of  Allied  prisoners  leads  naturally  to 
the  supposition  that  the  losses  on  our  side 
ha-ve  probably  been  proportionally  greater 
during  four  years  of  war  than  those  of  the 
Central  Powers.  If  this  is  so,  it  follows  that 
the  Allies  have  in  comparison  with  the  Teutons 
an  excess  of  losses  which  does  not  show  in 
our  table,  but  which  in  fact  diminished  by  just 
so  much  the  man-power  of  the  Entente. 

2d  reason.  The  European  Allies  certainly 
have  not  mobilized  their  population  on  a  20- 
pcr-cent  basis.  Neither  Portugal  nor  Greece 
could  go  above  10  per  cent,  and  even  this  has 
not  been  certainly  reached. 

3d  reason.  Even  if  Great  Britain,  France, 
and  Italy,  like  the  Central  Powers,  mobilized 
at  the  ratio  of  20  per  cent  of  their  population, 
the  Entente  countries  could  not  draw  from 
their  enlistments  an  amount  of  fighting  men 
proportionally    equal    to    that    of    Germany. 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     1G3 

This  was  so  because  the  scarcity  of  labor  in 
Allied  countries  has  driven  them  to  use  in  their 
munition  factories  a  much  larger  proportion 
of  their  enrolled  men  than  was  the  case  in 
the  Central  Empires.  The  Germans  and  their 
allies  had  at  least  4  millions  of  prisoners  and 
50  millions  of  Allied  subjects  held  as  slaves, 
from  whom  they  drew  free  labor  for  their  war 
factories,  and  which  left  them  at  liberty  to 
send  to  the  firing-line  a  proportion  of  their 
enrolled  men  undoubtedly  greater  than  was 
possible  to  the  great  Allied  states. 

These  three  reasons  ought  to  convince  us 
that  the  advantage  of  18  per  cent  in  man- 
power which  our  table  leads  us  to  think  we 
possessed  over  the  enemy  was  not  founded  on 
fact.  Even  if  we  imagine  the  4  millions  of 
American  soldiers  were  already  landed  in 
Europe,  the  most  favorable  estimates  could 
not  assure  us  that  during  the  fifth  year  of  the 
war  the  Entente  could  have  counted  on  man- 
power in  excess  of  that  of  the  Central  Empires, 
if  Central  Pangermany  had  been  able  to  hold 
out.  But  the  Bulgarian  defeat  brought  about 
by  its  consequences  the  exclusion  of  Turkey 
and  of  Austria-Hungary.  The  problem  of  ef- 
fectives was  then  at  once  completely  solved. 
At  last  directing  their  attacks  on  the  weak  ele- 


164  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

ments  of  the  effectives  marching  under  the  or- 
ders of  Berlin,  the  Alhes  eliminated  them  from 
the  conflict  and  on  this  head  secured  a  crushing 
superiority  of  numbers.  Such  is  one  of  the 
enormous  profits  that  the  Entente  derives  from 
the  Balkan  operations. 

VII. 

The  great  Allied  successes  in  the  Balkans, 
beginning  in  October,  1918,  show  that  if  the 
decisive  importance  of  the  Danube  front  and  of 
political  strategy  had  been  understood  in  1915 
the  war  might  have  been  ended  long  since  by 
a  complete  victory. 

To  convince  ourselves  of  this  let  us  con- 
sider first  the  teachings  of  the  past. 

First  example.  Austro-Germany  went  into 
the  struggle  with  68  -\-  50,  that  is,  118  millions 
of  inhabitants,  against  a  coalition  comprising 
273  millions  of  people:  Russia  182  millions  of 
inhabitants,  England  46  millions,  France  40, 
Serbia  5.  The  Berlin  General  Staff  saw  at 
once  that  to  counterbalance  such  a  dispro- 
portion in  numbers  the  help  of  Bulgaria  and 
Turkey  would  be  needful.  This  determina- 
tion to  solve  the  man-power  problem  in  Ger- 
many's favor  was  one  of  the  reasons  for  the 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     1G5 

destruction  of  Serbia  at  the  end  of  1915,  for 
it  was  Serbia  which  blocked  Germany's  road 
to  the  sources  of  eastern  man-power  in  Ger- 
manophile  countries. 

I  pointed  out  the  particular  object  of  this 
operation  at  the  time  it  was  begun,  in  an  ar- 
ticle which  appeared  October  23d,  1915,  in 
the  Paris  Illustration,  where  I  said: 

"Let  us  now  suppose  the  intervention  of 
the  Franco-English  Allies  via  Salonika  having 
failed,  that  the  Germans  can  reap  the  greatest 
possible  advantage  from  direct  and  permanent 
communications  with  Turkey.  They  can  thus 
obtain  a  considerable  number  of  fresh  effec- 
tives. ...  In  fact,  this  Turco-German  junc- 
tion, besides  implying  the  destruction  of 
350,000  fine  Serbian  soldiers — who,  fighting 
their  own  battle  at  the  same  time  gave 
valuable  help  to  the  general  cause  of  the  Allies 
by  killing  many  Austro-Boches — would  pro- 
duce direct  contact  with  troops  of  Bulgaria 
and  Turkey  and  the  large  recruiting-grounds 
of  Turkey-in-Asia  and  Persia.  In  this  way 
at  least  a  million  and  a  half  of  fresh  soldiers, 
armed  or  not — but  whom  the  Turks  are  al- 
ready recruiting  and  training  as  far  as  pos- 
sible— would  be  at  once  at  the  service  of  the 
Kaiser.     Can  there  he   any  doubt  that,  having 


166  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

solved  the  vital  effective  problem  in  his  own  favoVy 
he  would  hesitate  to  make  use  of  these  new 
men  on  the  west  front,  perhaps  before  Russia 
is  again  able  to  resume  a  strong  offensive 
along  her  entire  line?" 

The  weakening  followed  by  the  disintegra- 
tion of  Russia,  begun  several  months  after  I 
wrote  these  lines  (October,  1915),  gave  Ger- 
many the  chance  to  fill  up  her  western  lines 
with  levies  of  troops  drawn  from  the  Russian 
front  and  from  Austria-Hungary  and  left 
her  Turkish  and  Bulgarian  effectives  for  her 
eastern  operations.  But  it  cannot  be  denied 
that  when  Serbia  was  crushed  it  decided  the 
man -power  question  in  Germany's  favor.  This 
operation  gave  three  results  to  Berlin: 

1st.  It  has  provided  the  Central  Powers  up 
to  now  with  about  3  millions  of  new  mobilized 
Turks  and  Bulgars,  equal  to  twice  the  number 
I  estimated  in  October,  1915. 

2d.  It  has  deprived  the  Entente  of  the  sup- 
port of  350,000  l)ravc  Serbian  soldiers. 

3d.  It  placed  Greece— with  about  400,000 
possible  mobilized  men,  and  Roumania  with 
about  700,000  who  might  be  enrolled,  in  a  bad 
strategic  position  in  case  they  wished  to  in- 
tervene later,  as  events  have  abundantly 
proved. 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     167 

It  was  certainly  thanks  to  these  results  tliat 
Germany  was  able  to  hold  out  until  the  Bul- 
garian collapse. 

Second  example.  If  the  Entente  had  grasped 
earlier  than  Germany  the  vital  importance  of 
the  Danube  front,  not  only  would  she  have 
prevented  the  Austro-Germans  from  securing 
the  above  advantages,  but  the  Allies  would 
have  settled  the  great  question  of  man-power 
in  their  own  favor  even  more  decisively  than 
Germany  settled  it  through  the  destruction  of 
Serbia. 

To  understand  this,  let  us  suppose  that  in 
the  first  half  of  the  year  1915,  instead  of  send- 
ing 150,000  men  to  capture  the  Dardanelles 
under  conditions  which  forbade  success,  the 
Entente  had  sent  them  to  Belgrade  on  the 
Danube.  This  expedition  was  materially  per- 
fectly possible.  The  Salonika-Belgrade  Rail- 
road was  not  at  all  a  wretched  little  mountain 
line,  as  Colonel  Repington  wrongly  makes  out 
in  the  Atlantic  Monthly  for  August,  1918.  In 
1915,  it  was  a  good  single-track  road,  with 
double-track  passing  points  about  every  20 
kilometres;  it  wanted  rolling-stock,  but  this 
could  readily  have  been  suppHed.  If  necessary, 
the  double  track  could  have  been  extended  for  [ 
nearly  the  whole  length  of  the  line;  the  sec- 


168  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

tions  where  two  tracks  could  not  have  been  laid 
were  relatively  short  and  consequently  could 
not  have  made  the  main  line  impracticable. 
Besides,  in  point  of  fact,  the  Germans  made 
use  of  much  of  this  railroad  from  north  to 
south  to  organize  the  whole  German-Bulgar 
front  in  Macedonia,  a  proof,  if  any  were 
needed,  that  the  Allies  could  have  made  it 
equally  useful  from  south  to  north  to  trans- 
port an  army  to  the  Danube.  If  they  had 
sent  only  150,000  Franco-English  men  they 
would  have  brought  about  the  following  con- 
sequences: 

1st.  The  appearance  at  Belgrade  of  these 
150,000  Franco-English  soldiers  would  have 
been  a  tangible  proof  to  all  Greeks,  Serbians, 
Roumanians,  Slavs,  and  Latins  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  amounting  to  44  millions  of  anti- 
German  people,  that  France  and  England 
understood  that  the  true  aim  of  the  war  de- 
clared by  Germany  was  the  conquest  of  cen- 
tral Europe — the  key  of  the  world — and  that 
the  Allies  realized  that  the  best  way  to  win 
the  war  was  to  put  that  key  in  tlieir  pocket. 

2d.  The  appearance  on  the  Danube  of 
Anglo-French  troops  would  have  reassured 
the  Balkan  Allies  of  the  Entente  and  the  nu- 
merous    insurrectionist     groups     in     Austria- 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     1G9 

Hungary;  they  would  have  seen  in  it  a  pledge 
that  the  great  Western  Powers  would  employ 
all  material  necessary  for  their  liberation. 

3d.  Under  these  circumstances  Greece  and 
Roumania  unquestionably  would  have  joined 
the  Allies  without  further  delay.  In  fact, 
during  the  first  half  of  1915  popular  feeHng 
in  Greece,  and  especially  in  Roumania,  set  so 
strongly  toward  the  Entente  that  it  would 
have  been  easy  to  overcome  the  opposition 
of  King  Constantine  at  Athens  and  the  tem- 
porizing policy  of  M.  Bratiano  at  Bucharest. 

4th.  These  various  psychological  arguments 
should  convince  us  that  even  so  small  a  force 
as  150,000  Franco-English  on  the  Danube 
would  have  made  a  tie  strong  enough  to  bind 
together  the  many  elements  favorable  to  the 
Allies  in  central  Europe  and  the  Balkans. 

5th.  If  150,000  Franco-Britains  had  been 
sent  to  the  Balkans  it  would  have  had  for 
practical  effect  the  creation  of  an  Entente 
army  on  the  Danube  and  in  the  Balkans,  made 
up  as  follows: 

150,000  Franco-English. 
350,000  Serbians. 
400,000  Greeks. 
700,000  Roumanians. 


Say,  1,600,000  men. 


170  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

6th.  This  army  would  have  sufficed,  on  ac- 
count of  the  nature  of  the  country  and  the 
ease  with  which  it  can  be  defended^  to  form 
an  insurmountable  barrier  stretching  from 
Montenegro  on  the  Adriatic  to  the  mouth  of 
the  Danube  on  the  Black  Sea. 

7th.  The  road  to  the  east  would  have  been 
closed  to  Austria-Germany  by  this  barrier. 

8th.  South  of  this  barrier,  Bulgaria,  denuded 
of  munitions  by  the  Balkan  Wars  of  1912-13, 
would  have  been  helpless  for  the  remainder 
of  the  war. 

9th.  Again,  south  of  this  barrier,  Turkey, 
also  lacking  armament,  and  for  the  same  rea- 
son, at  the  end  of  a  very  few  weeks  would 
have  been  forced  not  only  to  cease  fighting 
the  Allies,  but  to  reopen  the  straits  to  them 
of  her  own  accord. 

To  the  north  of  this  barrier,  helped,  cheered, 
and  emboldened  by  the  presence  of  a  strong 
Allied  force  on  the  Danube,  the  28  millions  of 
Slavs  and  Latins,  unwilling  subjects  of  the 
Hapsburgs,  who  were  restless  from  the  begin- 
ning of  the  conflict,  would  have  risen  as  one 
man,  and  the  greater  number,  pressed  into 
the  Austro-IIungarian  army,  would  have  de- 
serted to  the  army  of  the  Danube,  so  that  the 
Entente  would  have  found  in  Austria-Hungary 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     171 

itself  an  unlimited  supply  of  good  soldiers. 
All  this  certainly  would  have  happened,  for 
under  much  less  favorable  circumstances  Slav 
soldiers,  subjects  of  Austria,  deserted  in  Serbia 
and  Russia  by  hundreds  of  thousands  and 
took  service  against  the  Central  Empires. 
In  the  summer  of  1916  the  Czecho-Slovaks, 
who  were  so  much  admired  by  the  Allies  for 
their  bravery  and  intelligence  in  Siberia  were 
ex-Austro-Hungarian  soldiers  who  surrendered 
to  the  Russians  and  afterward  enlisted  in  the 
armies  of  the  Czar  to  fight  the  Austro-Ger- 
mans. 

From  the  special  point  of  view  of  the  man- 
power question,  the  presence  of  only  150,000 
Franco-English  soldiers  would  have  led  to  the 
following  results: 

1st.  Three  millions  of  Turkish  and  Bul- 
garian mobilized  men  would  have  been  kept 
out  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  army. 

2d.  The  Entente  would  have  gained  1,450,- 
000  Balkan  soldiers,  well  placed  geograph- 
ically. 

3d.  The  Entente  was  so  placed  as  to  excite 
under  the  best  possible  conditions  the  revolt 
of  28  millions  of  Slavs  and  Latins  in  Austria- 
Hungary,  and  this  solution  of  the  man-power 
problem    would    have   had    decisive    influence 


172  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

in  favor  of  the  Allies.  In  1915,  the  Russians 
were  still  in  the  Carpathians,  in  eastern  Aus- 
tria; the  breakdown  of  Austria-Hungary  re- 
sulting from  insurrection  of  its  oppressed 
peoples  would  have  encircled  Germany  in  a 
geographical  sense,  and  the  latter,  cut  off  from 
her  eastern  food-supply  by  the  Allied  barrier 
on  the  Danube,  would  have  been  forced  at  the 
end  of  a  few  months  to  surrender  uncondi- 
tionally. 

These  wonderful  results  would  have  been 
the  logical  effect  produced  if  only  150,000 
Franco-English  soldiers  had  been  sent  to  the 
Danube. 

We  can  thus  demonstrate  the  overwhelming 
superiority  which  political  strategy  sometimes 
possesses  over  that  which  is  simply  mihtary. 
The  sending  of  150,000  men  to  a  point,  tech- 
nically well  chosen,  may  cause  these  men  to 
influence  the  fate  of  a  battle  much  more  than 
their  number  would  allow,  but  the  use  of  polit- 
ical strategy  can  add  extraordinarily  to  this 
effect.  This  is  proved  when  we  see  by  the 
preceding  explanations  that  only  150,000 
Franco-British  sent  to  the  Danube  would  have 
been  worth  millions  of  men  to  the  Allies. 
Why  should  this  be?  Because  Belgrade  was 
just  the  one  exact  spot  in  Europe  where  the 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     173 

Allies  could  have  utilized  all  the  factors  in 
the  political  strategy  of  the  situation  as  it 
was  in  1915.  The  factor  of  geography,  that 
is,  a  barrier  region  easy  to  organize  and  to 
defend  between  the  Adriatic  and  the  Black 
Sea — the  ethnological  factor,  meaning  the  Slav 
and  Latin  anti-German  groups  of  central 
Europe.  The  economic  factor,  which  meant 
to  cut  off  Austria-Germany  from  the  granaries 
of  the  east,  the  psychological  factor,  that  is, 
the  hatred  of  the  oppressed  populations  of 
central  Europe  for  the  German-Magyars.  The 
results  from  these  factors,  added  one  to  an- 
other, produce  the  wonderful  force  of  political 
strategy. 

However  this  may  be,  these  two  instances, 
that  of  the  supplementary  man-power  gained 
by  Germany  through  the  ruin  of  Serbia,  and 
that  of  the  Entente,  which  failed  to  under- 
stand the  tremendous  opportunity  given  by 
the  Danube  front  to  solve  once  and  for  all, 
and  advantageously,  the  effective  problem, 
give  proof,  supported  by  facts,  that  man- 
power and  even  decisive  victory  can  be  gained 
through  political  strategy  with  absolute  cer- 
tainty. 

The  events  in  the  Balkans  since  October, 
1918,  are  a  brilliant  confirmation  of  this  view, 


174  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

for  in  spite  of  all  the  faults  committed  in  this 
region  for  four  years,  the  victory  of  the  Allies 
over  Bulgaria  in  less  than  a  month  made  its 
consequences  felt  to  the  very  heart  of  Germany. 
Why  is  this  so?  Because  at  last  the  Allies 
comprehended  that  it  was  necessary  to  attack 
on  the  weak  fronts,  and  above  all  to  shut  out 
of  the  fighting  the  troops  of  Pangermany 
mobilized  in  spite  of  themselves  by  Germany. 
It  is  the  view  which  I  have  supported  for  a 
very  long  time,  notably  in  the  Atlantic  Monthly. 

We  are  now  about  to  grasp  the  basic  reason 
of  the  great  victories  which  the  Allies  have 
won  at  the  end  of  1918. 

We  estimated  at  about  22  millions  (page 
150)  the  mobilized  forces  of  Pangermany  at 
the  outset  of  the  fifth  year  of  war.  This  figure 
represented  not  only  the  elements  of  German 
strength,  but  it  contained  also  large  elements 
of  weakness  in  the  armies  of  Pangermany.  It 
is  just  these  weaknesses  which  gave  a  great 
opportunity  to  the  Allies,  for  in  fact  this 
amount  of  22  millions  of  soldiers  included  a 
considerable  proportion  of  Latins,  Slavs,  and 
vSemitic  soldiers  forced  into  the  service  and 
who  hate  Germans,  Magyars,  and  Turks  with 
a  deadly  hatred. 

Let  us  try  to  find  what  proportion  of  anti- 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     175 


Germans  were  enrolled  in  German  armies 
against  their  will,  aceording  to  the  figures  for 
1914. 

The  following  table  will  show: 


Total  populatioa 


millions 
Germany 68 


Austria- 
Hungary  , 


.50 


Turkey 10 

Total  128 


Pro-German  elements 


millions 
Germans 61 

Germans 12 

Magyars 10 

Turks 6 

89 


Anti-German  elements 


millions 

Poles,  Danes, 
Alsace-Lor- 
raines 7 

Slavs  and  Lat- 
ins  28 

Semites 4 

39 


Reckoning  the  Turks  at  only  half  their 
population  for  reasons  given  above  (see  page 
148),  the  proportion  of  the  anti-Germans  as 
against  the  pro-Germans,  included  in  the 
mobilization  ordered  from  Berlin,  is  as  39 
to  89.  That  is,  among  the  22  millions  of 
soldiers  in  Pangermany,  nearly  7  millions — 
6,700,000,  to  be  exact— were  determined  anti- 
Pangermanists.  Consequently,  even  if  accord- 
ing to  the  strict  provisions  of  the  recent 
Austro-German  alliance  the  Slav  and  Latin 
soldiers  were  already  distributed  among  the 
German  troops,  the  Pangerman  armies  com- 


176  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

prised  at  this  moment  three  men  out  of  ten 
who  served  under  constraint  for  a  cause  which 
they  detested,  for  they  knew  well  that  the 
permanent  triumph  of  Pangermany  would  have 
riveted  their  chains. 

Until  the  recent  offensive  of  October  in  the 
Balkans,  the  Allies  had  drawn  no  advantage 
from  this  situation,  which  was  so  favorable  to 
them,  for  two  reasons.  First,  they  had  failed 
for  too  long  to  see  the  enormous  importance 
of  the  ethnographical  character  of  this  war. 
It  is  only  at  the  end  of  the  fourth  year  of 
the  struggle  that  we  are  beginning  to  under- 
stand the  value  of  the  Czecho-Slovak  and 
Jugo-Slav  populations,  who  with  the  Poles  and 
the  Roumanians  form  a  group  of  nearly  60 
millions  of  anti-Germans  inhabiting  central 
Europe.  Secondly,  the  Allies  pursued  a  purely 
military  strategy,  of  which  the  effects  were 
concentrated  on  the  western  front,  while  the 
Germans  employed  political  strategy,  which 
placed  infinite  resources  at  their  disposal, 
allowing  them  to  dissipate  the  adverse  forces 
by  other  methods  than  those  simply  military, 
but  which  in  certain  cases  are  more  efficacious 
than  the  latter  in  arriving  at  victory.  The 
results  obtained  by  the  Germans  by  the  help 
of  political  strategy  have  been  striking  and  in- 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     177 

disputable.  It  was  thanks  to  political  strategy 
and  not  by  force  that  the  Germans  brought 
about  the  military  downfall  of  Russia.  It 
was  their  pacifist  propaganda  which  permitted 
them  to  cause  the  surrender  of  the  Italian 
divisions  defending  Caporetto,  and  thus  to 
take  possession  of  mountain  regions  considered 
impregnable  to  military  attacks.  If  the  Ger- 
mans were  in  the  Allies'  place,  is  it  possible  to 
believe  that  they  would  fail  for  four  years  to 
play  the  trump-card  in  their  hand,  represented 
by  7  millions  of  anti-German  populations  of 
Poles,  Czecho-Slovaks,  Jugo-Slavs,  and  Rou- 
manians of  central  Europe  ? 

Among  the  Allies  many  people  have  long 
thought  it  was  quite  natural  that  the  Germans 
should  carry  on  intrigues  in  Ireland,  in  Mo- 
rocco, in  China,  in  India,  in  Afghanistan,  etc., 
but  held  that  it  was  impossible  to  act  on  the 
Slav  and  Latin  soldiers  incorporated  against 
their  will  in  the  armies  of  Pangermany.  Their 
great  argument  consisted  in  saying:  "These 
soldiers  are  commanded  by  Germans  and  Mag- 
yars, and  therefore  they  can  do  nothing."  In 
the  first  place,  those  of  the  Allies  who  reasoned 
in  this  way  did  not  know  the  peoples  of  central 
Europe.  In  addition,  have  the  Allies  ever 
tried  the  effect  of  political  strategy  in  those 


178  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

countries  during  the  first  four  years  of  the 
war?  Never.  On  the  contrary,  for  a  very 
long  lime  the  poHcy  of  the  war  was  directed 
by  the  AUies  so  as  really  to  discourage  all  ac- 
tion in  their  favor  on  the  part  of  Slav  and 
Latin  soldiers  mobilized  unwillingly  by  Ger- 
many and  her  allies.  These  Slav  and  Latin 
soldiers,  nevertheless,  did  of  their  own  accord 
all  that  was  possible  to  them.  At  the  .out- 
break of  war,  as  has  been  mentioned  above, 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  soldiers  included  in 
the  Austro-Hungarian  armies  gave  themselves 
up  to  the  Russians  and  Serbians.  In  May, 
1917,  the  authorized  representatives  of  the 
Poles,  Czechs,  and  Jugo-Slavs  declared  in 
open  parliament  at  Vienna,  in  the  plainest 
manner,  in  favor  of  the  Entente  and  against 
Pangermany.  Could  they  do  more.^  And 
how  were  they  answered  ?  In  November, 
1917,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  under  pressure  from 
the  British  pacifists,  who  thought  to  shorten 
the  war  by  eliminating  from  the  Allied  peace- 
programme  the  solution  of  the  problem,  most 
vital  of  all,  that  of  central  Europe,  made  an 
address  in  which  he  declared  himself  a  par- 
tisan of  the  maintenance  of  Austria-Hungary. 
The  text  of  this  speech  was  widely  reproduced 
in    Austria-Hungary   by    the     government   of 


PANGERMANY'S  MILITARY  STRENGTH     179 

Vienna,  in  order  that  its  Slav  and  Latin  sub- 
jects should  cease  to  count  on  the  Entente, 
since  the  latter  was  no  longer  interested  in 
their  fate.  This  propaganda  produced  among 
the  Slavs  and  Latins  of  central  Europe  a  very 
natural  period  of  discouragement.  Under  these 
conditions,  how  could  they  be  expected  to 
revolt  efficaciously  against  their  oppressors? 

Since  this,  however,  events  have  immensely 
developed.  The  Allies  have  realized  at  last 
that  a  separate  peace  with  Austria-Hungary,  if 
it  was  not  a  terrible  piece  of  trickery,  would  be 
a  chimera.  The  congress  of  oppressed  nation- 
alities which  met  at  Rome  in  April,  1918, 
sealed  the  alliance  of  Italians  and  Jugo-Slavs. 
Lansing's  note  came  near  to  approbation  of 
the  hopes  of  the  nationalities  of  central  Eu- 
rope, as  did  also  an  analogous  note  of  the  War 
Council  at  Versailles,  which  at  last  turned  the 
policy  of  the  Entente  in  the  right  direction, 
bringing  the  political  aims  of  the  war  into 
harmony  with  the  democratic  principles  that 
she  has  invoked  as  justification  for  her  mili- 
tary action. 

At  last  the  offensive  against  Bulgaria,  after 
having  been  carefully  prepared  by  General 
Franchet  d'Esperey  and  General  Henrys,  who 
rendered  immense  services,  was  developed  in 


180  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

October,  1918,  into  a  complete  success.  The 
results  already  assure  to  the  Entente  complete 
victory  on  the  sole  condition  that  it  does  not 
lose  in  negotiations  the  essential  fruits  of  the 
strategic-political  manoeuvre  which  has  just 
taken  place  in  central  Europe.  But  the  ex- 
planations just  made  allow  us  to  be  convinced 
that  these  results  could  have  been  gained  much 
more  easily  and  with  still  more  decisive  con- 
sequences at  the  beginning  of  1915  if  the  fatal 
theory  of  the  principal  front  had  not  pre- 
vented for  four  years  the  realization  that  the 
front  of  the  Danube-Middle  Europe  Allies  is 
the  decisive  one. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

WHY  THE  ALLIES  OF  GERMANY  HAVE  THOUGHT 
IT  WAS  TO  THEIR  INTEREST  TO  ACT  WITH 
HER. 

I.    Why  Turkey  went  with  Germany. 
II.    The  advantages  which  the  Bulgarians  thought  to  gain 

by  siding  with  BerUn, 
III.     Reasons  for  which  Austria-Hungary  is  unavoidably  an 

indispensable  base  for  Pangerman  imperialism. 
rV.    The  five  centres  of  imperialism  must  be  destroyed. 

Many  of  the  disappointments  suffered  by 
the  Alhes  arise  from  the  fact  that  they  have 
not  completely  realized  the  political  aspects  of 
the  war  in  its  European  extent.  The  result  is 
that  after  four  years  of  war  large  numbers  in 
the  Entente,  seeing  only  Germany  as  personi- 
fied by  her  Kaiser,  look  upon  her  allies  as 
participants  certainly  in  the  world  conflict, 
but  as  partners  of  quite  secondary  impor- 
tance, as  relatively  negligible  quantities,  and 
even  sometimes  as  states  worthy  of  a  sort  of 
compassion  on  account  of  the  crafty  violence 
which  they  endured  at  the  hands  of  Germany 
to  force  them  to  follow  her  into  the  war. 
Many  among  the  Allies  are  really  convinced 

181 


182  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

that  Turkey,  Bulgaria,  and  Austria-Hungary 
have  bent  against  their  will  under  the  yoke 
which  circumstances  allow  Berlin  to  impose 
upon  them. 

These  two  opinions  are  not  correct.  In  the 
first  place,  these  three  countries  have  given 
help  to  Germany  which  has  been  most  valua- 
ble to  her  for  the  conduct  of  the  war,  and, 
secondly,  they  have  done  this  with  good-will, 
because  these  three  states  have  believed  that 
it  was  to  their  interest  to  take  this  course. 

Too  much  importance  cannot  be  attached 
to  these  facts.  But  to  grasp  the  interest 
which  has  led  Germany's  allies  to  throw  in 
their  lot  with  hers,  it  is  necessary  to  go  out- 
side of  ourselves,  or,  according  to  the  forcible 
expression  of  my  teacher,  Albert  Sorel,  *'we 
must  get  into  the  enemy's  skin,"  that  is  to 
say,  judge  the  interests  of  the  governments  of 
Vienna,  Budapest,  Sofia,  and  Constantinople, 
not  with  the  ideas  of  people  fighting  for  justice 
and  democracy,  but  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  governmental  aims  of  the  Austrians,  Bul- 
gars,  or  Turks,  who  have  been  all  aristocratic 
or  imperialist  or  both.  It  is  therefore  only 
from  the  adversary's  standpoint  that  we  can 
see  the  advantage  he  seeks,  and  understand 
clearly  why  Constantinople,  Sofia,  and  Vienna 


THE  ALLIES  OF  GERMANY  183 

have  for  four  years  been  in  close  alliance  with 
Berlin. 

I. 

The  assistance  given  by  the  Turks  to  Ger- 
many has  been  much  more  valuable  than  is 
generally  supposed.  From  the  Ottoman  Em- 
pire, the  Germans  have  drawn  foodstuffs,  hides, 
fats,  and  minerals  which  aid  them  considerably 
in  keeping  up  the  war.  The  co-operation  of 
the  government  of  Constantinople  has  placed 
at  the  disposal  of  the  Berlin  General  Staff 
about  2  million  men,  of  whom  many  have 
been  employed  to  cultivate  the  soil  in  Asia 
Minor,  while  the  rest,  fighting,  have  contrib- 
uted strongly  to  the  accomplishment  of  the 
Pangerman  plan  in  the  Balkans  and  the  over- 
throw of  Russia.  Besides  this,  the  close  ac- 
cord of  the  Commander  of  the  Faithful  with 
the  Kaiser  has  allowed  the  latter  to  profit  by 
the  Pan-Islam  agitation,  which  has  been  a  hin- 
drance to  the  Allies  in  Africa  and  India,  and 
was  destined  to  injure  them  still  more  in  those 
regions,  as  well  as  in  the  Caucasus,  southern 
Russia,  Persia,  central  Asia,  Afghanistan,  and 
China,  if  the  brilliant  victories  of  the  Allies 
in  the  Balkans  had  not  come  to  render  Turkey 
powerless. 


184  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

The  close  solidarity  of  the  Turkish  and  Ger- 
man Empires  was  caused  for  the  clearest  and 
strongest  of  reasons. 

Under  the  Sultan  Abdul-Hamid  the  in- 
terior situation  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  had 
become  so  intolerable  for  all  its  subjects  that, 
in  1908,  the  Young  Turk  revolution  took  place, 
based  ostensibly  on  liberal  principles,  and 
was  enthusiastically  supported  by  the  Chris- 
tian populations.  For  some  months  all  Eu- 
rope believed  that  the  Ottoman  Empire  would 
at  last  enter  on  the  path  of  regeneration,  but 
this  illusion  was  short-lived.  From  the  be- 
ginning the  Young  Turks  had  seized  on  the 
revolutionary  movement,  and  soon  showed 
themselves  to  be  inordinately  vain,  incapable 
of  any  reforms,  and  such  harsh  oppressors  of 
the  Christians  that  Bulgaria,  Serbia,  and 
Greece,  in  spite  of  the  mutual  distrust  arising 
from  their  rival  ambitions,  united  to  rescue 
their  coreligionists,  the  Ottoman  Christians  of 
Macedonia,  from  the  Young  Turkish  yoke. 

These  events  led  to  the  Balkan  Wars  of 
1912-13,  which  left  the  Ottoman  Empire  in 
Europe  deprived  of  all  but  a  small  territory 
to  the  northwest  of  Constantinople.  This 
disaster  showed  in  a  still  clearer  light  the  pro- 
found incapacity  of  the  Young  Turks,  so  that 


THE  ALLIES  OF  GERIVLINY  185 

it  was  widely  believed  that  the  Turkish  Em- 
pire would  shortly  crumble  as  a  result  of  its 
internal  disintegration.  This  state  of  things 
might  have  been  predicted  for  some  time,  and 
particularly  since  1910,  and  perhaps  for  this 
reason  Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  1912-13,  as 
Prince  Lichnowsky's  memoirs  assert,  entered 
into  secret  negotiations  with  Germany  for 
the  division  of  Turkey  in  Asia  among  the 
Great  Powers.  According  to  the  principles 
of  agreement  laid  down  on  this  subject,  Ger- 
many obtained  the  lion's  share  as  sphere  of 
influence,  that  is,  all  Mesopotamia  as  far  as 
Bassorah,  the  largest  and  richest  district  of 
Turkey  in  Asia,  which  is  crossed  by  the  Ham- 
burg-Persian Gulf  Line,  and  which  from  about 
1895  had  been  ardently  coveted  by  the  gov- 
ernment of  Berlin.  To  the  great  surprise  of 
Prince  Lichnowsky,  German  ambassador  in 
London,  if  this  treaty  was  negotiated,  it  was 
not  definitely  concluded,  that  is,  signed  by 
the  German  Government.  On  learning  this, 
many  readers  of  the  Lichnowsky  memoirs 
asked  themselves  why  Germany  did  not  ratify 
this  treaty,  which  was  so  advantageous  to  her, 
giving  her,  as  it  did,  the  long-desired  coun- 
try of  Mesopotamia.  Events  since  this  war 
began  throw  hght  on  the  reasons  for  which 


186  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

Germany  decided  not  to  ratify  the  treaty  ar- 
ranged at  London  by  her  ambassador,  and 
show  also  why  Turkey  threw  herself  with  all 
her  force  into  the  war  against  the  Allies. 

At  the  end  of  1913  and  the  beginning  of 
1914  the  Young  Turks  found  themselves 
situated  as  follows:  Having  banished  or 
hanged  most  of  their  political  enemies,  the 
Old  Turks,  among  whom  were  the  adherents 
of  a  good  understanding  with  the  Western 
Powers,  the  Young  Turks  just  before  the  war 
were  undoubtedly  sole  masters  of  Turkey, 
and  all  the  more  because  the  government  of 
Constantinople  was  absolutist  and  made  up 
of  very  few  persons,  all  leaders  of  the  Young 
Turk  party :  Enver  Pacha,  Talaat  Bey,  Djavid 
Bey,  General  Djemal  Pacha,  Doctor  Nazim, 
etc.  As  for  the  Sultan,  Mahomet  V,  the  poor 
man  was  so  debilitated  by  the  long  captivity 
inflicted  on  him  by  the  suspicious  Abdul- 
Ilamid  that  he  had  lost  all  will-power,  had 
absolutely  no  influence,  and  was  a  mere  puppet 
in  the  hands  of  the  Young  Turk  pro-consuls. 
The  latter  held  the  reins  of  power,  but  they 
were  confronted  by  insurmountable  difficulties. 
Their  financial  embarrassments  were  enor- 
mous and  nearly  impossible  to  overcome. 
The   Young  Turks  were  detested  by  all  the 


THE  ALLIES  OF  GERMANY  187 

non-Turkish  populations  of  the  empire,  whom 
they  had  duped,  and  they  were  also  deei)ly 
humiliated  by  the  tremendous  defeat  which 
Turkey  had  suffered  under  their  rule  at  the 
hands  of  the  Balkan  States.  Lastly,  the  Young 
Turks  were  much  irritated  against  Russia, 
England,  and  France,  for  these  countries  had 
come  to  see  that  there  was  nothing  to  be  made 
of  the  Young  Turks,  and  had  shown  in  1912- 
13  sympathy  with  the  Balkan  peoples. 

These  circumstances  taken  together  brought 
about  a  material  and  psychological  situation 
particularly  favorable  to  William  II,  when 
he  acted  so  as  to  decide  the  Turks  to  join  with 
him  in  the  struggle  for  which  he  was  preparing. 

Profiting  by  the  above-mentioned  state  of 
affairs,  it  is  most  probable  that  at  the  begin- 
ning of  1914  the  German  Emperor  should 
have  spoken  as  follows  to  the  Young  Turks, 
especially  to  Talaat  Bey,  and  even  more  to 
Enver  Pacha — the  most  ambitious  and  Ger- 
manophile  of  all  the  Turks,  who  is  known  to 
have  made  a  mysterious  journey  into  Ger- 
many a  few  months  before  the  war: 

The  Kaiser  probably  said: 

^'England  wishes  to  break  up  the  Ottoman 
Empire;  here  are  the  notes  of  the  treaty  on 
this  subject,  drawn  up  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  and 


188  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

Prince  Lichnowsky  in  London.  I  let  the  Eng- 
lish go  on,  so  that  I  could  fathom  their  whole 
intention,  but  I  refused  to  sign  the  treaty  they 
offered  me,  because  I  am  a  sincere  friend  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire.  A  great  plan  is  in  prepara- 
tion, which  w^ill  put  an  end  to  all  your  troubles. 
In  a  few  months  Germany  will  declare  war 
on  her  enemies,  who  are  yours  also.  Let  Tur- 
key join  us  with  all  her  might  in  this  conflict, 
and  not  only  w^ill  I  oppose  the  disruption  of 
your  empire,  but  I  will  promise  you  the  fol- 
lowing advantages : 

"At  the  present  moment,  the  Young  Turk 
party  can  scarcely  maintain  itself  in  the  Otto- 
man Empire,  which  consists  now  of  only  20 
million  inhabitants  since  the  disastrous  Balkan 
War.  Confronted  with  2  million  Levantines 
and  Jews,  with  8  millions  of  Arabs,  of  whom 
a  part  hate  you,  with  2  miUions  of  Greeks, 
and  2  of  Armenians — your  irreconcilable  en- 
emies— you  have  only  G  millions  of  Turks  in 
your  own  empire,  and  are  therefore  a  minor- 
ity faced  by  numerous  and  insurmountable 
difficulties.  [See  the  annexed  map,  which 
gives  a  clear  view  of  the  great  nationalities  in 
Turkey.]  Well !  come  into  the  war  with  me 
and  the  situation  will  be  radically  transformed. 

"Aided  by  the  struggle,  you  can  eliminate 


THE  ALLIES  OF  GERMANY 


189 


190  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

the  Armenians,  Greeks,  and  those  of  the  Arabs 
who  are  in  your  way.  This  'ethnographical 
rearrangement'  of  Turkey  will  enable  you 
later  to  dominate  your  non-Turkish  popula- 
tions without  difficulty.  Enriched  by  the  war, 
Germany  will  advance  the  sums  necessary 
to  develop  the  enormous  economic  resources 
latent  in  your  country,  and  will  also  furnish 
engineers  and  technicians.  In  order  to  in- 
crease the  number  of  Moslems  in  the  en- 
larged Turkish  Empire,  victorious  Germany 
will  also  restore  or  acquire  the  Crimea,  the 
Turkish  parts  of  the  Caucasus,  Persia,  and 
Egypt,  which  will  extend  your  influence 
strongly  over  all  Mussulman  Africa.  One 
of  Germany's  objects  in  this  war  is  to  destroy 
Russia,  the  age-long  enemy  of  the  Turkish 
Empire.  Following  the  overthrow  of  the  em- 
pire of  the  Czars,  Moslem  states  will  be  set 
up  in  the  Caucasus  and  in  central  Asia,  and 
these  states  will  be  guided  from  Constan- 
tinople, owing  to  the  soHdarity  of  the  Tura- 
nian races.  When  all  those  who  would  profit 
by  this  plan  have  well  understood  its  value  it 
will  establish  good  and  permanent  relations  be- 
tween you,  the  Bulgarians,  and  the  Magyars, 
who  will  form  the  geographical  basis  of  your 
direct  understanding  with  Germany. 


THE  ALLIES  OF  GERMANY  191 

"When  this  programme  is  carried  out  it  will 
be  as  of  old  and  even  more;  the  power  of  the 
Commander  of  the  Faithful  will  be  exerted 
not  only  religiously,  as  in  former  days,  but 
politically  as  well.  It  will  extend  over  a  great 
part  of  the  world,  reaching  from  South  Africa 
to  the  heart  of  China." 

For  any  one  who  knows  the  imperialist  ten- 
dencies of  the  Young  Turks  and  their  profound 
hatred  for  the  Armenians,  the  Greeks,  and  the 
Arabs,  such  words  from  the  German  Emperor 
early  in  1914,  when  the  Ottoman  Empire  was 
tottering  to  its  fall,  must  have  been  welcomed 
with  pleasure  and  even  enthusiasm  by  the 
Young  Turk  leaders,  who  knew  that  not  only 
Turkey  but  they  themselves  were  on  the  verge 
of  ruin. 

Most  of  these  men  had  long  held  Germa- 
nophile  opinions,  and  it  is  easy  to  see  the  mo- 
tives which  led  the  Young  Turks  and  the 
empire  which  was  entirely  in  their  hands  to 
take  sides  with  Germany  in  the  approaching 
war. 

But  the  war  has  lasted  too  long  for  an  em- 
pire in  the  condition  of  the  Turkish  Empire. 
Oriental  indolence  has  been  irritated  at  the 
length  of  the  work  which  the  Germans  have 
imposed  upon  it.     Finally,  the  defeat  of  Bui- 


192  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

garia  and  the  immediate  seizure  of  the  Danube 
by  the  Alhes  have  cut  off  Turkey  from  Ger- 
many strategically,  thus  compelling  its  com- 
plete surrender. 

II. 

The  attitude  of  the  Entente  toward  Bul- 
garia has  been  for  a  long  time  wanting  in  the 
clearness  which  alone  makes  it  possible  to 
act  with  the  decision  needed  to  win  a  victory. 
After  four  years  of  war  there  were  still  Allies 
with  Bulgarophile  tendencies,  and  if  that  was 
so  it  was  because  in  the  Entente,  with  regard 
to  Bulgaria,  as  also  on  other  subjects,  people 
lived  on  old  ideas,  which  were  well  enough 
in  their  day,  but  were  now  out  of  date. 

If  the  aspirations  of  the  Bulgarian  author- 
ities since  1907,  if  the  violent  hatreds  of  the 
entire  people,  from  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest 
to  the  10th  of  August,  1913,  had  been  realized 
from  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  Allies  would 
have  known  that  on  the  first  opportunity  the 
Bulgars  would  throw  in  their  lot  with  Berlin. 

I  cannot  be  suspected  of  partiality  when 
I  speak  of  Bulgaria,  for  I  have  visited  that 
country  often  in  the  last  twenty-five  years, 
have  been  her  devoted  friend,  and  labored 
for  a  good  understanding  between  her,  Serbia, 


THE  ALLIES  OF  GERMANY  193 

and  Roumania  up  to  June,  1913,  that  is,  until 
the  Bulgars  treacherously  attacked  their  Greek 
and  Serbian  allies.  This  inexcusable  aggres- 
sion put  an  end  to  my  sympathy,  and  my 
estimate  of  the  Bulgars  was  definitely  fixed 
when  at  Sofia  in  March,  1914,  I  became  pos- 
sessed of  an  oflicial  Bulgarian  document  which 
revealed  to  the  fullest  extent  the  imperialist 
aims  which  I  had  not  before  suspected.  This 
document  consists  of  the  Bulgarian  book 
called  The  Soldier's  Comrade,  first  published 
in  1907  with  the  authorization  and  recom- 
mendation of  the  Bulgarian  minister  of  war 
(Report  No.  25,  March  21st,  1907,  and  No.  31, 
March  10th,  1908).  Since  1907,  this  book  has 
been  distributed  in  all  the  barracks  and  mili- 
tary schools,  thus  reaching  every  inhabitant 
of  Bulgaria  who  has  passed  through  these 
barracks  since  that  date.  On  page  56  of  the 
historical  section  of  this  book  is  a  colored 
map  of  "Greater  Bulgaria,"  which  shows  the 
whole  scheme  for  Bulgarian  hegemony  in  the 
Balkan  Peninsula.  The  accompanying  draw- 
ing, an  exact  copy  of  this  map,  gives  a  clear 
idea  of  the  considerable  encroachments  con- 
templated by  this  plan  on  neighboring  states. 
It  is  therefore  undeniable  that  the  authorities 
at  Sofia,  ever  since  1907,  that  is,  seven  years 


194 


AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 


THE  ALLIES  OF  GERMANY  195 

prior  to  the  war,  have  taught  the  people  of 
Bulgaria  that  they  should  fight  to  conquer, 
not  alone  the  districts  of  Macedonia  settled  by 
Bulgars,  but  also  extensive  regions  in  Greece, 
as  well  as  those  inhabited  by  Serbians,  Al- 
banians, and  the  whole  Roumanian  Dobrudja, 
up  to  the  mouths  of  the  Danube.  This 
idea  was  spread  abroad  among  the  people  of 
Bulgaria,  as  the  Pangerman  scheme  was  dis- 
seminated in  Germany,  and  it  has  been  pur- 
sued since  1907,  by  the  Bulgarian  Government, 
seeking  tenaciously  to  bring  it  about  by  means 
of  successive  operations.  The  plan  allows  us 
to  see  why  the  Bulgars  were  not  sincere  when, 
in  1912,  they  concluded  an  alliance  merely  to 
make  use  of  the  Serbians  and  the  Greeks  in 
order  to  beat  the  Turks,  who  were  too  strong 
for  them  to  conquer  by  themselves.  But  as 
soon  as  the  part  of  their  plan  relating  to  Tur- 
key was  realized,  in  order  to  carry  it  out,  this 
time  at  the  expense  of  Greece  and  Serbia,  Bul- 
garia attacked  her  former  allies  in  June,  1913. 
Roumania  then  intervened  against  the  Bul- 
gars, and,  the  Serbians  having  won  the  battle 
of  the  Bregalnitza,  Bulgaria  was  beaten  and 
forced  to  sign  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest,  August 
10th,  1913.  This  treaty  did  not  establish 
Bulgarian  hegemony;    rather  the  Balkan  bal- 


196  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

ance  of  power,  just  the  reverse  of  what  Bul- 
garia wished;  for  if  the  peace  had  lasted  the 
Balkan  equilibrium  would  have  crystallized, 
and  the  success  of  the  Bulgarian  plan  in  the 
future  have  become  impossible.  This  is  why 
the  Treaty  of  Bucharest  was  so  deep  a  disap- 
pointment to  the  Bulgars,  and  created  so  much 
irritation  as  to  alter  their  former  feelings  ab- 
ruptly. Having  taken  from  the  Turks  nearly 
as  much  as  was  designed  in  the  plan  for  Greater 
Bulgaria,  and  seeing  that  it  would  be  more 
to  their  advantage  to  declare  themselves  Tu- 
ranians than  to  remain  Slavs,  the  Bulgars 
decided  to  ally  themselves  with  the  Turks, 
and  from  that  time  concentrated  their  hate 
and  vindictive  qualities,  which  are  enormous, 
against  their  recent  conquerors,  the  Greeks, 
and  above  all  the  Serbians  and  Roumanians. 

Granting  the  imperialist  aims  of  the  Bul- 
gars resulting  from  their  plan  of  1907,  and 
their  resentment  irrevocably  directed  against 
their  neighbors  since  the  end  of  1913,  it  is 
plain  that  they  could  not  satisfy  their  exag- 
gerated ambition  and  their  intense  hatreds 
except  by  taking  the  side  of  Germany.  The 
Entente  was  in  no  position  to  help  Bulgaria 
to  lay  hands  on  Roumanian,  Serbian,  and 
Greek  territory;   and  therefore,  for  these  com- 


THE  ALLIES  OF  GERMANY  197 

bined  reasons,  an  understanding  was  easily 
reached  between  Berlin  and  Sofia,  several 
months  before  the  war,  as  certain  facts  will 
convince  us. 

In  1916,  Frederic  Naumann,  the  man  of 
Middle  Europe,  published  a  pamphlet  called 
Bulgaria  and  Central  Europe y  of  which  Payot, 
the  publisher  at  Paris,  furnished  a  translation. 
Naumann  writes  as  follows: 

"When,  about  a  year  ago,  in  August,  1915, 
I  wrote  my  book  Mitteleuropa,  I  could  not 
then  speak  of  Bulgaria,  for  at  that  time  in 
the  eyes  of  the  European  public  the  attitude 
of  that  country  was  doubtful.  Even  if  the 
Czar  Ferdinand,  and  his  Minister-President 
Radoslavqff  had  then  known  exactly  what  they 
wished  to  do,  and  even  if  those  in  charge  of  foreign 
policy  in  Germany  regarded  Sofia  with  ever-in- 
creasing confidence,  it  would  nevertheless  have 
been  impossible  to  discuss  the  rapprochemeiit 
while  it  was  forming.  Now  everything  then 
hidden  is  brought  into  the  light  of  day.  The 
alliance  is  made,  and  the  success  of  the  war 
against  Serbia  has  amply  proved  that  they 
were  right  who  labored  for  the  Union  of  Cen- 
tral Europe  with  Bulgaria." 

It  is  clear  that  Naumann  tells  only  a  part  of 
the  truth,  but  this  part  is  most  interesting,  for 


198  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

It  is  a  proof  that  in  August,  1915 — that  is,  at 
a  time  when  the  AUies  were  still  foolish  enough 
to  imagine  that  the  government  of  Sofia  was 
hesitating,  or,  as  I  have  often  heard  it  said, 
even  that  it  could  be  bought — the  Czar  Ferdi- 
nand and  his  first  minister,  Radoslavoff,  ^'knew 
exactly  what  they  wished  to  do,''  the  whole  thing 
being  then  a  secret.  Now,  therefore,  we  are 
really  justified  in  believing  that  the  Czar  Fer- 
dinand and  his  Radoslavoff,  who  for  a  long 
time  had  been  among  the  most  notorious  Ger- 
manophiles  of  Sofia,  knew  exactly  what  they 
wanted  to  do  not  only  in  August,  1915,  but 
long  before  the  war. 

In  fact,  according  to  information  published 
by  the  Petit  Parisien,  March  26th,  1916,  and 
the  Temps,  April  10th,  1916,  M.  Radoslavoff 
revealed  during  a  suit  which  took  place  in 
Sofia  early  in  1916  that  the  treaties  between 
Bulgaria,  Berlin,  and  Constantinople  were  con- 
cluded before  April,  1914.  These  treaties  were 
not  made  public  for  excellent  reasons.  In  the 
first  place,  it  was  necessary  to  let  the  Allies 
entangle  themselves  in  interminable  negotia- 
tions, making  them  think  that  the  Bulgarian 
Government  had  not  yet  made  its  choice;  then 
it  was  best  to  wait  until  military  events  were 
sufficiently  advanced  to  persuade  the  Bulgar 


THE  ALLIES  OF  GERMANY  199 

people,  some  of  whom  were  still  Russophiles,  to 
join  Germany.  This  object  was  attained  after 
the  defeat  of  the  Allies  in  the  Dardanelles  and 
the  great  Russian  retreat  on  the  Dunaietz  in 
May,  1915,  and  was  finished  some  months 
later. 

During  the  first  three  years  of  the  war  the 
Bulgars  were  stalwart  Germanophiles.  They 
have  undeniable  qualities;  they  are  sober  and 
economical,  but  they  are  born  rapacious  to  an 
incredible  degree.  This  last  characteristic  ac- 
counts for  the  action  of  this  democratic  people 
— democratic,  as  it  consists  entirely  of  peas- 
ants— but  they  have  been  made  imperialists 
through  the  propagation  of  the  plan  for  Bul- 
garian hegemony  since  1907,  because  that 
propaganda  has  developed  in  the  peasants  the 
passion  for  the  soil,  for  territorial  aggrandize- 
ment, to  an  extent  of  which  nothing  can  give 
an  idea.  They  were  greatly  pleased,  there- 
fore, with  the  acquisitions  they  made,  thanks 
to  their  friendship  with  Berlin. 

In  his  pamphlet  called  Bulgaria  and  Cen- 
tral Europe,  published  in  1916  and  quoted 
above,  Frederic  Naumann  describes  as  follows 
a  trip  he  had  just  made  to  Bulgaria  with  ten 
other  members  of  the  Reichstag. 

"Greater  Bulgaria  is  not  yet  defined;  foreign 


200  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

powers  threaten  us  continually  with  fresh  at- 
tacks; but  the  first  and  most  decisive  step  has 
now  been  taken;  Bulgaria  came  to  us  in  the 
midst  of  a  besieged  Central  Europe,  as  the  first 
addition  to  the  group  which  we  shall  form  in 
the  future. 

"A  description  from  day  to  day  of  our  jour- 
ney, taken  under  the  thoughtful  care  of  the 
former  Bulgarian  minister  at  Belgrade,  M. 
Tchaprachikoff*  does  not  enter  into  our  plan, 
and,  besides,  could  hardly  be  put  into  words. 
One  may  experience  the  development  of  popu- 
lar enthusiasm,  loyal  and  simple,  but  it  cannot 
be  described  in  one  place  after  another  with- 
out needless  tediousness.  It  suffices  to  say 
that  we,  German  representatives,  having  some 
experience  as  critics  of  assemblies  and  popular 
movements,  were  impressed  afresh  each  day 
by  the  clamorous  wave  of  people  who  cheered 
joyously  and  vigorously  those  who  came  to 
help  them  to  victory.  The  Bulgars  are  not 
dramatic  by  nature;  they  have  nothing  of  the 
Latin,  and  little  of  the  Greek;  they  do  not 


*  Stephen  Tchaprachikoff  formerly  studied  at  the  School  of  Polit- 
ical Sciences  in  Paris  about  180.5,  and  up  to  March,  1914,  was  one 
of  my  personal  friends,  lie  was  for  a  long  time  the  private  secretary 
of  King  Ferdinand  and  his  confidential  agent.  Since  the  war,  he  has 
become  such  a  thorough  Germanophile  that  Naumann  and  his  com- 
panioQS  were  placed  in  his  care  during  their  journey  in  Bulgaria. 


THE  ALLIES  OF  GERMANY  201 

pose  as  stage  heroes,  but  they  are  brave  and 
rough,  practical,  rather  silent  and  shy. 

*'It  was  a  nation  of  peasants  who  left  their 
villages  in  crowds,  flocking  to  the  railroad  sta- 
tions to  see  us,  German  representatives.  It 
was  not  on  our  account  personally,  being  as 
we  were  for  the  most  part  unknown  to  them, 
but  for  the  sake  of  the  German  army,  the  Ger- 
man state  and  policy  of  Central  Europe,  and 
for  the  cause  of  their  own  king  and  country. 
We  received  in  this  way  a  popular  ovation, 
particularly  significant  and  beautiful  in  the 
extreme.  While  the  Bulgarian  people  spoke 
to  us  by  the  mouth  of  its  representatives  and 
magistrates,  it  felt  that  the  first  period  of  its 
national  existence  was  closing:  the  period  ex- 
tending from  its  deliverance  by  the  Russians 
to  the  Second  Balkan  War,  from  1876  to 
1914." 

But  as  the  extension  of  Bulgaria  was  estab- 
lished over  territories  which  were  not  truly 
Bulgarian,  and  as  it  was  artificial  and  it  was 
constantly  necessary  to  be  in  conflict  with  the 
populations  ripe  for  rebellion  at  the  same  time 
that  they  had  to  hold  the  lines  of  the  Salonika 
front,  the  fourth  year  of  the  war  was  of  an 
increasing  strenuousness,  which,  never  ceasmg, 
became  more  intolerable  from  day  to  day.     In 


202 


AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 


trying  to  become  bigger  than  the  ox  the  Bul- 
garian frog  burst,  and  when  the  AlHed  offen- 
sive developed  in  October,  1918,  in  a  few  days 
Bulgaria  fell. 

Ill 

Austria-Hungary  is  not  a  nation,  but  a  state, 
alone  of  its  kind,  where  everything  is  organized 


THE  THREE  PARTS  OF  AUSTRIA  ■  HUNGARY 


1  Avstiia 

2  Bangarj 
I  Bosnia  •Hcnegovim 


ROUMANU 


r^- — y 

S  E  R  B I aS 

WiMOBo  /  BULGARIA 


with  a  special  object,  which  is  to  make  it  pos- 
sil)le  for  the  German -Magyar  minority  to  exer- 
cise the  most  complete   political   domination 


THE  ALLIES  OF  GERMANY  203 

over  the  vast  majority  of  the  inhabitants,  who 
are  Slavo-Latins. 

In  order  to  grasp  the  truth  in  its  simplest 
form  as  to  the  organization  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary, it  should  be  remembered  that  this  sin- 
gular state  is  made  up  of  three  distinct  parts, 
as  will  be  seen  on  the  annexed  map. 

1.  Austria,  which,  with  a  fragment  geograph- 
ically detached  along  the  Adriatic  (Dalmatia) 
constitutes  one  empire. 

2.  Hungary,  which  is  a  kingdom. 

3.  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  whose  constitu- 
tional situation  in  reference  to  Austria-Hun- 
gary is  not  clearly  defined,  but  which  may  be 
considered  as  a  sort  of  territory  of  the  empire, 
a  colony  equally  dependent  on  Austria  and 
Hungary 

The  three  maps  below  show  exactly  how  the 
50  million  inhabitants  (this  figure  is  taken, 
exclusive  of  foreigners,  from  the  census  of 
1910,  the  last  given  for  the  different  nationali- 
ties) are  divided  among  the  three  districts 
which  together  constitute  the  Austro-Hunga- 
rian  Empire. 

The  double  lines  which  define  these  popula- 
tions show  the  arbitrary  nature  of  their  distri- 
bution. In  spite  of  themselves.,  nearly  a  mil- 
lion ItaHans  are  cut  off  from  Italy,  5  millions 


204 


AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 


of  Poles  separated  from  Poland,  3,250,000  Rou- 
manians kept  out  of  Roumania  against  their 
will.  The  Jugo-Slavs  and  the  Czecho-Slovaks 
are  divided  between  the  Empire  of  Austria  and 
the  Kingdom  of  Hungary.  In  Bosnia-Herze- 
govina alone  is  the  entire  Jugo-Slav  popula- 
tion homogeneous,  but  this  is  again  involun- 


THE  NATIONALITIES 
IN  BOSNIA  -  HERZEGOVINA. 


4'  Serb© •Croats  or  Yngo- Slavs    2 millions 


tary,  as  she  is  a  kind  of  colony  common  to 
Austria  and  Hungary. 

The  figures  which   accompany  these  maps 

bring  out  the  fact  that  altogether  there  are: 

12  millions  of  Germans  (10  in  Austria  and 

2  in  Hungary.)     10  millions  of  Magyars 

in  Hungary,  which  makes  22  millions  of 


THE  ALLIES  OF  GERMANY  20.5 

inhabitants  in  Austria-Hungary  who  rule 
over: 
4  milHons  of  Latins  (1  in  Austria,  3  in  Hun- 
gary). 
2414  millions  of  Slavs  (17  in  Austria,  5}4  in 

Hungary,  2  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina). 
Say  over  283^  millions  of  Slavs  and  Latins, 
who  are  forced  to  submit  to  this  domina- 
tion. 
These  figures  show  a  majority  of  6}4  millions 
in  favor  of  the  Slav  and  Latin  subjects  of  the 
Hapsburgs.  In  fact,  however,  this  majority  is 
much  larger,  for  actually  the  above  figures  do 
not  give  the  exact  truth,  as  they  are  those  of 
the  official  statistics  drawn  up  by  Germans  at 
Vienna  and  Magyars  at  Budapesth,  who  have 
systematically  falsified  them  to  serve  their  own 
ends.  The  Germans  and  Magyars  add  to 
their  numbers  and  diminish  in  a  large  propor- 
tion the  true  figures  of  the  Latins  and  Slavs. 
Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  this  perversion  of  the 
truth,  it  is  plainly  to  be  seen  that,  even  accord- 
ing to  the  official  German  and  Magyar  figures, 
Austria-Hungary  is  run  entirely  in  the  interest 
of  the  22  millions  of  German-Magyars.  The 
truth  is  even  more  striking,  for  in  relation  to 
these  figures  two  facts  stand  out — one  relative 
to  the  Germans,  the  other  to  the  Magyars. 


206  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

THE  NATIONALITIES  IN  AUSTRIA 


♦ 

O                  '''- 

ly\r^'' 

^ 

K 

^  5' 

^jij 

^^'e^ 

o 

^r 

)  ^ 

fs^ 

e^^v       \ 

s 

<> 

s 

\^i 

•-^ 

'^ 

2^ 

r  2 

^^r 

/\- 

N 

^  .«^^>fe«»„ 

£     H     U 

N     G     A     R      Y      \ 

4' 

Ay ^.^    ^ 

j>  BOSNIA   (^ 

^IS^ERZECOVlNAv^ 

S  /A.X--W  /^R  0  U  M  A  N 1 A 

"7'' ^ 

^^^=3 

^P 

ag^S       <"^ 

SERBIA    N 
E^RO           /BULGARIA 

^ 

— ^ 
s 

^^S^^^^MON^ 

Note. — The  6gures  in  the  table  below  correspond  with  those  used 
for  the  ethnographic  regions  in  the  map.  The  numbers  without  primes 
(for  instance,  5)  show  the  ethnographic  regions  of  Hungary  correspond- 
ing to  the  nationalities  of  which  the  scattered  fragments  make  up  the 
greater  part  of  Austria. 

No.  1'  is  not  found  in  the  table  below,  because  it  serves  to  indicate 
in  Hungary  the  Magyars,  no  group  of  which  exists  in  Austria. 

No.  3'  in  Austria  designates  the  Austro-Roumanians  who  are 
separated  from  Roumania. 

No.  4'  in  Austria  designates  the  Slovenes  (1,250,000)  and  the  Serbo- 
Croats  (750,000)  in  Dalmatia,  these  being  different  names  belonging 
to  the  Jugo-Slavic  people  still  distributed  in  Hungary,  Bosnia,  and 
in  Herzegovina  or  Montenegro  or  Serbia. 

No.  8'  indicates  the  Italians  of  Istria  and  the  Trentino,  separated 
from  their  mother  country,  Italy. 


2'.  Germans 10,000,000 

3'.  Roumanians 250,000 

8'.  Italians 750,000 

4'.  Jugo-Slavs 2,000,000 

5'.  C'A-chs 6,500,000 

0'.  Ruthenes 3,500,000 

7',  Poles 6,000,000 


Germans,  10  millions. 
Latins,         1  million. 


Slavs, 
Total . . 


17  millions. 
.  28  millions. 


THE  ALLIES  OF  GERMANY 


207 


THE  NATIONALITIES  IN  HUNGARY 


9       40      to      go     ISO  Miles 


Note.— The  figures  in  the  table  correspond  to  those  used  for  the 
ethnographic  regions  in  the  map. 

The  figures  with  a  prime  (5',  for  instance)  indicate  the  ethno- 
graphic regions  of  Austria,  Bosnia,  and  Herzegovina,  Serbia,  and 
Roumania,  corresponding  to  the  nationalities  of  which  fragments, 
arbitrarily  distributed,  form  the  majority  of  the  population  of  Hun- 
gary. 

The  figures  given  are  in  round  millions. 


1.  Magyars 10  mill 

2.  Germans 2 

3.  Roumanians 3 

4.  Serbo-Croats 3 

5.  Czecho-Slovaks 2 

6.  Ruthenians J^ 


Race  of  Asiatic  origin. 
Teutonic  race. 
Latin  race. 

Slavic  race, 
5H  millions. 


20j^  millions. 


Out  of  the  12  millions  of  Germans  10  mil- 
lions are  in  Austria,  of  whom  about  3  are  mixed 
with  the  Bohemian  Czechs,  in  a  country  wliicli 
the  Germans  former]}^  wrested  from  them,  and 


208  AN  ENDURING   VICTORY 

2  millions  of  Germans  are  distributed  over 
Hungary  in  small  groups,  geographically  so 
far  removed  from  the  bulk  of  the  Germans 
that  one  can  hardly  say  that  Austria-Hungary 
exists  for  their  benefit;  this  is  realh'  true  only 
of  the  10  millions  of  Germans  in  Austria. 

As  for  the  10  millions  of  Magyars,  this  figure 
should  be  analysed  from  the  standpoints  of 
differing  social  interests. 

Among  10  millions  of  Magyars,  8,  that  is,  the 
vast  majority,  are  poor  agricultural  or  indus- 
trial laborers,  who  have  nothing  and  are  cyni- 
cally exploited  by  only  2  millions  of  large 
landed  proprietors,  priests,  and  government 
ofiicials,  who  still  enjoy  many  feudal  privileges, 
as  in  the  Middle  Ages,  and  want  to  preserve 
them,  not  only  in  regard  to  the  10  millions  of 
Slavs  and  Latins  under  the  Magyar  rule,  but 
also  as  to  the  8  millions  of  the  unfortunate 
Magyar  proletariat.  The  oppression  of  the  2 
millions  of  feudal  Magyars  has  a  character  at 
once  national  and  social  in  the  case  of  the  10 
millions  of  Slavs  and  Latins  incorporated  as 
unwilling  citizens  of  Hungary;  and  social  as 
regards  the  8  millions  of  Magyar  working  men. 
Now,  if  these  last  were  really  free  and  were 
not  subjected  to  the  domination  of  the  2  mil- 
lions of  Magyars  who  ()])press  them  socially. 


THE  ALLIES  OF   GER^LVNY  209 

they  could  surely  come  to  an  understanding' 
with  their  Slav  and  Latin  neighbors,  wliicli 
would  enable  these  to  form  the  states  to  which 
they  are  entitled ;  and  for  themselves  the  Mag- 
yars, freed  from  their  feudal  masters,  could 
erect  in  the  midst  of  Poland,  Bohemia,  Rouma- 
nia,  and  Jugo-Slavia,  a  democratic  Magyar 
state  which  could  agree  with  its  neighbors  to 
form  part  of  the  economic  territory  of  southern 
central  Europe. 

Remembering  the  state  of  mind  and  the 
social  interests  of  the  8  millions  of  laboring 
Magyars,  it  is  plain  that  in  reality  it  is  not  for 
the  advantage  of  the  12  millions  of  Magyars, 
but  only  for  the  2  millions  of  feudal  masters 
and  functionaries  of  this  race  that  Hungary 
really  exists. 

The  two  observations  just  made  are  ex- 
tremely important,  for  through  them  we  estab- 
lish the  fact  that  Austria-Hungary  only  sub- 
sists for  the  benefit  of  10  millions  of  Germans 
in  Austria,  and  2  millions  of  feudal  Magyars  in 
Hungary,  a  total  of  12  millions  of  inhabitants, 
against  the  interests  of  38  millions  of  Slavs, 
Latins,  and  Magyar  proletarians. 

Austria-Hungary  is  therefore  the  empire  of 
extreme  injustice,  in  a  degree  even  worse  than 
Germany.     In   the   latter  country,  among  08 


210  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

millions  of  inhabitants  in  1914  at  least  61  are 
Germans,  and  perfectly  willing  to  be  governed 
as  a  single  nation;  in  Austria-Hungary,  on  the 
contrary,  12  millions  only  of  German-Magyars, 
with  the  help  of  the  Hapsburg  dynasty,  im- 
pose their  will  on  38  millions  of  Slavs,  Latins, 
and  Magyar  laborers.  For  these  causes,  if 
modern  justice  does  not  demand  the  overthrow 
of  Germany,  at  least  it  should  insist  inexorably 
on  that  of  Austria-Hungary. 

This  empire  is  maintained,  also,  for  the  ad- 
vantage of  the  Hapsburg  dynasty,  which  is 
German,  and  has  a  strong  interest  in  the  con- 
tinuation of  the  Austro-Hungarian  state. 

Before  186G,  it  was  an  open  question  if  the 
Hapsburgs  could  dominate  the  Hohenzollerns, 
and  rule  in  their  stead  over  the  mass  of  the 
German  population  of  central  Europe,  but 
since  the  defeat  of  the  Hapsburgs  at  Sadowa 
by  the  Prussians,  in  IBGG,  this  question  has 
been  so  completely  settled  that  the  Hapsburgs 
have  entirely  renounced  the  idea  of  their 
supremacy  over  the  Hohenzollerns. 

The  alternative  from  which  the  former  must 
choose  is  explained  very  clearly  in  a  snudl 
pamphlet  which  appeared  at  Berlin  in  1895, 
Pangermany  and  Central  Europe  almnt  1950 
{(Iross-Drutschland   und   Mitteleuropa    um   das 


THE   ALLIES  OF   GERMANY  'Z\\ 

Jahr  1950),  which  is  a  pamphlet  of  remark- 
able interest,  for  it  descrihed  Iwcnty-tlirce 
years  ago  the  Pangerman  design  exactly  as 
it  has  come  to  pass  since  1914. 

"Certainly,"  said  our  Pangcrmanist  in  1895, 
"the  successful  Germanization  of  the  non- 
Germans  of  Austria-Hungary  would  not  be 
possible  without  the  energetic  support  of  the 
47  millions  of  Germans  of  the  empire  (figures 
of  1895).  Naturally,  in  order  to  reach  this 
result  the  principle  of  the  equal  rights  of  na- 
tionalities, and  certain  existing  principles  as 
to  public  and  private  rights,  would  have  to 
be  abandoned.  .  .  . 

"In  case  that  the  House  of  Hapsburg  should 
not  be  disposed  nor  well  adapted  to  succeed  in  the 
difficult  task  of  welding  together  Austria-IIungary 
and  Germany,  its  part  might  he  played  by  some 
less  important  German  families'"  (page  28). 

It  is,  then,  twenty-three  years,  at  least,  since 
a  sort  of  permanent  ultimatum  was  presented 
to  the  Hapsburgs  by  Berlin,  an  ultimatum 
which,  by  the  way,  they  long  ago  accepted. 

It  is  easy  to  understand  how  this  can  be, 
when  we  know  the  present  position  of  the 
Hapsburgs.  To-day  this  house  has  an  alter- 
native from  which  to  choose.  It  must  totally 
disappear  through  the  triumph  of  the  demo- 


212  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

cratic  aspirations  of  its  Slav  and  Latin  subjects, 
who  will  no  longer  endure  its  yoke — and  this 
triumph  can  only  come  by  the  victory  of  the 
Entente,  or  it  can  continue  thanks  to  the  sup- 
port of  the  Hohenzollerns,  and  this  implies 
that  the  Hapsburgs  must  do  their  utmost  to 
bring  about  a  victory  for  Germany.  It  is 
manifest  that  the  latter  solution  would  be 
much  less  disastrous  for  the  Austrian  imperial 
family,  and  they  have  therefore  adopted  it. 
To  sum  up,  the  Hapsburgs,  the  10  millions  of 
Germans  in  Austria,  and  the  2  millions  of 
feudal  Magyars  have  dynastic,  national,  and 
social  reasons  which  give  them  a  common 
interest  in  the  maintenance  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary. 

Under  these  conditions  it  is  clear  that  the 
continued  existence  of  the  empire  is  of  great 
advantage  to  Germany,  as  this  existence  is 
the  geographical  condition  on  which  central 
Pangermany  depends;  for  the  Pangerman 
bridge  toward  the  east  rests  on  three  piers, 
Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria  reaching  to  Hun- 
gary, and  Turkey.  Austria-Hungary  is  the 
main  pier  of  this  bridge  which  unites  Germany 
to  the  east.  The  absolute  necessity  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  Austrian  Empire  by  the 
Germans  is  so  evident  tliat  in  the  pamphlet 


THE  ALLIES  OF  GERMANY  213 

above  mentioned,  Gross-DcutscJdand  und  Mit- 
teleuropa  um  das  Johr  1950 — Berlin  1895 — it  is 
stated  plainly:  "The  present  German  Em- 
pire, especially  North  Germany,  needs  Austria 
for  her  eventual  defense;  this  is  well  under- 
stood by  all  Prussians"  (page  23). 

Looking  at  another  aspect  of  the  question, 
at  present  the  Magyar  authorities,  in  order 
to  preserve  their  mediaeval  privileges,  which 
are  identically  those  of  the  Prussian  Junkers, 
very  deliberately  accept  the  creation  of  cen- 
tral Pangermany.  On  the  1st  of  January, 
1918,  the  president  of  the  Hungarian  Council 
spoke  as  follows  to  the  parliament  at  Buda- 
pesth : 

"Closer  relations  with  Germany,  owing  to 
considerations  of  the  greatest  value,  are  of 
capital  importance  to  us.  If  we  wish  to  form 
part  of  the  great  movement  which  will  stretch 
from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Black  Sea,  and 
from  thence  into  Asia  Minor,  we  must  take 
measures  accordingly." 

Finally,  the  Tagesposf,  a  German  paper  pub- 
lished at  Gratz,  in  Austria,  said  on  May  Uth, 
1918: 

"The  strengthening  of  our  alliance  with  Ger- 
many demands  an  energetic  conduct  of  our  for- 
eign policy.     Germany  has  a  vital  interest  in 


214  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

the  existence  of  Austria-Hungary,  in  the  main- 
tenance of  order  within  the  empire,  in  the 
economic  development  of  its  peoples,  and  the 
prospects  of  the  Austrian  state." 

The  whole  truth  is  contained  in  these  lines, 
as  is  well  known  to  those,  unfortunately  too 
few,  who  have  studied  on  the  spot  for  twenty 
years  the  complicated  problem  of  central  Eu- 
rope. The  recent  projects  for  reorganization 
of  the  Austrian  state  with  autonomy  extended 
to  the  Slavs,  have  been  a  farce  to  deceive  the 
Allies.  No  experienced  politician,  either  Slav 
or  Latin,  a  Hapsburg  subject,  believes  in  these 
proposals,  for  the  word  of  a  Hapsburg  is  worth 
just  about  as  much  as  that  of  a  Ilohenzollern. 
In  1871  the  Emperor  Francis- Joseph  solemnly 
promised  the  Czechs  to  have  himself  crowned 
King  of  Bohemia,  but  he  has  never  since 
chosen  to  keep  his  word. 

Finally,  at  the  moment  when  I  write  these 
lines,  Austria-Hungary  begins  to  yield  under 
the  pressure  of  her  oppressed  peoples.  This 
result  has  not  })een  l)rought  about  without 
trouble.  A  considerable  number  of  Allied 
politicians,  diplomats,  and  publicists  have 
persisted  since  the  beginning  of  the  war  in 
the  idea  that  Austria-Hungary  must  be  main- 
tained.    They  have  tluis  worked  for  the  King 


THE  ALLIES  OF  GERALVNY  215 

of  Prussia,  they  have  played  the  game  of  the 
Pangermanists,  they  have  deserted  the  cause 
of  democracy,  they  have  incredibly  prolonged 
the  war  by  hindering  the  attack  on  Austria, 
the  weakest  point  of  the  Central  Empires, 
and  have  contributed  to  keep  in  an  atrocious 
bondage  admirable  peoples  like  the  Slavs  and 
Latins  of  Austria-Hungary,  who  have  been 
since  the  beginning  of  the  struggle  determined 
allies  of  the  Entente,  and  for  a  long  time 
worthy  of  unrestricted  liberty. 


IV. 

The  annexed  map  gives  a  comprehensive 
view  of  the  causes  which  determined  the  soli- 
darity of  the  Central  Powers.  This  map  again 
shows  that  there  are  five  centres  of  imperial- 
ism which  rendered  possible  the  formation  of 
Pangermany.  The  chief  centre  is  Berlin,  and 
the  four  secondary  centres,  Vienna,  Budapest, 
Sofia,  and  Constantinople,  have  allowed  Ger- 
man militarism  during  the  war  to  extend  its 
methods  and  its  detestable  influence  as  far  as 
the  eastern  confines  of  Turkey.  These  secon- 
dary centres  of  imperialism,  having  greatly  as- 
sisted the  propagation  of  the  Pangerman  cause, 
ought  to  be  completely  destroyed. 


216 


AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 


CONCLUSIONS  217 


Conclusions. 


The  main  object  of  the  war  for  the  Entente 
beyond  and  above  all  others  should  consist  of 
so  complete  a  destruction  of  German  milita- 
rism that  all  other  military  systems  will  have 
no  further  reason  for  existence,  and  a  general 
disarmament  will  ensue. 

It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  an  incomplete  vic- 
tory of  the  Allies  will  allow  German  militarism 
to  continue  even  in  a  German  republic,  a  thing 
which  is  quite  possible,  because  the  German 
socialists  are  for  the  most  part  nationalists, 
many  are  even  at  bottom  Pangermanists,  and 
they  have  the  military  spirit  in  the  very  blood 
of  their  race.  In  this  case,  the  other  nations 
w411  be  obliged  to  keep  up  exhausting  arma- 
ments. For  all  the  terrible  nightmare  of  mili- 
tarism would  be  prolonged  under  still  more 
intolerable  conditions  than  before,  the  war  hav- 
ing laid  unprecedentedly  hea\y  financial  bur- 
dens on  the  people. 

To  make  the  world  reall}'  safe  for  democracy 
and  enter  into  a  new  era,  it  is  therefore  indis- 
pensable to  bring  about  the  total  annihilation 
of  the  German  military  system. 

Let  us,  then,  cherish  no  illusions;  only  the 
thorough  and  complete  victory  of  the  Allies 


218  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

can  bring  about  this  annihilation,  as  the  effect 
of  peace  conditions  carefully  studied  out  to 
produce  such  a  result. 

This  final  victory  is  now,  however,  relatively 
easy  to  reach  if  the  Allies  are  unalterably  de- 
termined to  insist  to  the  end  on  ten  essential 
conditions.  These  conditions  have  this  pe- 
culiarity that  only  one  is  applicable  to  the 
terms  of  peace  to  be  imposed  on  the  enemy; 
the  others  relate  to  the  tactics  and  attitude  to 
be  held  by  the  Allies,  and  this  is  particularly 
important  in  order  to  avoid  mistakes,  such  as 
it  is  quite  possible  may  be  committed  during 
the  period  of  the  armistice,  mistakes  which 
would  suffice  to  deprive  us  of  the  conclusive 
success. 

First  Condition. 

Written  acceptances  by  the  Germans  and 
the  foundation  of  the  republic  in  Germany 
should  not  modify  in  any  way  the  pro- 
gramme of  guarantees  and  realizations  of  all 
kinds  demanded  by  tlie  Allies. 

This  for  the  reason  that — 
1st.  An  assassin  is  tried.     TTis  saying  to  the 
court,  "I  am  a  rej)ubli("ui,"  does  nol  diminish 


CONCLUSIONS  219 

his  punishment  in  any  way.  The  spirit  of 
justice  forbids  it. 

2d.  The  German  sociaHsts  have  shown  them- 
selves Pangermanists  under  the  Kaiser;  it  is 
not  reasonable  to  think  that  they  have  sud- 
denly abandoned  their  opinions. 

3d.  The  German  people  is  not  unhappy  be- 
cause it  has  fought  an  unjust  war;  it  is  enraged 
for  the  reason  that  it  is  forced  to  see  that  the 
game  will  soon  be  lost. 

4th.  The  Boches  are  excessively  double- 
dealing,  and  all  their  republican  setting  has  for 
its  first  object  to  seek  to  prevent  the  occupa- 
tion of  all  Germany  by  the  Allied  armies.  This 
occupation,  however,  must  take  place  to  com- 
pass a  complete  victory  for  the  Entente,  assure 
in  Europe  the  territorial  changes  necessary  to 
peace,  and  the  reparation  of  the  damage  done, 
for  this  reparation  is  indispensable  to  save 
from  complete  ruin  the  countries  invaded  by 
the  Boches.  In  this  direction  every  generosity 
which  is  shown  them  will  be  in  reality  at  the 
expense  of  the  French,  of  the  Belgians,  etc., 
whom  the  Boches  have  robbed  and  pillaged. 

5th.  Papers  signed  by  the  Germans  have  no 
value  whatever.  The  treaty  which  guaranteed 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  was  as  clear  and  pre- 
cise as  possible,  but  was  of  no  use.    We  already 


220  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

see  the  Boche  republicans  manoeuvring  to  have 
the  conditions  of  the  armistice  modified. 

6th.  To  beheve  that  the  course  of  events 
may  in  a  few  months  open  the  eyes  of  the  Ger- 
man people  and  entirely  change  them  is  to 
betray  complete  ignorance  of  German  history 
and  psychology.  The  mentality  of  these  peo- 
ple, their  passion  for  wars  of  gain  and  for  pil- 
lage, has  remained  the  same  ever  since  it  was 
described  by  Tacitus.  It  does  not,  then,  result 
exclusively  from  the  Hohenzollern  influence,  it 
is  century-long,  which  can  only  be  gradually 
modified  if  the  Germans,  by  well-advised  mea- 
sures, are  prevented  during  a  long  period  from 
following  their  predatory  instincts. 

Second  Condition. 

The  Allies  ought  to  be  thoroughly  convinced 
that  the  German  people  is  just  as  responsible 
for  the  war  as  the  Kaiser  himself. 

It  is  easy  now  that  the  Kaiser  has  fallen  to 
see  a  tendency  in  the  Allied  countries  to  dis- 
tinguish between  Kaiserism  and  the  German 
peoi)le.  This  tendency  is,  however,  shown 
only  by  those  who  have  been  wrong  as  to  tlie 
origin  of  the  war.     They  say:  "The  German 


CONCLUSIONS  221 

people  have  been  deceived  l)y  the  IIoliciizol- 
lerns.  They  have  renounced  their  sovereign. 
It  is  a  proof  of  good  faith;  we  may  consider 
now  the  responsibihty  of  the  people  as  greatly 
diminished." 

I  protest  with  all  my  force  against  this  ten- 
dency and  these  opinions,  for  they  show  on 
the  part  of  their  advocates  a  profound  igno- 
rance of  Germany  and  are  very  far  from  the 
truth. 

I  have  studied  Germany  since  the  year  1894 
and  all  my  previsions  as  to  the  action  of  the 
German  Government  and  the  German  people 
have  been  exactly  fulfilled  by  the  events,  and  I 
am  therefore  a  qualified  witness  and  have  the 
right  to  be  heard.  I  declare  boldly  tliat,  if 
William  II  was  the  inventor  and  stage-man- 
ager of  the  Pangermanist  plan,  the  Pangerman 
propaganda  which  was  carried  on  from  189,5  to 
1914  throughout  the  empire  was  welcomed  en- 
thusiastically, almost  unanimously,  by  the  Ger- 
man people,  for  the  Pangerman  aims  satisfied 
their  mentality  and  their  ancestral  passion  for 
spoils. 

During  four  years  of  war,  the  whole  German 
population  has  upheld  the  Kaiser  to  the  ex- 
tent of  its  power.  The  laborers  have  shown 
themselves  quite  as  Pangermanist  as  the  other 


222  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

social  classes.  To  give  a  proof  of  this,  at  the 
end  of  September,  1918,  the  Christian  Associa- 
tion of  Metal  Workers  adopted  the  following 
resolution:  "The  Christian  Metal  Workers 
assembled  at  Duisburg  .  .  .  dwell  particularly 
on  the  hope  that  the  coal  districts  of  Longwy- 
Briey,  conquered  by  German  arms,  shall  re- 
main in  the  possession  of  the  Empire.  .  .  ."* 

These  lines  show  the  attitude  of  mind  of  the 
Boche  Pangermanist  w^orkman  a  few  weeks  be- 
fore the  armistice,  and  if  since  then  the  Ger- 
man people  have  ceased  to  express  themselves 
in  the  same  way,  it  is  because  the  Bulgarian 
disaster  has  taken  place,  opening  to  the  Allies 
the  road  to  Austria-Hungary,  thus  seizing  cen- 
tral Europe,  which  is  for  Germany  the  key  of 
the  world. 

It  is  not  at  all,  then,  the  remorse  they  feel 
for  having  waged  a  wicked  war  that  now  tor- 
ments the  Germans  and  had  put  a  stop  to  their 
annexationist  demands,  but  solely  their  intense 
anxiety  lest  the  Allies  should  act  so  as  to  bring 
about  the  permanent  downfall  of  that  Pan- 
gcrman  scheme  wliicli  had  just  taken  form, 
and  in  the  accomplislimcnt  of  which  nearly 
the  entire  Boche  nation  was  passionately  in- 
terested during  the  last  forty  years.     It  is  be- 

*  St'c  Lc  Tcwp.1,  September  30,  1918. 


CONCLUSIONS  9«3 

sides  undeniable  that  the  Gornians  niohilizcd 
from  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  liave  j)illa^'c(l, 
burned,  stolen,  and  committed  unheard-of 
atrocities,  as  they  were  ordered  to  do.  Since 
they  thus  docilely  obeyed  their  leaders  when 
they  were  commanded  to  commit  crimes,  they 
are  themselves  equally  responsible.  Never  in 
the  history  of  the  world  has  any  people  act- 
ing after  long  reflection  been  more  responsible 
for  its  acts  than  the  German. 

Those  of  the  Allies  who  see  only  the  guilt  of 
the  Kaiser  try  by  that  means  to  shield  his 
people  from  their  punishment,  a  thousand 
times  deserved;  but  though  they  may  not  in- 
tend it,  this  would  be  a  tremendous  injustice 
to  the  Allied  populations.  In  fact,  to  divide 
the  cause  of  the  German  people  from  that  of 
their  Kaiser  would  restrict  the  application  of 
conditions  of  reparation  to  the  Emperor  and 
his  immediate  surroundings,  while  tlie  j)ec)i)le 
of  Germany  with  equal  responsibility  provide 
the  only  basis  broad  enough  to  furnish  to  the 
Allied  populations  of  Europe  the  indenmities 
which  are  strictly  due  and  must  be  paid  to 
save  them  from  complete  ruin.  It  is,  there- 
fore, highly  important  to  let  the  German  na- 
tion bear  the  full  weight  of  its  resi)()nsi})ilily; 
to  relieve  it  of  this  would  be  in  the  first  place 


224  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

contrary  to  justice,  and,  secondly,  In  this  way 
the  Allied  peoples  would  not  obtain  sufficient 
to  make  up  the  enormous  losses  they  have 
suffered  through  German  aggression,  and  the 
Germans,  through  the  effect  of  the  economic 
consequences  of  the  war,  would  finally  bear 
away  the  victory. 


Third  Condition. 

Any  negotiated  peace  should  be  resolutely 
and  absolutely  rejected,  as  it  would  make  im- 
possible a  complete  victory  for  the  Allies. 

During  all  the  period  of  the  armistice  the 
Germans  are  going  to  struggle  to  arrive  at  a 
negotiated  peace.  If  we  concede  that  the 
republican  attitude  ought  not  to  prevent  the 
German  people  from  suffering  the  consequences 
of  the  crimes  that  they  have  committed,  we 
must  likewise  concede  that  one  of  the  justifica- 
tions of  the  war  lies  in  the  fact  that  peace 
shall  be  dictated  to  the  German  people.  More 
than  that,  a  negotiated  peace  would  be  incon- 
sistent with  the  formula  of  unconditional  sur- 
render which  expresses  so  exactly  the  will  of 
the  practical  unanimity  of  the  Allied  peoples. 


CONCLUSIONS  225 


Fourth  Condition. 

To  understand  realistically  the  conditions 
of  a  programme  for  a  lasting  peace. 

An  Allied  peace  programme,  meant  to  bring 
about  precisely  their  ideal,  should  not  be  theo- 
retic but  exclusively  practical.  It  is  conse- 
quently useless  for  such  a  programme  to  lay 
down  principles,  already  many  times  repeate<l, 
on  which  we  have  all  agreed  for  a  long  time. 
But  what  is  of  capital  importance  is  that  this 
programme  should  contain  only,  without  the 
omission  of  one  essential  point,  the  list  of  facts 
and  practical  changes,  the  realization  of  which 
on  the  soil  of  Europe  will  automatically  assure 
respect  for  the  principles  for  which  the  Entente 
is  fighting.  The  peace  programme  of  the 
Allies  should  be  merely  technical,  something 
like  a  list  of  repairs  which  an  expert  mechanic 
draws  up  after  a  careful  examination  of  a  com- 
plicated machine  which  has  suffered  serious 
injuries. 

Europe  is,  in  fact,  a  huge  machine  throv^Ti 
out  of  gear,  and  our  common  sense  tells  us 
that  it  can  only  be  put  in  order  by  mechanics 
who  thoroughly  understand  it. 


226  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

The  best  Parisian  architects  could  not  sensi- 
bly pretend  to  come  and  build  a  sky-scraper  in 
the  city  of  New  York  unless  they  had  pre- 
viously carefully  studied,  with  the  help  of 
American  architects,  the  peculiarities  and  de- 
mands of  this  special  form  of  construction.  In 
the  same  way  the  most  intelligent  and  well- 
meaning  of  the  English,  Americans,  or  French 
could  not  make  a  concrete  programme  for  the 
reconstruction  of  Europe  unless  the  plan  had 
been  long  and  carefully  studied  on  the  spot 
with  the  assistance  of  those  who  well  under- 
stood the  complications  of  European  ma- 
chinery. 

Therefore,  and  this  explains  in  a  great  mea- 
sure the  mistakes  as  to  the  political  situation 
made  during  the  war,  there  are  in  the  Entente 
countries  extremely  few  men  in  politics  who, 
before  the  war,  devoted  themselves  seriously 
to  the  study  of  these  grave  foreign  questions. 
The  Allied  leaders,  in  order  to  be  sure  of  estab- 
lishing a  just  and  permanent  peace,  would  find 
it  to  their  interest  to  call  to  their  aid  two 
groups  of  experts,  for  in  this  way  all  danger  of 
technical  mistakes  would  be  avoided. 

1st.  It  would  be  necessary  to  pay  the  great- 
est attention  to  the  advice  of  experts  in  foreign 
politics  to  be  found  among  the  Allies,  whose 


CONCLUSIONS  m 

worth  has  been  proved  by  the  course  of 
events. 

For  example,  in  France  Messrs.  Louis  Leger, 
Ernest  Denis,  Haumant,  and  Auguste  Gau- 
vain;  in  England  Messrs.  Wickham  Steed, 
Seton-Watson,  and  Sir  Arthur  Evans  are  al- 
most the  only  men  who  have  seriously  studied 
for  a  long  time,  prior  to  the  war,  the  difficult 
problems  of  central  Europe,  the  right  solution 
of  which  will  form  the  firmest  foundations  of 
peace.  These  men  should  be  called  in  as  tech- 
nical advisers  of  the  Inter-Allied  commissions 
charged  to  apply  practically  the  peace  pro- 
gramme. 

2d.  There  is  a  second  group  of  experts  whose 
help  would  be  valuable — even  indispensable;  I 
mean  the  authorized  representatives  of  the 
Poles,  the  Czechs,  the  Jugo-Slavs,  the  Rouma- 
nians, the  Armenians,  the  Jews,  etc.,  that  is,  of 
all  the  peoples  who  are  to  be  liberated  from 
the  yoke  of  Germany  and  her  allies. 

Representatives  of  these  peoples — such  men 
as  Professor  Masaryk,  Dr.  Kramarsh  for  the 
Czecho-Slovaks;  Paderewsky,  Roman  Dmovsky 
for  the  Poles;  Trumbich,  Savic  for  the  Jugo- 
Slavs;  Take  Jonesco  for  the  Roumanians; 
Boghos  Nubar  Pacha  for  the  Armenians,  etc. 
— ought   they  not   also   to  be  added   to  the 


228  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

peace  commission  as  technical  advisers  to  aid 
in  the  creation  of  a  new  Europe?  This  co- 
operation is  absolutely  necessary. 

We  ought  clearly  to  understand  that  the 
entire  liberation  of  oppressed  peoples  is  in 
reality  the  first  condition  of  a  durable  victory 
of  the  Allies,  for,  unless  the  freedom  of  these 
races  is  firmly  established,  we  cannot  build 
up  in  central  Europe  the  strong  barrier  which 
will  protect  us  against  the  aggressive  spirit  of 
the  Teutons. 


Fiflli  Condition. 

To  realize  a  concrete  programme  of  peace 
conditions  having  for  its  object : 

1st.  To  prevent  a  further  outbreak  of  the 
war. 

2d.  To  repair  as  far  as  possible  the  deep  in- 
juries caused  by  German  aggression. 

A  detailed  technical  programme  for  peace 
cannot,  in  fact,  be  completely  given  until  the 
Allied  forces  occui)y  central  Europe  and  the 
Allied  leaders  have  been  able  thus  to  secure  at 
its  very  source  the  exact  and  indispensable  in- 
formation which  is  certainly  even  now  lacking. 
In  any  case,  it    is  necessary    that  from  now 


CONCLUSIONS  229 

on  public  opinion  should  see  clearly,  at  least 
in  its  large  outline,  what  should  he  the  mini- 
mum concrete  programme.  I  shall  therefore 
attempt  to  make  such  a  sketch;  not  that  I  feel 
myself  safe  from  error,  but  I  can  say  that  for 
twenty-five  years  I  have  thought  on  the  ques- 
tions which  peace  now  brings  l)efore  us,  and 
that  there  is  not  one  of  them  which  I  have  not 
studied  on  the  spot,  unprejudicedly  and  care- 
fully consulting  those  best  qualified  to  aid  nie 
in  their  comprehension. 

This  concrete  peace  programme  of  the  Allies 
ought,  as  a  whole,  to  turn  into  a  reality  the 
excellent  formula  long  ago  thought  out  by  ^Ir. 
Lloyd  George — guarantees,  reparations,  retri- 
butions. 

This  programme  ought  to  be  composed  of 
very  different  elements  brought  together,  and 
each  part  studied  so  that  they  all  may  harmo- 
niously combine  their  effects  in  such  a  way  as 
to  reach  the  desired  result. 

These  realizations  fall,  then,  into  five  groups, 
each  one  indispensable,  and  consequently  all 
of  them  together  constitute  the  niininunn 
terms  to  be  imposed. 

1st.  Territorial  reorganizations  in  Euroi)e. 

2d.  Social  reforms  which  will  overthrow  the 
foundations  of  German  militarism. 


230  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

3d.  The  practical  measures  necessary  to  pre- 
vent the  rearmament  of  Germany. 

4th.  Measures  of  reparation  for  the  injuries 
caused  by  the  war. 

5th.  The  just  restitutions  dictated  by  the 
idea  of  modern  law  and  the  moral  sense  of  the 
world. 

7.     Territorial  reorganisation  of  Europe. 

Colonel  Roosevelt  and  Senator  Lodge  have 
given  a  programme  for  the  reconstruction  of 
Europe  which  is,  in  my  opinion,  excellent,  and 
to  which  I  subscribe.  This  programme  makes 
an  application,  perfectly  well  understood,  of 
the  high  principle  which  unites  the  Allies:  the 
right  of  self-determination  of  peoples — a  princi- 
ple which  has  been  so  eloquently  and  often 
declared  by  President  Wilson. 

On  the  whole,  these  changes  in  European 
territory  ought  to  be  undertaken  so  as  to  pro- 
duce a  two-fold  result. 

1st.  To  make  it  forever  impossible  to  re- 
constitute Pangermany. 

2d.  To  assure  the  free  development  of  the 
peoples  oppressed  by  Germany  and  her  allies. 

The  Ottoman  Empire,  which  forms  an  en- 
tirely arbitrary  territory,  ought  to  be  abolished, 
for  Turkish  sovereignty  ought  only  to  exist  in 


CONCLUSIONS  231 

really  Turkish  regions,  that  is,  in  Anatolia;  all 
the  other  races,  Armenians,  Jews,  and  Arabs, 
should  be  made  independent,  as  far  as  pos- 
sible. 

Constantinople  being  an  essentially  cosmo- 
politan city,  where  the  Turks,  contrary  to 
what  is  the  generally  accepted  idea,  are  only  a 
minority  (45  per  cent),  it  should  be  inter- 
nationalized, together  with  the  straits.  Its 
cosmopolitan  character  and  its  geographical 
position,  in  touch  with  three  continents — 
Europe,  Asia,  and  Africa,  through  Egypt — 
make  Constantinople  the  ideal  place  for  the 
seat  of  the  League  of  Nations  when  it  shall  be 
put  into  a  practical  shape. 

The  complete  withdrawal  of  central  Europe 
from  all  Pangerman  influence  will  best  be  ob- 
tained— 

First,  by  destroying  all  efforts  of  the  Bulgars 
to  attain  the  hegemony  of  the  Balkans,  by 
forcing  them  to  give  up  the  territory  occupied 
by  them  in  the  course  of  the  war. 

Secondly,  as  a  basic  and  unavoidable  condi- 
tion of  their  victory  the  Allies  should  over- 
throw the  Empire  of  Austria,  and  the  King- 
dom of  Hungary,  states  which  are  simply 
founded  on  a  frightful  injustice. 

Thirdly,  the  Poles,  Danes,  and  French  who 


232  AN  ENDURING   VICTORY 

are  now  held  in  subjection  by  the  Germans 
should  be  liberated. 

These  three  rearrangements  would  lead  to 
the  establishment  of  five  new  independent 
states,  all  absolutely  essential  to  the  new  order 
in  Europe: 

1st.  Poland,  including  Dantzig,  as  an  open- 
ing on  the  Baltic. 

2d.  The  state  of  the  Czecho-Slovaks,  or 
Bohemia,  which  must  be  understood  to  in- 
clude also  her  strategic  mountain  frontiers  on 
the  north  and  west. 

3d.  A  Magyar  state  democratized  in  the 
manner  indicated  below. 

4th.  A  Jugo-Slav  state,  embracing  the  Jugo- 
slav regions  of  Austria-Hungary,  Serbia,  and 
Montenegro. 

5th.  Greater  Roumania,  comprising  all  the 
Roumanian  districts  in  Bukovina,  Transyl- 
vania, and  Bessarabia. 

These  five  states,  whose  interest  will  lie  in 
agreement  among  themselves  and  being  made 
up  of  anti-German  elements  only — as  will  ap- 
pear later  in  the  case  of  a  democratic  Magyar 
state — will  form  about  00  millions  of  inhabi- 
tants, between  the  Baltic  and  Greece. 

They  will  thus  provide  a  first  great  barrier 
which  will  make  a  revival  of  Pangermanism 


CONCLUSIONS  2315 

impossible.  Behind  this  barrier,  and  with  the 
help  of  the  Allies,  can  be  organized  federated 
Russia  and  the  other  states  which  Colonel 
Roosevelt  and  Senator  Lodge  mentioned  in 
their  programme, 

As  for  Germany,  when  she  has  set  free  about 
7  millions  of  Poles,  Alsatians,  Lorrainers,  and 
Danes,  she  will  still  retain  61  millions  of  in- 
habitants. As  Austria  does  not  include  more 
than  about  7  millions  of  Germans,  well  grouped 
geographically,  even  if  these  7  million  Ger- 
mans wished  to  unite  themselves  with  Ger- 
many, they  would  together  not  amount  to 
more  than  68  millions  of  inhabitants — that  is, 
the  same  population  as  before  the  war,  but 
with  this  difference  that  Germany  would  have 
lost  all  the  strategic  regions  (Poland  and 
Alsace-Lorraine)  which  facilitated  her  aggres- 
sions, would  have  had  to  pay  each  year  for 
a  very  long  period  an  annual  instalment  of 
indemnity  which  would  have  prevented  her 
from  arming  herself  again,  and  would  find 
herself  surrounded  by  people  vitally  interested 
to  prevent  any  revival  of  the  former  military 
system. 

The  annexed  map  does  not  pretend  to  show 
the  solution  of  these  problems  in  detail,  but 
it  gives  a  general  view  of  the  territorial  modi- 


^34 


AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 


CONCLUSIONS  235 

fications  absolutely  required.  This  map  has  a 
history.  My  studies  had  long  ago  convinced 
me  that  the  only  way  to  defeat  Pangermanisni 
was  to  form  the  five  new  states  above  described. 

At  the  end  of  191G,  I  wished  to  publish  this 
map  in  the  Paris  Illustration,  but  I  found  my- 
self opposed  by  the  veto  of  the  French  censor, 
who  was  much  alarmed  by  my  map.  Even  at 
this  time  Allied  diplomatists  viewed  the  inde- 
pendence of  Poland  with  little  confidence,  and 
one  could  not  speak  of  the  Jugo-Slavs  for  fear 
of  vexing  the  Italians,  who  then  had  designs 
on  Dalmatia.  As  for  the  Czecho-Slovaks, 
their  importance  was  very  vaguely  recognized, 
and  the  hope  of  Allied  diplomacy  was  to  make 
a  separate  peace  with  Austria-Hungary. 

Finding  my  publication  interdicted,  I  tried 
to  get  round  the  difficulty  by  saying  to  my 
censors : 

"After  all,  Europe,  as  I  depict  it,  is  only  the 
result  of  the  principle  declared  by  President 
Wilson:  'I  propose  that  every  people  shall  be 
free  to  determine  its  own  policy.'  So  let  me 
print  my  map  with  this  text." 

This  proposal  overcame  the  scruples  of  my 
critics  and  at  last  my  map — which  was  greatly 
in  advance  of  the  conceptions  of  Allied  diplo- 
mats— was  allowed  to  appear  in  the  lllustra- 


236  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

Hon  of  February  24th,  1917.  Since  then  pub- 
he  opinion  has  been  strongly  influenced  by 
events,  and  the  Entente  has  become  more  con- 
vinced that  this  plan  gave  a  very  reasonable 
idea  of  what  ought  to  be  the  state  of  Europe 
after  the  peace. 

I  ought  strongly  to  emphasize  the  fact  that 
the  claim  apparently  now  being  renewed  by 
the  Italians  to  establish  themselves  in  the  final 
ownership  of  a  considerable  part  of  the  Dalma- 
tian coast  would  very  seriously  imperil  that 
organization  of  central  Europe  which  is  indis- 
pensable to  the  peace  of  the  world.  In  reality, 
the  Jugo-Slav  problem  can  only  be  perma- 
nently solved  with  the  aid  of  mutual  and  sin- 
cere concessions  which  the  Italians  and  Jugo- 
slavs should  make  to  each  other.  Let  the  half 
of  Istria,  with  Trieste  and  Pola,  go  to  Italy, 
although  the  majority  of  the  population  of 
this  territory  is  incontestably  Slavic.  Thus 
Italy  will  be  assured  of  control  over  the  Adri- 
atic to  a  permissible  extent.  But  to  the  east 
of  the  boundary-line  of  Istria  let  the  Jugo- 
slavs be  assured  of  complete  liberty.  Fiume 
is  a  port  indispensable  not  only  to  the  Jugo- 
slav state  but  to  the  democratized  Magyar 
state  and  to  Bohemia,  the  i)r(Klurts  of  which 
would   be   able   to   freely   reach    the   Adriatic 


CONCLUSIONS  237 

through  a  transport  system  which  sliould  })e 
protected  by  guarantees.  It  is  al)s()kit('ly 
necessary  that  American  pubHc  opinion  sliail 
understand  at  once  how  inadmissible  are  the 
ItaHan  claims  to  Dalmatia  and  bring  pressure 
to  bear  on  the  Jugo-Slavs  and  Italians  to  in- 
duce them  to  make  as  soon  as  possible  the 
mutual  concessions  which  both  their  own  in- 
terest and  that  of  peace  in  Europe  really 
require. 

II.  Social  reforms  will  lead  to  the  destruction 
of  the  aristocratic  foundations  of  German  mili- 
tarism. 

A.     By  the  abolition  of  the  feudal  property- 
system  in  Hungary. 

In  Hungary,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  only 
real  pro-Prussians  imbued  with  imperialist 
ideas  are  the  large  landed  proprietors  among 
the  Magyars,  who  enjoy  feudal  privileges,  and 
in  order  to  preserve  them  have  a  personal  in- 
terest in  making  common  cause  with  the  Prus- 
sian Junkers. 

The  great  Magyar  landowners  have  been  for 
many  years  actual  monopolists.  Two  thou- 
sand only  among  them  hold  more  than  7  mil- 
lions of  hectares,  that  is,  more  than  a  third  of 
all  the  arable  land  in  Hungary,  and,  saturated 


238  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

to  the  bone  as  they  are  with  ideas  of  aristoc- 
racy and  autocracy,  they  not  only  oppress  the 
10  miUions  of  Slavs  and  Latins,  who  are  un- 
willing Hungarian  subjects,  but  also  8  millions 
of  Magyars,  industrial  but  chiefly  agricultural 
laborers. 

If,  then,  the  feudal  privileges  are  abolished 
in  Hungary,  we  shall  at  the  same  time  destroy 
the  only  support  of  German  militarism  in 
south  central  Europe  and  make  possible  the 
liberation  of  8  millions  of  Magyar  proleta- 
rians. 

It  is,  therefore,  highly  necessary  for  the  En- 
tente to  include  as  soon  as  possible  in  its  plans 
the  expropriation  of  Magyar  feudal  landlords 
and  the  division  of  their  estates  for  the  benefit 
of  the  working  classes  organized  into  agricul- 
tural syndicates  for  purposes  of  cultivation. 

These  social  reforms  and  changes,  which 
indeed  are  beginning  to  be  made  spontane- 
ously, so  indispensable  are  they,  will  have 
great  consequences;  they  will  give  political 
power  in  the  Magyar  districts  of  Hungary  to 
the  true  Magyar  i)C()p]e,  who  luive  up  to  now 
been  entirely  held  down  l^y  Uic  ()pi)ression  of 
the  feudal  proprietors.  The  final  result  would 
be  the  creation  of  a  democratic  state,  exclu- 
sively   Magyar,    of   about    10    million    inhabi- 


CONCLUSIONS  239 

tants,  whose  Interest  it  would  be,  botli  political 
and  economic,  to  ally  themselves  with  tlicir 
neighbors,  Poland,  Bohemia,  Uoumania,  and 
Jugo-Slavia,  and  also  to  form  part  of  the  great 
anti-German  bulwark. 

B.  Destruction  of  Prussian  Junkers. 

These  are  at  the  very  base  of  Prussian  mili- 
tarism, and  as  an  injurious  caste  they  ought 
to  be  completely  abolished.  This  could  be 
accomplished  legally  by  employing  the  follow- 
ing method: 

All  the  Junkers  are  at  the  same  time  large 
landed  proprietors  and  officers  in  the  German 
army;  in  the  latter  capacity  each  one  of  them 
has  certainly  been  guilty  during  the  war  of 
criminal  acts  and  orders,  which  by  rights 
should  be  severely  punished.  After  our  vic- 
tory, the  Allies  should  set  up  legal  commissions 
before  which  these  crimes  could  be  tried,  their 
authors  indicted,  and  proper  punishment  de- 
creed. The  landed  property  of  the  Junkers 
should  be  taken  as  indemnity  and  divided, 
according  to  the  region,  for  the  benefit  of 
Prussian  or  Polish  peasants. 

III.  The  practical  steps  to  be  taken  in  order 
to  prevent  the  rearmament  of  Germanij. 

Destruction  in  the  whole  German   lerrilory 


240  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

of  machinery  specially  designed  for  the  manu- 
facture of  war  material.  (This,  of  course, 
would  also  apply  to  Austria-Hungary,  Bulga- 
ria, and  Turkey.) 

IV.  Measures  of  reparation  for  injuries 
caused  by  the  war. 

1st.  Returning  by  Germany  and  her  allies 
to  the  proper  owners  of  all  furniture,  ma- 
chinery, and  property  of  all  kinds  stolen  from 
invaded  countries. 

2d.  Giving  to  the  legitimate  owners  of  Ger- 
man furniture,  machinery,  and  other  property, 
as  compensation  for  stolen  goods  which  cannot 
be  returned  in  kind. 

3d.  The  determination  and  security  of  the 
annuities  that  Germany  should  furnish  to  the 
states  attacked  by  her,  as  compensation  for 
injuries  of  all  sorts  and  expenses  caused  by  the 
war. 

The  Germans  have  stripped  the  invaded 
countries  of  everything,  and  the  war  has  been 
so  much  more  costly  to  the  Allies  than  to  Ger- 
many that  if  the  economic  differences  result- 
ing from  this  state  of  things  were  to  last  the 
military  success  of  the  Allies  would  mean 
nothing,  especially  for  France,  for  in  a  few 
years  after  the  conclusion  of  peace  Germany 


CONCLUSIONS  241 

would  appear  victorious,  simply  througli  the 
economic  consequences  of  the  war. 

This  overwhelming  money  question  is  of 
such  extraordinary  importance  that  if  we  wish 
to  avoid  terrible  financial  catastrophes  sure 
to  follow  the  conclusion  of  a  peace  we  may 
consider  satisfactory,  but  too  hastily  con- 
cluded, America's  great  business  men  ought  to 
insist  that  money  questions  should  be  dealt 
with  thoroughly  by  the  Allies,  studied  witliout 
haste,  and  completely  solved. 

The  attempt  to  see  clearly  in  the  interests 
of  the  future  is  all  the  more  necessary  because 
the  extreme  importance  of  the  financial  aspect 
of  the  situation  is  not  as  well  understood  as  it 
ought  to  be  by  many  of  those  who  nevertheless 
are  deeply  interested. 

This  is  the  case  for  reasons  which  follow, 
and  will  be  understood,  taking  France  as  an 
example. 

Before  the  war  6  milliards  only  of  bank  bills 
were  in  circulation  in  France,  while  up  to  the 
present  moment  30  milliards  have  been  issued ; 
also  many  people  have  made  enormous  profits 
in  munitions  of  war,  while  workmen's  wages 
have  considerably  increased.  The  effect  of 
this  apparently  satisfactory  situation  is  that 
many  Frenchmen  do  not  realize  to  what  an 


242  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

extraordinary  extent  the  war  has  brought  ruin 
to  France. 

The  30  milhards  of  paper  which  now  circu- 
late so  easily  produce  an  illusion  of  wealth, 
but  this  wealth  is  partly  artificial,  and  partly 
conditional.  In  fact,  the  truth  is  that  these 
30  milliards  of  French  bank  bills  are  secured  by 
the  consequences  of  an  absolute  victory  which 
will  oblige  Germany  to  repair  progressively  the 
immense  losses  of  all  kinds  caused  to  France; 
this  is  also  equally  true  of  the  other  countries 
which  have  suffered  under  German  aggression. 

Germany  is  perfectly  able  to  pay,  certainly 
not  all  at  once,  but  by  annual  amounts.  If 
the  credit  of  the  German  Empire  fails  under 
the  final  defeat,  the  material  riches  of  Ger- 
many, which  are  considerable,  will  remain. 

\Vhen  the  Allies  are  in  a  condition  to  study 
German  revenues  carefully  and  at  leisure  on 
the  spot,  when  the  possession  of  a  fair  share 
of  these  revenues  is  secured,  by  guarantees  as 
solid  and  durable  as  may  be  necessary,  then 
the  German  people  can  certainly  pay  annually 
a  sum  of  at  least  10  milliards  of  marks.  Let 
us  suppose  that  the  share  of  each  of  the  Allied 
states  who  are  creditors  of  Germany  is  2  mil- 
liards a  year.  These  2  milliards  being  guar- 
anteed during  a  very  long  period,  thanks  to 


CONCLUSIONS  213 

modern  financial  combinations,  will  be  sufTi- 
cient  to  allow  each  Allied  state  to  raise  inter- 
nal loans,  relatively  small,  and  therefore  easy 
to  float,  which  will  enable  it  to  draw  in  its 
budget,  enormously  increased  by  the  war,  sav- 
ing its  citizens  from  the  taxes  which  would 
crush  them  to  death,  but  which  it  would  l)e 
impossible  to  avoid  if  the  Germans  were  not 
made  to  fear,  as  far  as  possible,  the  burden  of 
injuries  which  they  have  caused. 

The  annual  sums  to  be  paid  by  the  Germans 
should  not  be  too  heavy;  in  order  to  make 
these  payments  absolutely  certain,  therefore, 
these  annuities  will  be  spread  over  a  long 
period,  probably  at  least  fifty  years,  but,  as  the 
German  people  had  prepared  their  attacks  for 
more  than  forty  years,  what  could  be  more 
natural  and  just  than  that  they  should  have 
to  bear  the  consequences  for  a  nearly  eciual 
space  of  time? 

As  a  further  consideration,  the  reparations 
to  be  made  by  means  of  annual  payments 
spread  over  a  long  period  will  be  a  powerful 
guarantee  of  peace,  for  it  is  certain  that  Ger- 
many could  never  keep  up  the  immense  ma- 
terial of  war  required  by  modern  armies  as 
long  as  she  w^ill  be  forced  to  pay  the  amount 
of  her  reparations. 


244  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

V.     The  retributions  required  by  justice. 

The  frightful  massacres  and  tortures  of  the 
civil  population  which  have  been  ordered  dur- 
ing the  war  by  the  Turks,  the  Bulgars,  the 
Austrians,  the  Magyars,  and  the  Germans 
would  bring  disgrace  on  the  Entente  if  left 
unpunished.  But  the  mode  of  dealing  out 
justice  in  these  cases  can  only  be  settled  after 
investigations  on  the  spot  by  the  Allies,  which 
will  make  plain  facts  which  are  now  only  par- 
tially known. 

Sixth  Condition. 

To  understand  that  the  presence  of  Allied 
soldiers  in  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  is 
absolutely  indispensable  to  a  thorough  and 
permanent  victory. 

Let  us  face  the  truth.  Without  the  pres- 
ence of  Allied  troops  in  the  above  countries 
can  it  be  seriously  believed — 

1st.  That  if  the  Germans  arc  free  to  pursue 
their  intrigues  in  central  Europe,  Poland, 
Bohemia,  the  democratized  Magyar  state,  the 
Jugo-Slavia,  and  Greater  Roumania  could 
organize  themselves  on  a  solid  basis,  so  as  to 
assure  a  long  peace? 


CONCLUSIONS  245 

2d.  That  the  aboHtion  of  feudal  landed 
property  in  Hungary  could  be  accomplished 
as  thoroughly  as  is  necessary  to  deprive  mili- 
tarism of  all  support  in  these  regions? 

3d.  That  all  the  Prussian  Junkers  will  be 
tried,  and  their  land  divided  as  it  certainly 
should  be  ? 

4th.  That  the  enormous  amount  of  personal 
property  stolen  by  the  Germans  from  Allied 
citizens,  and  now  scattered  all  over  Germany 
can  be  actually  restored  to  the  owners? 

5th.  That  throughout  the  Central  Empires 
machinery  specially  intended  for  the  manu- 
facture of  war  material  would  be  destroyed  ? 

6th.  That  a  long  and  difficult  economic  in- 
vestigation w411  be  undertaken  by  the  Allies 
in  every  part  of  Germany,  to  decide  on  the 
amount  to  be  paid  every  year  as  reparation 
during  a  very  long  period,  for  damage  caused 
by  her  aggression  ? 

7th.  That  courts  of  justice  will  be  instituted 
as  is  most  necessary,  to  try  German  officers 
and  soldiers  who  have  been  guilty  of  i)articu- 
larly  odious  crimes  during  the  war  ? 

8th.  That  the  annuities  due  from  Germany 
will  be  regularly  paid  ? 

No  fair-minded  person  can  deny  that  the 
only  really  satisfactory  way  that  can  be  imag- 


246  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

ined  to  secure  the  enforcement  of  these  eight 
points,  each  one  an  essential  part  of  victory, 
would  consist  in  the  presence  of  Allied  soldiers 
wherever  they  might  be  needed  in  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary. 

All  disposable  Allied  troops  ought  to  be 
advanced  at  once  from  Belgrade  and  Fiume 
toward  the  north  through  Bohemia.  Their 
presence  on  the  soil  of  what  has  been  Austria- 
Hungary  will  give  a  solid  foundation  to  the 
new  states  carved  from  the  fragments  of  the 
Hapsburg  monarchy,  and  will  serve  in  future 
as  a  rampart  against  Germanism. 

Finally,  these  Allied  troops  will  be  in  the 
right  place  to  make  at  the  proper  time  the 
entrance  into  Berlin;  a  satisfaction,  also,  which 
ought  not  to  be  refused  to  those  splendid  sol- 
diers who  have  fought  for  four  years  with  ex- 
traordinary tenacity,  and  through  the  depths  of 
suffering  have  gained  freedom  for  the  world. 

Seventh  Condition. 

To  admit  that  to  enable  the  Germans  to 
repair  the  damage  they  have  caused,  they 
should  not  be  placed  under  a  general  boycott. 

Conditions  of  peace  should  be  logical  and 
coherent,  and  as  it  is  of  supreme  importance 


CONCLUSIONS  247 

that  the  Germans  should  repair  the  injuries 
they  have  caused,  as  far  as  is  humanly  possi- 
ble, they  must  have  the  means  of  payment. 

It  is  plain  to  the  meanest  comprehension 
that  if  we  prevented  the  Germans  from  work- 
ing and  making  money,  they  could  never  pay 
their  debts,  and  this  would  certainly  be  the 
result  obtained  if  we  followed  the  numerous 
plans  published  in  the  Allied  press,  and  put 
them  under  a  general  boycott.  In  my  opinion 
this  conception  should  be  abandoned,  as  di- 
rectly contrary  to  the  interests  of  the  victims 
of  German  aggression.  The  Germans  should  be 
allowed  to  work  and  engage  in  commerce,  but 
owing  to  the  extraordinary  circumstances  aris- 
ing out  of  this  long  war,  it  will  be  necessary 
that  German  commerce  go  on  under  the  control 
of  inter-Allied  commissions.  These  commis- 
sions, however,  must  avoid  vexatious  measures, 
for  the  Boche  debtor  cannot  earn  the  money 
to  pay  what  he  owes  if  he  is  constantly  worried. 

Eighth  Con dit io n . 

To  consider  the  League  of  Nations  from  a 
realistic  and  not  a  Utopian  standpoint. 

The  Utopian  conditions  which  ol)tainc(l  be- 
fore  the   war   in   the   states  now   in   alliance, 


248  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

greatly  facilitated  the  preparations  for  the 
German  aggression;  and  we  ought  carefully  to 
avoid  a  repetition  of  such  fatal  blunders.  It 
is,  therefore,  urgently  necessary  to  form  an 
idea  of  this  much-talked-of  League  of  Nations, 
which  will  conform  to  the  interests  of  peace, 
our  views  on  the  subject  being  still  vague. 

According  to  the  way  you  understand  it,  the 
League  of  Nations  is  either  a  beautiful  concep- 
tion to  be  applied  progressively,  or  a  dangerous 
absurdity;  and  the  distinction  between  these 
two  aspects  of  the  same  idea  is  easy  to  see. 

It  is  not  only  right  but  necessary  to  resolve 
that  after  the  war  the  actual  alliance  between 
the  nations,  which  now  unites  three-quarters 
of  the  people  on  earth,  should  become  a  per- 
manent league,  with  an  essential  object,  to 
prevent  any  future  war.  Logically  this  League 
of  Nations  itself  as  soon  as  peace  is  concluded 
should  undertake  the  following: 

1st.  The  distribution  of  troops  composed  of 
detachments  from  Allied  forces  in  disputed 
regions  of  Europe,  and  also  the  occupation  of 
German  territory  wherever  necessary. 

2d.  To  form  and  decide  on  the  functions  of 
the  inter-Allied  commissions  sent  to  study  on 
the  spot  the  resources  of  Germany,  In  order 
to  fix  the  amount  of  the  indemnity  due  to  the 


CONCLUSIONS  249 

victims  of  her  aggressions,  and  to  insure  its 
payment. 

The  League  of  Nations  should  also  act  in 
the  larger  interests  of  peace,  as  a  kind  of  tri- 
bunal which  would  itself  see  to  the  execution 
of  its  decisions,  and,  thus  understood,  the 
league  could  not  fail  to  receive  the  support  of 
practically  the  whole  world. 

There  are  some  incorrigible  lunatics  who 
propose,  contrary  to  common  sense,  and  to 
the  most  elementary  ideas  of  justice,  to  admit 
Germany  to  the  League  of  Nations  as  soon  as 
peace  is  concluded.  Would  it  not  be  absurd 
to  say  to  the  German  people,  "We  will  treat 
you  as  brothers,"  when  they  will  be  forced  to 
pay  an  indemnity  to  the  Allies  during  a  long 
term  of  years  ? 

There  are  millions  of  Allied  soldiers,  broken- 
hearted women  who  mourn  husbands,  fathers, 
and  fiances,  Slavs  and  Latins  from  central 
Europe,  the  Balkans,  and  Russia,  Greeks,  and 
Armenians,  who  have  all  suffered  in  their  ten- 
derest  affections  to  the  extreme  limits  of 
human  agony  through  the  action  of  German 
people.  Can  we  seriously  ask  of  all  these  to 
say  to  the  Germans  whose  hands  are  still 
stained  with  the  blood  of  their  crimes:  "Peo- 
ple of  Germany,  you  are  our  brothers,  come 


250  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

and  join  with  us  in  the  League  of  Nations"? 
If  a  son  was  bereaved  by  a  crime,  could  one 
say  to  the  orphan:  "Treat  the  murderer  of 
your  father  as  a  brother"  ?  None  but  a  mad- 
man could  have  such  a  conception  of  the 
League  of  Nations.  At  the  present  time  dis- 
cussions as  to  the  league  are  theoretic;  the 
public  generally  does  not  understand  clearly 
what  is  intended,  but  when  it  is  known  that 
the  idea  is  from  this  time  forth  to  treat  the 
Boche  assassins  as  equals  and  brothers,  it  will 
raise  a  furious  storm  of  indignation.  The  up- 
shot will  be  to  discredit  the  plan  for  a  League 
of  Nations,  even  in  its  practical  form,  of  which 
the  effect  would  be  lasting  as  well  as  attrac- 
tive and  desirable. 

Ninth  Condition. 

To  understand  that  the  pacifists  are  as 
dangerous  to  the  establishment  of  a  durable 
peace  as  the  Pangermanists. 

For  a  quarter  of  a  century  the  world  has 
suffered  from  two  great  diseases — Pangerman- 
ism  and  pacifism.  Both  are  follies,  the  second 
at  least  as  dangerous  as  the  first.  At  bottom 
the  Pangerman  plan  was  an  insane  dream, 
which  should  never  have  been  allowed  to  be 


CONCLUSIONS  251 

realized.  Nothing,  in  fact,  was  easier  during 
twenty  years  than  for  the  countries  threatened 
by  this  monstrous  plan  to  render  impossible 
any  attempt  at  its  execution.  That  this  did 
not  happen  was  due  to  a  coincidence,  which 
history  must  explain.  During  this  period  the 
different  countries  of  the  Entente  were  ruled 
by  pacifists,  who  taught  the  mass  of  the  peo- 
ple that  peace  was  assured,  without  consider- 
ing the  striking  signification  of  the  increasing 
armaments  of  Germany  and  the  great  spread 
of  Pangermanist  doctrines.  This  is  the  un- 
answerable reason  why  the  pacifists  of  the 
Entente  are  themselves  primarily  responsible 
for  the  war,  and  they  also  are  the  cause  of  its 
extreme  duration,  with  all  the  misery  resulting 
therefrom. 

It  is  a  fact  that,  instead  of  wishing  to  prose- 
cute the  war  with  determination,  the  pacifists 
who  were  able  to  influence  the  course  of  the 
Entente,  were  constantly  seeking  for  peace, 
where  a  strong  offensive  was  needed,  which 
would  long  ago  have  put  a  stop  to  the  carnage 
by  an  Allied  victory. 

The  pacifist  influence  is  largely  responsible 
for  the  fact  that  during  four  years,  instead  of 
pushing  an  offensive  campaign  against  Bul- 
garia and  Austria-Hungary,  which— as  is  now 


252  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

strikingly  proved — were  the  extreme  weak 
points  of  the  Central  Empires,  we  persistently 
tried  to  negotiate  with  these  countries  separate 
peace  treaties  which  were  impossible  of  attain- 
ment. The  result  was  that  our  whole  military 
force,  from  the  beginning  of  the  war,  has  been 
concentrated  on  the  western  front,  exactly  the 
line  where  the  Germans  were  strongest.  As  a 
consequence,  the  abortive  peace  negotiations 
with  Bulgaria  and  Austria-Hungary,  which 
took  place  in  the  first  years  of  the  war,  have 
cost  millions  of  men  to  the  Allies. 

If  these  things  have  happened  before  and 
during  the  war,  it  is  because  the  pacifist  is  an 
ideologist,  which  implies  an  extraordinary  igno- 
rance of  the  realities,  things  he  does  not  even 
wish  to  understand. 

The  chief  misfortune  is  that  the  public  has 
not  yet  been  enlightened  as  to  the  great  dan- 
ger that  pacifism  represents  for  the  peace  of 
the  world,  and  thus  naturally  public  opinion 
extends  an  undeserved  consideration  toward 
many  pacifists.  As  an  instance  of  this,  Sir 
Edward  Grey  is  almost  unanimously  held  to 
be  an  idealist  who  made  every  imaginable 
effort  before  1914  to  avert  war.  The  truth, 
however,  is  exactly  the  contrary,  not  that  Sir 
Edward  Grey  lacked  good-will,  but  because  he 


CONCLUSIONS  253 

did  not  understand  the  situation;  he  is,  no 
doubt,  an  excellent  trout-fishor,  l)ut  he  is  an 
Englishman  with  very  inconi])lete  ideas  on 
European  questions,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
he  was  at  the  head  of  the  Foreign  Office  for  a 
long  time. 

In  1912-13,  as  we  learn  by  Prince  Lich- 
nowsky's  memoirs.  Sir  Edward  ceded  all  Meso- 
potamia to  Germany  as  a  sphere  of  influence, 
something  which  he  had  no  sort  of  right  to  do, 
and,  though  he  did  not  suspect  it,  this  action 
made  Germany  wish  to  realize  at  once  the  rest 
of  the  Pangerman  plan  in  the  Balkans  and 
central  Europe — a  plan  which  was  entirely  un- 
known to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  It  is  true  that, 
if  you  give  up  20  per  cent  voluntarily  to  a 
German,  he  will  at  once  try  to  take  the  rest 
away  from  you,  but,  in  his  quality  of  inveter- 
ate pacifist,  Sir  Edward  entirely  ignored  Ger- 
man psychology. 

For  this  very  reason  when,  before  declaring 
war,  Germany  asked  if  England  would  take 
part  in  the  struggle.  Sir  Edward  Grey  nuide 
no  answer,  but,  if  he  had  understood  the  Ger- 
mans, he  would  have  replied,  '*Yes,"  and  this 
word,  resolutely  uttered  at  that  moment,  might 
have  moved  Germany  to  give  up  her  aggres- 
sion. 


254  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

Let  me  add  something  still  more  extraordi- 
nary which  is  unknown  to  the  general  public. 
In  September,  1915,  the  Bulgars  were  prepar- 
ing to  invade  Serbia,  when  the  Serbian  repre- 
sentatives in  London  said  to  Sir  Edward  Grey; 
"We  shall  attack  Bulgaria,  before  her  concen- 
tration is  complete,  as  the  only  way  to  pre- 
vent an  invasion  of  our  country."  To  which 
Sir  Edward  replied,  forbidding  absolutely  an 
attack  on  the  Bulgars,  for  he  thought  that 
they  were  mobilizing  to  join  the  Entente. 

This  colossal  mistake  on  the  part  of  Sir 
Edward  Grey  allowed  Serbia  to  be  invaded, 
and  enabled  Germany  to  effect  that  junction 
with  the  east  which  so  greatly  lengthened  the 
war.  It  seems  evident  that  since  his  reply  led 
to  such  consequences,  a  very  heavy  responsi- 
bility for  the  millions  of  deaths  that  resulted 
rests  upon  Sir  Edward  Grey.  When  the  reck- 
oning is  made  after  the  war  it  is  highly  possi- 
ble that  the  pacifists  will  be  found  to  have 
massacred  more  men  than  even  the  Panger- 
mans. 

To  sum  up,  a  pacifist  is  an  ideologist,  en- 
tirely indifferent  to  facts,  which  he  refuses  to 
understand — an  attitude  whicli  gives  a  crimi- 
nal character  to  his  ignorance.  A  pacifist  is 
always  talking  about  peace,  but  he  is  as  inca- 


CONCLUSIONS  255 

pable  of  maintaining  peace  as  he  is  of  making' 
war  with  resolution  and  competence,  so  that 
it  may  be  short,  and  therefore  less  sanguinary. 

A  pacifist,  then,  is  entirely  unable  to  grasp 
the  conditions  necessary  to  a  lasting  j)eace 
with  the  Boches,  who  generally  deceive  him 
like  a  child. 

It  is  in  the  highest  degree  important,  there- 
fore, to  prevent  the  pacifists — as  dangerous 
ideologists — from  exerting  their  influence  on 
the  conclusion  of  peace.  They  would  cer- 
tainly allow  causes  of  war  to  remain,  which 
those  who  have  real  knowledge  of  European 
conditions  would  undoubtedly  suppress. 

Tenth  Condition. 

Not  to  allow  ourselves  to  be  deceived  as  to 
the  character  of  the  Bolshevist  danger. 

Those,  unfortunately  so  few,  ^\llo  are  really 
acquainted  with  the  German  character,  believe 
that  Bolshevism  in  Germany  is  not  of  the 
same  character  as  in  Russia. 

In  fact,  Bolshevism,  which  served  tlie  Ger- 
man Great  General  Staff  as  a  ineaiis  for  de- 
stroying Russia,  is  at  present  a  weapon  very 
w^ell  managed  by  the  Boche  Social  Democrats, 


256  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

which,  if  care  is  not  taken,  will  permit  them  to 
destroy  the  solidarity  of  the  Entente  countries 
during  the  armistice,  and  so  finally  save  Ger- 
many from  real  defeat  under  cover  of  the 
general  confusion. 

To  appreciate  the  whole  extent  of  this  dan- 
ger one  has  only  to  note  the  results  gained 
from  the  Entente  by  the  Bolshevist  blackmail 
from  the  10th  of  November,  1918,  the  date  of 
the  signature  of  the  armistice,  to  the  15th  of 
November  only. 

In  this  very  short  space  of  time  the  Boches 
said,  on  the  12th  of  November:  "We  need 
definitive  peace  as  soon  as  possible.  If  not, 
all  Germany  will  be  the  prey  of  Bolshevism." 
And  the  Allies  visibly  appeared  to  hurry  for- 
ward the  peace  conference. 

Then,  on  the  14th  of  November,  the  Boches, 
men  and  women,  put  in  their  word:  "The 
terms  of  the  armistice  must  be  softened  and 
the  German  people  must  be  fed,  for,  unless  this 
is  done,  Bolshevism,"  etc.,  etc.  And  though 
this  last  demand  has  not  been  accepted  at  the 
moment  when  I  write  these  lines,  it  is  at  least 
being  taken  into  consideration.  But  we  must 
choose.  America  clearly  cannot  feed  every- 
body in  Europe.  It  is  certain  that  the  winter 
of  1918-19  will  be  a  terrible  one.     Therefore, 


CONCLUSIONS  <2.37 

if  the  Germans  are  to  be  fed,  we  condomn  to 
death  milhons  of  Slavs  and  Latins  of  central 
Europe  who  are  Allies  of  the  Entente,  who 
have  strongly  contributed  to  its  victor}-,  who 
are  necessary  to  form  a  powerful  barrier 
against  any  renewed  offensive  of  Pangermun- 
ism,  and  who  for  four  years  have  been  sys- 
tematically reduced  to  famine  by  these  very 
Boches.  Has  there  ever  been  anything  like 
this  in  history  ? 

The  best  course  for  the  Allies  to  pursue  to 
secure  themselves  against  the  Bolshevist  dan- 
ger, which  is  only  too  real,  is  to  act  not  accord- 
ing to  the  advice  of  the  Boches,  but  according 
to  our  own  good  sense.  Let  us  send  the  Allied 
soldiers  into  Austria-Hungary  to  organize  order 
there,  to  secure  the  feeding  first  of  all  of  those 
peoples  who  have  been  our  faithful  allies,  and 
then,  if  there  is  anything  left,  the  Boches 
themselves.  Let  us  try  this  way  and  we  shall 
see  that  the  Bolshevist  peril  will  disappear  in 
regions  where  the  Allies  are  able  to  act  directly. 


Such  are  the  different  conditions  which  the 
Allies  must  realize  if  they  are  really  seeking 
the  end  of  mihtarism  to  the  fullest  extent 
possible. 


258  AN  ENDURING  VICTORY 

As  the  German  propaganda,  aided  by  all 
those  in  the  Entente  nations  who  are  working 
to  save  Germany  by  leading  us  into  incomplete 
and  hastily  made  decisions,  threatens  during 
the  period  of  the  armistice  to  seriously  com- 
promise the  victory  of  the  xAllies,  it  is  particu- 
larly necessary,  in  order  to  neutralize  this  dan- 
gerous effort,  that  American  public  opinion 
shall  declare  itself  clearly,  without  delay  and 
with  the  greatest  emphasis,  for  the  following 
measures : 

1.  The  presence  of  Allied  soldiers  in  central 
Europe  during  the  reorganization. 

2.  The  rejection  of  every  form  of  generosity 
in  material  matters  which  can  only  be  shown 
to  the  Germans  at  the  expense  of  the  Allies. 

3.  Reparation  by  the  German  people,  strictly 
held  responsible  for  all  the  damage  which  they 
have  caused — and  this  to  the  greatest  extent 
possible. 

4.  A  suflBciently  exhaustive  examination  by 
the  Peace  Conference  of  the  immense  prob- 
lems which  it  has  to  solve. 

The  carrj'ing  out  of  this  programme  of 
action  only  recjuires  from  public  opinion  about 
six  months  of  effort,  clear  vision,  and  persis- 
tence; but  it  is  such  that  it  will  avoid  the 
very  great  dangers  of  the  armistice  period  and 


CONCLUSIONS  2o!) 

will  secure  to  the  Allies  real,  complete,  and 
permanent  victory.  In  my  opinion,  this  exer- 
tion of  vigilance  is  absolutely  necessary  in 
order  that  history  may  say  with  certainty: 
America  saved  Europe. 


This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below 


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